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Against Hermogenes

Chapter XXXVII.--Ironical Dilemmas Respecting Matter, and Sundry Moral Qualities Fancifully Attributed to It.

I see now that you are coming back again to that reason, which has been in the habit of declaring to you nothing in the way of certainty. For just as you introduce to our notice Matter as being neither corporeal nor incorporeal, so you allege of it that it is neither good nor evil; and you say, whilst arguing further on it in the same strain: "If it were good, seeing that it had ever been so, it would not require the arrangement of itself by God; ¹ if it were naturally evil, it would not have admitted of a change ² for the better, nor would God have ever applied to such a nature any attempt at arrangement of it, for His labour would have been in vain." Such are your words, which it would have been well if you had remembered in other passages also, so as to have avoided any contradiction of them. As, however, we have already treated to some extent of this ambiguity of good and evil touching Matter, I will now reply to the only proposition and argument of yours which we have before us. I shall not stop to repeat my opinion, that it was your bounden duty to have said for certain that Matter was either good or bad, or in some third condition; but (I must observe) that you have not here even kept to the statement which you chose to make before. Indeed, you retract what you declared--that Matter is neither good nor evil; because you imply that it is evil when you say, "If it were good, it would not require to be set in order by God;" so again, when you add, "If it were naturally evil, it would not admit of any change for the better," you seem to intimate ³ that it is good. And so you attribute to it a close relation ⁴ to good and evil, although you declared it neither good nor evil. With a view, however, to refute the argument whereby you thought you were going to clinch your proposition, I here contend: If Matter had always been good, why should it not have still wanted a change for the better? Does that which is good never desire, never wish, never feel able to advance, so as to change its good for a better? And in like manner, if Matter had been by nature evil, why might it not have been changed by God as the more powerful Being, as able to convert the nature of stones into children of Abraham? ⁵ Surely by such means you not only compare the Lord with Matter, but you even put Him below ⁶ it, since you affirm that ⁷ the nature of Matter could not possibly be brought under control by Him, and trained to something better. But although you are here disinclined to allow that Matter is by nature evil, yet in another passage you will deny having made such an admission. ⁸

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Adversus Hermogenem

XXXVII.

[1] Nunc enim uideo te ad illam rursus rationem reuerti quae tibi nihil certi renuntiare consueuit. Nam sicut nec corporalem nec incorporalem infers materiam, ita nec bonam nec malam adlegas [s]et proinde superargumentas 'Si enim', inquis, 'esset bona, quae semper hoc fuerat, non desideraret compositionem dei; si esset natura mala, non accepisset translationem in melius nec quicquam compositionis suae adplicuisset illi deus tali natura; in uacuum enim laborasset.' [2] Verba haec tua sunt quorum te et alibi meminisse oportuerat, ne quid his contrarium inferres. Sed quoniam de mali et boni ambiguitate super materiam in praeteritis aliquid retractauimus, nunc ad praesentem et solam propositionem et argumentationem tuam respondebo. Nec dicam et hic te certum aliquid debuisse pronuntiasse, aut bona aut mala aut tertium aliquid, sed nec hic quod tibi libuit pronuntiasse custodisse. [3] Rescindis enim quod pronuntiasti nec bonam nec malam, quia, cum dicis: 'Si esset bona, non desideraret componi a deo,' mala portendis et cum adponis: 'Si esse[n]t mala natura, non admitteret in melius translationem,' bonam subostendis. Atque ita et boni et mali adfinem constituisti [ei] quam nec bonam nec malam pronuntiasti. [4] Vt autem et argumentationem qua putasti te propositionem tuam confirmaturum retundam, oppono etiam illud: 'Si bona fuisset materia semper, quare non desiderasset in melius reformari? Quod bonum, non desiderat aut non optat aut non capit profectum, ut fiat de bono melius? Aeque si mala natura fuisset, quare non potuerit a deo conuerti ut a potentiore, ut ab eo qui lapidum quoque naturam conuertere ualeat in filios Abrahae?' [5] Nempe ergo non tantum comparas dominum materiae, sed et subicis, a quo natura[m] materiae deuinci et edomari melius potuisset. Sed et quam hic non uis natura[m] malam, alibi te confessum negabis.