Übersetzung ausblenden
La cité de dieu

CHAPITRE II.

COMMENT VARRON RÉDUIT TOUTES CES SECTES A TROIS, PARMI LESQUELLES IL FAUT CHOISIR LA BONNE.

De même, lorsqu’on demande si l’on doit embrasser la vie active ou la vie contemplative, ou celle qui est mêlée des deux, il ne s’agit pas du souverain bien, mais du genre de vie le plus propre à l’acquérir ou à le conserver. Du moment, en effet, que l’homme est supposé parvenu au souverain bien, il est heureux ; au lieu que la paix de l’étude, ou l’agitation des affaires publiques, ou le mélange de cette agitation et de cette paix, ne donnent pas immédiatement le bonheur. Car plusieurs peuvent adopter l’un de ces trois genres de vie et se tromper sur la nature du souverain bien. Ce sont donc des questions entièrement différentes que celle du souverain bien, qui constitue chaque secte de philosophes, et celles de la vie civile, de l’incertitude des académiciens, du genre de vie et du vêtement des cyniques, enfin des trois sortes de vie, l’active, la contemplative et le mélange de l’une et de l’autre. C’est pourquoi Varron, rejetant ces quatre différences qui faisaient monter les sectes presque au nombre de deux cent quatre-vingt-huit, revient aux douze, où il s’agit uniquement de savoir quel est le souverain bien de l’homme, afin d’établir qu’une seule, parmi elles, contient la vérité, tout le reste étant dans l’erreur. Ecartez en effet les trois genres de vie, les deux tiers du nombre total sont retranchés, et il reste quatre-vingt-seize sectes. Otez la différence qui se tire des cyniques, elles se réduisent à la moitié, à quarante-huit. Otez encore la différence relative à la nouvelle Académie, elles diminuent encore de moitié, et tombent à vingt-quatre. Otez enfin la différence de la vie solitaire ou sociale, il ne restera plus que douze sectes, nombre que cette différence doublait et portait à vingt-quatre. Quant à ces douze sectes, on ne peut leur contester leur qualité, puisqu’elles ne se proposent d’autre recherche que celle du souverain bien. Or, pour former ces douze sectes, il faut tripler quatre choses : la volupté, le repos, le repos et la volupté, et les premiers biens de la nature, attendu que chacune d’elles est soumise, préférée ou associée à la vertu, ce qui donne bien douze pour nombre total. Maintenant, de ces quatre choses, Varron en ôte trois, la volupté, le repos, le repos joint à la volupté, non qu’il les improuve, mais parce qu’elles sont comprises dans les premiers biens de la nature. De sorte qu’il n’y a plus que trois sectes à examiner; car ici, comme en toute autre matière, il ne peut y en avoir plus d’une qui soit véritable, et ces trois sectes consistent en ce que l’on y recherche soit les premiers biens de la nature pour la vertu, soit la vertu pour les premiers biens de la nature, soit chacune de ces deux choses pour elle-même.

Übersetzung ausblenden
The City of God

Chapter 2.--How Varro, by Removing All the Differences Which Do Not Form Sects, But are Merely Secondary Questions, Reaches Three Definitions of the Chief Good, of Which We Must Choose One.

The same may be said of those three kinds of life, the life of studious leisure and search after truth, the life of easy engagement in affairs, and the life in which both these are mingled. When it is asked, which of these should be adopted, this involves no controversy about the end of good, but inquires which of these three puts a man in the best position for finding and retaining the supreme good. For this good, as soon as a man finds it, makes him happy; but lettered leisure, or public business, or the alternation of these, do not necessarily constitute happiness. Many, in fact, find it possible to adopt one or other of these modes of life, and yet to miss what makes a man happy. The question, therefore, regarding the supreme good and the supreme evil, and which distinguishes sects of philosophy, is one; and these questions concerning the social life, the doubt of the Academy, the dress and food of the Cynics, the three modes of life--the active, the contemplative, and the mixed--these are different questions, into none of which the question of the chief good enters. And therefore, as Marcus Varro multiplied the sects to the number of 288 (or whatever larger number he chose) by introducing these four differences derived from the social life, the New Academy, the Cynics, and the threefold form of life, so, by removing these differences as having no bearing on the supreme good, and as therefore not constituting what can properly be called sects, he returns to those twelve schools which concern themselves with inquiring what that good is which makes man happy, and he shows that one of these is true, the rest false. In other words, he dismisses the distinction founded on the threefold mode of life, and so decreases the whole number by two-thirds, reducing the sects to ninety-six. Then, putting aside the Cynic peculiarities, the number decreases by a half, to forty-eight. Taking away next the distinction occasioned by the hesitancy of the New Academy, the number is again halved, and reduced to twenty-four. Treating in a similar way the diversity introduced by the consideration of the social life, there are left but twelve, which this difference had doubled to twenty-four. Regarding these twelve, no reason can be assigned why they should not be called sects. For in them the sole inquiry is regarding the supreme good and the ultimate evil,--that is to say, regarding the supreme good, for this being found, the opposite evil is thereby found. Now, to make these twelve sects, he multiplies by three these four things--pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined, and the primary objects of nature which Varro calls primigenia. For as these four things are sometimes subordinated to virtue, so that they seem to be desired not for their own sake, but for virtue's sake; sometimes preferred to it, so that virtue seems to be necessary not on its own account, but in order to attain these things; sometimes joined with it, so that both they and virtue are desired for their own sakes,--we must multiply the four by three, and thus we get twelve sects. But from those four things Varro eliminates three--pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined--not because he thinks these are not worthy of the place assigned them, but because they are included in the primary objects of nature. And what need is there, at any rate, to make a threefold division out of these two ends, pleasure and repose, taking them first severally and then conjunctly, since both they, and many other things besides, are comprehended in the primary objects of nature? Which of the three remaining sects must be chosen? This is the question that Varro dwells upon. For whether one of these three or some other be chosen, reason forbids that more than one be true. This we shall afterwards see; but meanwhile let us explain as briefly and distinctly as we can how Varro makes his selection from these three, that is, from the sects which severally hold that the primary objects of nature are to be desired for virtue's sake, that virtue is to be desired for their sake, and that virtue and these objects are to be desired each for their own sake.