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The City of God

Chapter 6.--What the Cause of the Blessedness of the Good Angels Is, and What the Cause of the Misery of the Wicked.

Thus the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found to be this, that they cleave to Him who supremely is. And if we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and not unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such essence. And this vice, what else is it called than pride? For "pride is the beginning of sin." ¹ They were unwilling, then, to preserve their strength for God; and as adherence to God was the condition of their enjoying an ampler being, they diminished it by preferring themselves to Him. This was the first defect, and the first impoverishment, and the first flaw of their nature, which was created, not indeed supremely existent, but finding its blessedness in the enjoyment of the Supreme Being; whilst by abandoning Him it should become, not indeed no nature at all, but a nature with a less ample existence, and therefore wretched.

If the further question be asked, What was the efficient cause of their evil will? there is none. For what is it which makes the will bad, when it is the will itself which makes the action bad? And consequently the bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing is the efficient cause of the bad will. For if anything is the cause, this thing either has or has not a will. If it has, the will is either good or bad. If good, who is so left to himself as to say that a good will makes a will bad? For in this case a good will would be the cause of sin; a most absurd supposition. On the other hand, if this hypothetical thing has a bad will, I wish to know what made it so; and that we may not go on forever, I ask at once, what made the first evil will bad? For that is not the first which was itself corrupted by an evil will, but that is the first which was made evil by no other will. For if it were preceded by that which made it evil, that will was first which made the other evil. But if it is replied, "Nothing made it evil; it always was evil," I ask if it has been existing in some nature. For if not, then it did not exist at all; and if it did exist in some nature, then it vitiated and corrupted it, and injured it, and consequently deprived it of good. And therefore the evil will could not exist in an evil nature, but in a nature at once good and mutable, which this vice could injure. For if it did no injury, it was no vice; and consequently the will in which it was, could not be called evil. But if it did injury, it did it by taking away or diminishing good. And therefore there could not be from eternity, as was suggested, an evil will in that thing in which there had been previously a natural good, which the evil will was able to diminish by corrupting it. If, then, it was not from eternity, who, I ask, made it? The only thing that can be suggested in reply is, that something which itself had no will, made the will evil. I ask, then, whether this thing was superior, inferior, or equal to it? If superior, then it is better. How, then, has it no will, and not rather a good will? The same reasoning applies if it was equal; for so long as two things have equally a good will, the one cannot produce in the other an evil will. Then remains the supposition that that which corrupted the will of the angelic nature which first sinned, was itself an inferior thing without a will. But that thing, be it of the lowest and most earthly kind, is certainly itself good, since it is a nature and being, with a form and rank of its own in its own kind and order. How, then, can a good thing be the efficient cause of an evil will? How, I say, can good be the cause of evil? For when the will abandons what is above itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil--not because that is evil to which it turns, but because the turning itself is wicked. Therefore it is not an inferior thing which has made the will evil, but it is itself which has become so by wickedly and inordinately desiring an inferior thing. For if two men, alike in physical and moral constitution, see the same corporal beauty, and one of them is excited by the sight to desire an illicit enjoyment while the other steadfastly maintains a modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose brings it about, that there is an evil will in the one and not in the other? What produces it in the man in whom it exists? Not the bodily beauty, for that was presented equally to the gaze of both, and yet did not produce in both an evil will. Did the flesh of the one cause the desire as he looked? But why did not the flesh of the other? Or was it the disposition? But why not the disposition of both? For we are supposing that both were of a like temperament of body and soul. Must we, then, say that the one was tempted by a secret suggestion of the evil spirit? As if it was not by his own will that he consented to this suggestion and to any inducement whatever! This consent, then, this evil will which he presented to the evil suasive influence,--what was the cause of it, we ask? For, not to delay on such a difficulty as this, if both are tempted equally and one yields and consents to the temptation while the other remains unmoved by it, what other account can we give of the matter than this, that the one is willing, the other unwilling, to fall away from chastity? And what causes this but their own wills, in cases at least such as we are supposing, where the temperament is identical? The same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both; the same secret temptation pressed on both with equal violence. However minutely we examine the case, therefore, we can discern nothing which caused the will of the one to be evil. For if we say that the man himself made his will evil, what was the man himself before his will was evil but a good nature created by God, the unchangeable good? Here are two men who, before the temptation, were alike in body and soul, and of whom one yielded to the tempter who persuaded him, while the other could not be persuaded to desire that lovely body which was equally before the eyes of both. Shall we say of the successfully tempted man that he corrupted his own will, since he was certainly good before his will became bad? Then, why did he do so? Was it because his will was a nature, or because it was made of nothing? We shall find that the latter is the case. For if a nature is the cause of an evil will, what else can we say than that evil arises from good or that good is the cause of evil? And how can it come to pass that a nature, good though mutable, should produce any evil--that is to say, should make the will itself wicked?

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De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput VI: Quae causa sit beatitudinis angelorum bonorum et quae causa sit miseriae angelorum malorum.

Proinde causa beatitudinis angelorum bonorum ea uerissima reperitur, quod ei adhaerent qui summe est. cum uero causa miseriae malorum angelorum quaeritur, ea merito occurrit, quod ab illo, qui summe est, auersi ad se ipsos conuersi sunt, qui non summe sunt; et hoc uitium quid aliud quam superbia nuncupetur? initium quippe omnis peccati superbia. noluerunt ergo ad illum custodire fortitudinem suam, et qui magis essent, si ei qui summe est adhaererent, se illi praeferendo id quod minus est praetulerunt. hic primus defectus et prima inopia primumque uitium eius naturae, quae ita creata est, ut nec summe esset, et tamen ad beatitudinem habendam eo, qui summe est, frui posset, a quo auersa non quidem nulla, sed tamen minus esset atque ob hoc misera fieret. huius porro malae uoluntatis causa efficiens si quaeratur, nihil inuenitur. quid est enim quod facit uoluntatem malam, cum ipsa faciat opus malum? ac per hoc mala uoluntas efficiens est operis mali, malae autem uoluntatis efficiens nihil est. quoniam si res aliqua est, aut habet aut non habet aliquam uoluntatem; si habet, aut bonam profecto habet aut malam; si bonam, quis ita desipiat, ut dicat quod bona uoluntas faciat uoluntatem malam? erit enim, si ita est, bona uoluntas causa peccati, quo absurdius putari nihil potest. si autem res ista, quae putatur facere uoluntatem malam, ipsa quoque habet uoluntatem malam, etiam eam quae fecerit res consequenter interrogo, atque ita, ut sit aliquis inquirendi modus, causam primae malae uoluntatis inquiro. non est enim prima uoluntas mala, quam fecit uoluntas mala; sed illa prima est, quam nulla fecit. nam si praecessit a qua fieret, illa prior est, quae alteram fecit. si respondetur quod eam nulla res fecerit et ideo semper fuerit: quaero utrum in aliqua natura fuerit. si enim in nulla fuit, omnino non fuit; si autem in aliqua, uitiabat eam et corrumpebat eratque illi noxia ac per hoc bono priuabat. et ideo in mala natura uoluntas mala esse non poterat, sed in bona, mutabili tamen, cui uitium hoc posset nocere. si enim non nocuit, non utique uitium fuit, ac per hoc nec mala uoluntas fuisse dicenda est. porro si nocuit, bonum auferendo uel minuendo utique nocuit. non igitur esse potuit sempiterna uoluntas mala in ea re, in qua bonum naturale praecesserat, quod mala uoluntas nocendo posset adimere. si ergo non erat sempiterna, quis eam fecerit quaero. restat ut dicatur, quod ea res fecerit malam uoluntatem, in qua nulla uoluntas fuit. haec utrum superior sit, requiro, an inferior, an aequalis. sed superior utique melior; quomodo ergo nullius, ac non potius bonae uoluntatis? hoc idem profecto et aequalis. duo quippe quamdiu sunt pariter uoluntatis bonae, non facit alter in altero uoluntatem malam. relinquitur ut inferior res, cui nulla uoluntas est, fecerit angelicae naturae, quae prima peccauit, uoluntatem malam. sed etiam res ipsa quaecumque est inferior usque ad infimam terram, quoniam natura et essentia est, procul dubio bona est, habens modum et speciem suam in genere atque ordine suo. quomodo ergo res bona efficiens est uoluntatis malae? quomodo, inquam, bonum est causa mali? cum enim se uoluntas relicto superiore ad inferiora conuertit, efficitur mala, non quia malum est, quo se conuertit, sed quia peruersa est ipsa conuersio. idcirco non res inferior uoluntatem malam fecit, sed rem inferiorem praue atque inordinate, ipsa quia facta est, adpetiuit. si enim aliqui duo aequaliter affecti animo et corpore uideant unius corporis pulchritudinem, qua uisa unus eorum ad inlicite fruendum moueatur, alter in uoluntate pudica stabilis perseueret, quid putamus esse causae, ut in illo fiat, in illo non fiat uoluntas mala? quae illam res fecit in quo facta est? neque enim pulchritudo illa corporis; nam eam non fecit in ambobus, quandoquidem amborum non dispariliter occurrit aspectibus. an caro intuentis in causa est? cur non et illius? an uero animus? cur non utriusque? ambos enim et animo et corpore aequaliter affectos fuisse praediximus. an dicendum est alterum eorum occulta maligni spiritus suggestione tentatum, quasi non eidem suggestioni et qualicumque suasioni propria uoluntate consenserit? hanc igitur consensionem, hanc malam quam male suadenti adhibuit uoluntatem, quae in eo res fecerit, quaerimus. nam ut hoc quoque impedimentum ab ista quaestione tollatur, si eadem tentatione ambo tententur, et unus ei cedat atque consentiat, alter idem qui fuerat perseueret: quid aliud apparet, nisi unum noluisse, alterum uoluisse a castitate deficere? unde nisi propria uoluntate, ubi eadem fuerat in utroque corporis et animi affectio? amborum oculis pariter uisa est eadem pulchritudo, ambobus pariter institit occulta tentatio; propriam igitur in uno eorum uoluntatem malam res quae fecerit scire uolentibus, si bene intueantur, nihil occurrit. si enim dixerimus quod ipse eam fecerit, quid erat ipse ante uoluntatem malam nisi natura bona, cuius auctor deus, qui est inmutabile bonum? qui ergo dicit eum, qui consensit tentanti atque suadenti, cui non consensit alius, ad inlicite utendum pulchro corpore, quod uidendum ambobus pariter adfuit, cum ante illam uisionem ac tentationem similes ambo animo et corpore fuerint, ipsum sibi fecisse uoluntatem malam, qui utique bonus ante uoluntatem malam fuerit: quaerat cur eam fecerit, utrum quia natura est, an quia ex nihilo facta est, et inueniet uoluntatem malam non ex eo esse incipere quod natura est, sed ex eo quod de nihilo facta natura est. nam si natura causa est uoluntatis malae, quid aliud cogimur dicere, nisi a bono fieri malum et bonum esse causam mali, siquidem a natura bona fit uoluntas mala? quod unde fieri potest, ut natura bona, quamuis mutabilis, antequam habeat uoluntatem malam, faciat aliquid mali, hoc est ipsam uoluntatem malam?