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De Trinitate

XVI.

[XVI 17] Nec moveat quod spiritus sanctus, cum sit coaeternus patri et filio, dicitur tamen aliquid ex tempore veluti hoc ipsum quod donatum diximus. Nam sempiterne spiritus donum, temporaliter autem donatum. Nam et si dominus non dicitur nisi cum habere incipit servum, etiam ista appellatio relativa ex tempore est deo; non enim sempiterna creatura est cuius est ille dominus. Quomodo ergo obtinebimus nec ipsa relativa esse accidentia, quoniam nihil accidit deo temporaliter quia non est mutabilis sicut in exordio huius disputationis tractavimus?

Ecce dominum esse non sempiternum habet ne cogamur etiam creaturam sempiternam dicere, quia ille sempiterne non dominaretur nisi etiam ista sempiterne famularetur. Sicut autem non potest esse servus qui non habet dominum, sic nec dominus qui non habet servum. Et quisquis exstiterit qui aeternum quidem deum solum dicat, tempora autem non esse aeterna propter varietatem et mutabilitatem, sed tamen tempora non in tempore esse coepisse (non enim erat tempus antequam inciperent tempora, et ideo non in tempore accidit deo ut dominus esset quia ipsorum temporum dominus erat quae utique non in tempore esse coeperunt), quid respondebit de homine qui in tempore factus est cuius utique dominus non erat antequam esset cui esset? Certe vel ut dominus hominis esset ex tempore accidit deo, et ut omnis auferri videatur controversia, certe ut tuus dominus esset aut meus qui modo esse coepimus ex tempore accidit deo. Aut si et hoc propter obscuram quaestionem animae videtur incertum, quid ut esset dominus populi Israhel? Quia etsi iam erat animae natura quam ille populus habebat – quomodo non quaerimus – tamen ille populus nondum erat et quando esse coepit apparet. Postremo ut dominus esset huius arboris et huius segetis ex tempore accidit quae modo esse coeperunt. Quia etsi materies ipsa iam erat, aliud est tamen dominum esse materiae, aliud esse dominum iam factae naturae. Alio enim tempore est etiam homo dominus ligni et alio tempore est dominus arcae quamvis ex ipso ligno fabricatae, quod utique non erat cum ligni dominus iam esset.

Quomodo igitur obtinebimus nihil secundum accidens dici deum nisi quia ipsius naturae nihil accidit quo mutetur, ut ea sint accidentia relativa quae cum aliqua mutatione rerum de quibus dicuntur accidunt? Sicut amicus relative dicitur, neque enim esse incipit nisi cum amare coeperit; fit ergo aliqua mutatio voluntatis ut amicus dicatur. Nummus autem cum dicitur pretium relative dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est cum esse coepit pretium neque cum dicitur pignus et si qua similia. Si ergo nummus potest nulla sui mutatione totiens dici relative ut neque cum incipit dici neque cum desinit aliquid in eius natura vel forma qua nummus est mutationis fiat, quanto facilius de illa incommutabili dei substantia debemus accipere ut ita dicatur relative aliquid ad creaturam ut, quamvis temporaliter incipiat dici, non tamen ipsi substantiae dei accidisse intellegatur sed illi creaturae ad quam dicitur? Domine, inquit, refugium factus es nobis. Refugium ergo nostrum deus relative dicitur; ad nos enim refertur; et tunc refugium nostrum fit cum ad eum refugimus. Numquid tunc fit aliquid in eius natura quod antequam ad eum refugeremus non erat? In nobis ergo fit aliqua mutatio; deteriores enim fuimus antequam ad eum refugeremus, et efficimur ad eum refugiendo meliores; in illo autem nulla. Sic et pater noster esse incipit cum per eius gratiam regeneramur quoniam dedit nobis potestatem filios dei fieri. Substantia itaque nostra mutatur in melius cum filii eius efficimur; simul et ille pater noster esse incipit, sed nulla suae commutatione substantiae. Quod ergo temporaliter dici incipit deus quod antea non dicebatur manifestum est relative dici, non tamen secundum accidens dei quod ei aliquid acciderit, sed plane secundum accidens eius ad quod dici aliquid deus incipit relative. Et quod amicus dei iustus esse incipit ipse mutatur; deus autem absit ut temporaliter aliquem diligat quasi nova dilectione quae in ipso ante non erat apud quem nec praeterita transierunt et futura iam facta sunt. Itaque omnes sanctos suos ante mundi constitutionem dilexit sicut praedestinavit, sed cum convertuntur et inveniunt illum, tunc incipere ab eo diligi dicuntur ut eo modo dicatur quo potest humano affectu capi quod dicitur. Sic etiam cum iratus malis dicitur et placidus bonis, illi mutantur non ipse; sicut lux infirmis oculis aspera, firmis lenis est, ipsorum scilicet mutatione non sua.

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The Fifteen Books of Aurelius Augustinus, Bishop of Hippo, on the Trinity

Chapter 16.--What is Said of God in Time, is Said Relatively, Not Accidentally.

17. Nor let it trouble us that the Holy Spirit, although He is co-eternal with the Father and the Son, yet is called something which exists in time; as, for instance, this very thing which we have called Him, a thing that has been given. For the Spirit is a gift eternally, but a thing that has been given in time. For if a lord also is not so called unless when he begins to have a slave, that appellation likewise is relative and in time to God; for the creature is not from all eternity, of which He is the Lord. How then shall we make it good that relative terms themselves are not accidental, since nothing happens accidentally to God in time, because He is incapable of change, as we have argued in the beginning of this discussion? Behold! to be the Lord, is not eternal to God; otherwise we should be compelled to say that the creature also is from eternity, since He would not be a lord from all eternity unless the creature also was a servant from all eternity. But as he cannot be a slave who has not a lord, neither can he be a lord who has not a slave. And if there be any one who says that God, indeed, is alone eternal, and that times are not eternal on account of their variety and changeableness, but that times nevertheless did not begin to be in time (for there was no time before times began, and therefore it did not happen to God in time that He should be Lord, since He was Lord of the very times themselves, which assuredly did not begin in time): what will he reply respecting man, who was made in time, and of whom assuredly He was not the Lord before he was of whom He was to be Lord? Certainly to be the Lord of man happened to God in time. And that all dispute may seem to be taken away, certainly to be your Lord, or mine, who have only lately begun to be, happened to God in time. Or if this, too, seems uncertain on account of the obscure question respecting the soul, what is to be said of His being the Lord of the people of Israel? since, although the nature of the soul already existed, which that people had (a matter into which we do not now inquire), yet that people existed not as yet, and the time is apparent when it began to exist. Lastly, that He should be Lord of this or that tree, or of this or that corn crop, which only lately began to be, happened in time; since, although the matter itself already existed, yet it is one thing to be Lord of the matter (materiae), another to be Lord of the already created nature (naturae). ¹ For man, too, is lord of the wood at one time, and at another he is lord of the chest, although fabricated of that same wood; which he certainly was not at the time when he was already the lord of the wood. How then shall we make it good that nothing is said of God according to accident, except because nothing happens to His nature by which He may be changed, so that those things are relative accidents which happen in connection with some change of the things of which they are spoken. As a friend is so called relatively: for he does not begin to be one, unless when he has begun to love; therefore some change of will takes place, in order that he may be called a friend. And money, when it is called a price, is spoken of relatively, and yet it was not changed when it began to be a price; nor, again, when it is called a pledge, or any other thing of the kind. If, therefore, money can so often be spoken of relatively with no change of itself, so that neither when it begins, nor when it ceases to be so spoken of, does any change take place in that nature or form of it, whereby it is money; how much more easily ought we to admit, concerning that unchangeable substance of God, that something may be so predicated relatively in respect to the creature, that although it begin to be so predicated in time, yet nothing shall be understood to have happened to the substance itself of God, but only to that creature in respect to which it is predicated? "Lord," it is said, "Thou hast been made our refuge." ² God, therefore, is said to be our refuge relatively, for He is referred to us, and He then becomes our refuge when we flee to Him; pray does anything come to pass then in His nature, which, before we fled to Him, was not? In us therefore some change does take place; for we were worse before we fled to Him, and we become better by fleeing to Him: but in Him there is no change. So also He begins to be our Father, when we are regenerated through His grace, since He gave us power to become the sons of God. ³ Our substance therefore is changed for the better, when we become His sons; and He at the same time begins to be our Father, but without any change of His own substance. Therefore that which begins to be spoken of God in time, and which was not spoken of Him before, is manifestly spoken of Him relatively; yet not according to any accident of God, so that anything should have happened to Him, but clearly according to some accident of that, in respect to which God begins to be called something relatively. When a righteous man begins to be a friend of God, he himself is changed; but far be it from us to say, that God loves any one in time with as it were a new love, which was not in Him before, with whom things gone by have not passed away and things future have been already done. Therefore He loved all His saints before the foundation of the world, as He predestinated them; but when they are converted and find them; then they are said to begin to be loved by Him, that what is said may be said in that way in which it can be comprehended by human affections. So also, when He is said to be wroth with the unrighteous, and gentle with the good, they are changed, not He: just as the light is troublesome to weak eyes, pleasant to those that are strong; namely, by their change, not its own.