Chapter XV.--Ecphantus; His Scepticism; Tenet of Infinity.
One Ecphantus, a native of Syracuse, affirmed that it is not possible to attain a true knowledge of things. He defines, however, as he thinks, primary bodies to be indivisible, 1 and that there are three variations of these, viz., bulk, figure, capacity, from which are generated the objects of sense. But that there is a determinable multitude of these, and that this is infinite. 2 And that bodies are moved neither by weight nor by impact, but by divine power, which he calls mind and soul; and that of this the world is a representation; wherefore also it has been made in the form of a sphere by divine power. 3 And that the earth in the middle of the cosmical system is moved round its own centre towards the east. 4
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Some confusion has crept into the text. The first clause of the second sentence belongs probably to the first. The sense would then run thus: "Ecphantus affirmed the impossibility of dogmatic truth, for that every one was permitted to frame definitions as he thought proper." ↩
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Or, "that there is, according to this, a multitude of defined existences, and that such is infinite." ↩
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Or, "a single power." ↩
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[So far anticipating modern science.] ↩
