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The City of God

Chapter 31.--Against the Arguments on Which the Platonists Ground Their Assertion that the Human Soul is Co-Eternal with God.

Why, then, do we not rather believe the divinity in those matters, which human talent cannot fathom? Why do we not credit the assertion of divinity, that the soul is not co-eternal with God, but is created, and once was not? For the Platonists seemed to themselves to allege an adequate reason for their rejection of this doctrine, when they affirmed that nothing could be everlasting which had not always existed. Plato, however, in writing concerning the world and the gods in it, whom the Supreme made, most expressly states that they had a beginning and yet would have no end, but, by the sovereign will of the Creator, would endure eternally. But, by way of interpreting this, the Platonists have discovered that he meant a beginning, not of time, but of cause. "For as if a foot," they say, "had been always from eternity in dust, there would always have been a print underneath it; and yet no one would doubt that this print was made by the pressure of the foot, nor that, though the one was made by the other, neither was prior to the other; so," they say, "the world and the gods created in it have always been, their Creator always existing, and yet they were made." If, then, the soul has always existed, are we to say that its wretchedness has always existed? For if there is something in it which was not from eternity, but began in time, why is it impossible that the soul itself, though not previously existing, should begin to be in time? Its blessedness, too, which, as he owns, is to be more stable, and indeed endless, after the soul's experience of evils,--this undoubtedly has a beginning in time, and yet is to be always, though previously it had no existence. This whole argumentation, therefore, to establish that nothing can be endless except that which has had no beginning, falls to the ground. For here we find the blessedness of the soul, which has a beginning, and yet has no end. And, therefore, let the incapacity of man give place to the authority of God; and let us take our belief regarding the true religion from the ever-blessed spirits, who do not seek for themselves that honor which they know to be due to their God and ours, and who do not command us to sacrifice save only to Him, whose sacrifice, as I have often said already, and must often say again, we and they ought together to be, offered through that Priest who offered Himself to death a sacrifice for us, in that human nature which He assumed, and according to which He desired to be our Priest.

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De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput XXXI: Contra argumentum Platonicorum, quo animam humanam deo adserunt esse coaeternam.

Cur ergo non potius diuinitati credimus de his rebus, quas humano ingenio peruestigare non possumus, quae animam quoque ipsam non deo coaeternam, sed creatam dicit esse, quae non erat? ut enim hoc Platonici nollent credere, hanc utique causam idoneam sibi uidebantur adferre, quia, nisi quod semper antea fuisset, sempiternum deinceps esse non posset; quamquam et de mundo et de his, quos in mundo deos a deo factos scribit Plato, apertissime dicat eos esse coepisse et habere initium, finem tamen non habituros, sed per conditoris potentissimam uoluntatem in aeternum mansuros esse perhibeat. uerum id quomodo intellegant inuenerunt, non esse hoc uidelicet temporis, sed substitutionis initium. sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in puluere, semper ei subesset uestigium, quod tamen uestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret, nec alterum altero prius esset, quamuis alterum ab altero factum esset: sic, inquiunt, et mundus atque in illo di creati et semper fuerunt semper existente qui fecit, et tamen facti sunt. numquid ergo, si anima semper fuit, etiam miseria eius semper fuisse dicenda est? porro si aliquid in illa, quod ex aeterno non fuit, esse coepit ex tempore, cur non fieri potuerit, ut ipsa esset ex tempore quae antea non fuisset? deinde beatitudo quoque eius post experimentum malorum firmior et sine fine mansura, sicut iste confitetur, procul dubio coepit ex tempore, et tamen semper erit, cum antea non fuerit. illa igitur omnis argumentatio dissoluta est, qua putatur nihil esse posse sine fine temporis, nisi quod initium non habet temporis. inuenta est enim animae beatitudo, quae cum initium temporis habuerit, finem temporis non habebit. quapropter diuinae auctoritati humana cedat infirmitas, eisque beatis et inmortalibus de uera religione credamus, qui sibi honorem non expetunt, quem deo suo, qui etiam noster est, deberi sciunt, nec iubent, ut sacrificium faciamus, nisi ei tantum, cuius et nos cum illis, ut saepe dixi et saepe dicendum est, sacrificium esse debemus, per eum sacerdotem offerendi, qui in homine, quem suscepit, secundum quem et sacerdos esse uoluit, etiam usque ad mortem sacrificium pro nobis dignatus est fieri.