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De Trinitate

X.

[X 15] Recte ergo quaeritur utrum omnis notitia verbum an tantum amata notitia. Novimus enim et ea quae odimus, sed nec concepta nec parta dicenda sunt animo quae nobis displicent. Non enim omnia quae quoquo modo tangunt concipiuntur, ut tantum nota sint non tamen verba dicantur ista de quibus nunc agimus. Aliter enim dicuntur verba quae spatia temporum syllabis tenent sive pronuntientur sive cogitentur; aliter omne quod notum est verbum dicitur animo impressum quamdiu de memoria proferri et definiri potest, quamvis res ipsa displiceat; aliter cum placet quod mente concipitur. Secundum quod genus verbi accipiendum est quod ait apostolus: Nemo dicit: Dominus Iesus, nisi in spiritu sancto; cum secundum aliam verbi notionem dicant hoc et illi de quibus ipse dominus ait: Non omnis qui mihi dicit: Domine, domine, intrabit in regnum caelorum.

Verumtamen cum et illa quae odimus recte displicent recteque improbantur, approbatur eorum improbatio et placet et verbum est. Neque vitiorum notitia nobis displicet sed ipsa vitia. Nam placet mihi quod novi et definio quid sit intemperantia, et hoc est verbum eius. Sicuti sunt in arte nota vitia, et recte approbatur eorum notitia cum discernit cognitor speciem privationemque virtutis sicut aiere et negare et esse et non esse; attamen virtute privari atque in vitium deficere damnabile est. Et definire intemperantiam verbumque eius dicere pertinet ad artem morum; esse autem intemperantem ad id pertinet quod illa arte culpatur. Sicut nosse ac definire quid sit soloecismus pertinet ad artem loquendi; facere autem vitium est quod eadem arte reprehenditur. Verbum est igitur quod nunc discernere et insinuare volumus, cum amore notitia. Cum itaque se mens novit et amat, iungitur ei amore verbum eius. Et quoniam amat notitiam et novit amorem, et verbum in amore est et amor in verbo et utrumque in amante atque dicente. [16] Sed omnis secundum speciem notitia similis est ei rei quam novit. Est enim alia notitia secundum privationem quam cum improbamus loquimur, et haec privationis improbatio speciem laudat ideoque approbatur.

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The Fifteen Books of Aurelius Augustinus, Bishop of Hippo, on the Trinity

Chapter 10.--Whether Only Knowledge that is Loved is the Word of the Mind.

15. It is rightly asked then, whether all knowledge is a word, or only knowledge that is loved. For we also know the things which we hate; but what we do not like, cannot be said to be either conceived or brought forth by the mind. For not all things which in anyway touch it, are conceived by it; but some only reach the point of being known, but yet are not spoken as words, as for instance those of which we speak now. For those are called words in one way, which occupy spaces of time by their syllables, whether they are pronounced or only thought; and in another way, all that is known is called a word imprinted on the mind, as long as it can be brought forth from the memory and defined, even though we dislike the thing itself; and in another way still, when we like that which is conceived in the mind. And that which the apostle says, must be taken according to this last kind of word, "No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost;" ¹ since those also say this, but according to another meaning of the term "word," of whom the Lord Himself says, "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven." ² Nay, even in the case of things which we hate, when we rightly dislike and rightly censure them, we approve and like the censure bestowed upon them, and it becomes a word. Nor is it the knowledge of vices that displeases us, but the vices themselves. For I like to know and define what intemperance is; and this is its word. Just as there are known faults in art, and the knowledge of them is rightly approved, when a connoisseur discerns the species or the privation of excellence, as to affirm and deny that it is or that it is not; yet to be without excellence and to fall away into fault, is worthy of condemnation. And to define intemperance, and to say its word, belongs to the art of morals; but to be intemperate belongs to that which that art censures. Just as to know and define what a solecism is, belongs to the art of speaking; but to be guilty of one, is a fault which the same art reprehends. A word, then, which is the point we wish now to discern and intimate, is knowledge together with love. Whenever, then, the mind knows and loves itself, its word is joined to it by love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, both the word is in love and love is in the word, and both are in him who loves and speaks. ³