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The City of God

Chapter 1.--That the Nature of the Angels, Both Good and Bad, is One and the Same.

It has already, in the preceding book, been shown how the two cities originated among the angels. Before I speak of the creation of man, and show how the cities took their rise so far as regards the race of rational mortals I see that I must first, so far as I can, adduce what may demonstrate that it is not incongruous and unsuitable to speak of a society composed of angels and men together; so that there are not four cities or societies,--two, namely, of angels, and as many of men,--but rather two in all, one composed of the good, the other of the wicked, angels or men indifferently.

That the contrary propensities in good and bad angels have arisen, not from a difference in their nature and origin, since God, the good Author and Creator of all essences, created them both, but from a difference in their wills and desires, it is impossible to doubt. While some steadfastly continued in that which was the common good of all, namely, in God Himself, and in His eternity, truth, and love; others, being enamored rather of their own power, as if they could be their own good, lapsed to this private good of their own, from that higher and beatific good which was common to all, and, bartering the lofty dignity of eternity for the inflation of pride, the most assured verity for the slyness of vanity, uniting love for factious partisanship, they became proud, deceived, envious. The cause, therefore, of the blessedness of the good is adherence to God. And so the cause of the others' misery will be found in the contrary, that is, in their not adhering to God. Wherefore, if when the question is asked, why are the former blessed, it is rightly answered, because they adhere to God; and when it is asked, why are the latter miserable, it is rightly answered, because they do not adhere to God,--then there is no other good for the rational or intellectual creature save God only. Thus, though it is not every creature that can be blessed (for beasts, trees, stones, and things of that kind have not this capacity), yet that creature which has the capacity cannot be blessed of itself, since it is created out of nothing, but only by Him by whom it has been created. For it is blessed by the possession of that whose loss makes it miserable. He, then, who is blessed not in another, but in himself, cannot be miserable, because he cannot lose himself.

Accordingly we say that there is no unchangeable good but the one, true, blessed God; that the things which He made are indeed good because from Him, yet mutable because made not out of Him, but out of nothing. Although, therefore, they are not the supreme good, for God is a greater good, yet those mutable things which can adhere to the immutable good, and so be blessed, are very good; for so completely is He their good, that without Him they cannot but be wretched. And the other created things in the universe are not better on this account, that they cannot be miserable. For no one would say that the other members of the body are superior to the eyes, because they cannot be blind. But as the sentient nature, even when it feels pain, is superior to the stony, which can feel none, so the rational nature, even when wretched, is more excellent than that which lacks reason or feeling, and can therefore experience no misery. And since this is so, then in this nature which has been created so excellent, that though it be mutable itself, it can yet secure its blessedness by adhering to the immutable good, the supreme God; and since it is not satisfied unless it be perfectly blessed, and cannot be thus blessed save in God,--in this nature, I say, not to adhere to God, is manifestly a fault. ¹ Now every fault injures the nature, and is consequently contrary to the nature. The creature, therefore, which cleaves to God, differs from those who do not, not by nature, but by fault; and yet by this very fault the nature itself is proved to be very noble and admirable. For that nature is certainly praised, the fault of which is justly blamed. For we justly blame the fault because it mars the praiseworthy nature. As, then, when we say that blindness is a defect of the eyes, we prove that sight belongs to the nature of the eyes; and when we say that deafness is a defect of the ears, hearing is thereby proved to belong to their nature;--so, when we say that it is a fault of the angelic creature that it does not cleave to God, we hereby most plainly declare that it pertained to its nature to cleave to God. And who can worthily conceive or express how great a glory that is, to cleave to God, so as to live to Him, to draw wisdom from Him, to delight in Him, and to enjoy this so great good, without death, error, or grief? And thus, since every vice is an injury of the nature, that very vice of the wicked angels, their departure from God, is sufficient proof that God created their nature so good, that it is an injury to it not to be with God.

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De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput I: De una bonorum angelorum malorumque natura.

Antequam de institutione hominis dicam, ubi duarum ciuitatum, quantum ad rationalium mortalium genus adtinet, apparebit exortus, sicut superiore libro apparuisse in angelis iam uidetur: prius mihi quaedam de ipsis angelis uideo esse dicenda, quibus demonstretur, quantum a nobis potest, quam non inconueniens neque incongrua dicatur esse hominibus angelisque societas, ut non quattuor - duae scilicet angelorum totidemque hominum - , sed duae potius ciuitates, hoc est societates, merito esse dicantur, una in bonis, altera in malis non solum angelis, uerum etiam hominibus constitutae. angelorum bonorum et malorum inter se contrarios adpetitus non naturis principiisque diuersis, cum deus omnium substantiarum bonus auctor et conditor utrosque creauerit, sed uoluntatibus et cupiditatibus extitisse dubitare fas non est, dum alii constanter in communi omnibus bono, quod ipse illis deus est, atque in eius aeternitate ueritate caritate persistunt; alii sua potestate potius delectati, uelut bonum suum sibi ipsi essent, a superiore communi omnium beatifico bono ad propria defluxerunt et habentes elationis fastum pro excelsissima aeternitate, uanitatis astutiam pro certissima ueritate, studia partium pro indiuidua caritate superbi fallaces inuidi effecti sunt. beatitudinis igitur illorum causa est adhaerere deo; quocirca istorum miseriae causa ex contrario est intellegenda, quod est non adhaerere deo. quamobrem si cum quaeritur, quare illi beati sint, recte respondetur: quia deo adhaerent; et cum quaeritur, cur isti sint miseri, recte respondetur: quia non adhaerent deo: non est creaturae rationalis uel intellectualis bonum, quo beata sit, nisi deus. ita quamuis non omnis beata possit esse creatura - neque enim hoc munus adipiscuntur aut capiunt ferae ligna saxa et si quid huiusmodi est - , ea tamen, quae potest, non ex se ipsa potest, quia ex nihilo creata est, sed ex illo, a quo creata est. hoc enim adepto beata, quo amisso misera est. ille uero qui non alio, sed se ipso bono beatus est, ideo miser non potest esse, quia non se potest amittere. dicimus itaque incommutabile bonum non esse nisi unum uerum beatum deum; ea uero, quae fecit, bona quidem esse, quod ab illo, uerumtamen mutabilia, quod non de illo, sed de nihilo facta sunt. quamquam ergo summa non sint, quibus est deus maius bonum: magna sunt tamen ea mutabilia bona, quae adhaerere possunt, ut beata sint, inmutabili bono, quod usque adeo bonum eorum est, ut sine illo misera esse necesse sit. nec ideo cetera in hac creaturae uniuersitate meliora sunt, quia misera esse non possunt; neque enim cetera membra corporis nostri ideo dicendum est oculis esse meliora, quia caeca esse non possunt. sicut autem melior est natura sentiens et cum dolet quam lapis qui dolere nullo modo potest, ita rationalis natura praestantior etiam misera, quam illa quae rationis uel sensus est expers, et ideo in eam non cadit miseria. quod cum ita sit, huic naturae, quae in tanta excellentia creata est, ut, licet sit ipsa mutabilis, inhaerendo tamen incommutabili bono, id est summo deo, beatitudinem consequatur, nec expleat indigentiam suam nisi utique beata sit eique explendae non sufficiat nisi deus, profecto non illi adhaerere uitium est. omne autem uitium naturae nocet ac per hoc contra naturam est. ab illa igitur, quae adhaeret deo, non natura differt ista, sed uitio; quo tamen etiam uitio ualde magna multumque laudabilis ostenditur ipsa natura. cuius enim recte uituperatur uitium, procul dubio natura laudatur. nam recta uitii uituperatio est, quod illo dehonestatur natura laudabilis. sicut ergo cum uitium oculorum dicitur caecitas, id ostenditur, quod ad naturam oculorum pertinet uisus; et cum uitium aurium dicitur surditas, ad earum naturam pertinere demonstratur auditus: ita, cum uitium creaturae angelicae dicitur, quo non adhaeret deo, hinc apertissime declaratur, eius naturae ut deo adhaereat conuenire. quam porro magna sit laus adhaerere deo, ut ei uiuat, inde sapiat, illo gaudeat tantoque bono sine morte sine errore sine molestia perfruatur, quis digne cogitare possit aut eloqui? quapropter etiam uitio malorum angelorum, quo non adhaerent deo, quoniam omne uitium naturae nocet, satis manifestatur deum tam bonam eorum creasse naturam, cui noxium sit non esse cum deo.