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The City of God

Chapter 8.--That the Platonists Hold the First Rank in Moral Philosophy Also.

The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is called by the Greeks ethike, in which is discussed the question concerning the chief good,--that which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to be blessed, if only we make all our actions refer to it, and seek it not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake. Therefore it is called the end, because we wish other things on account of it, but itself only for its own sake. This beatific good, therefore, according to some, comes to a man from the body, according to others, from the mind, and, according to others, from both together. For they saw that man himself consists of soul and body; and therefore they believed that from either of these two, or from both together, their well-being must proceed, consisting in a certain final good, which could render them blessed, and to which they might refer all their actions, not requiring anything ulterior to which to refer that good itself. This is why those who have added a third kind of good things, which they call extrinsic,--as honor, glory, wealth, and the like,--have not regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to be sought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be sought for the sake of something else, affirming that this kind of good is good to the good, and evil to the evil. Wherefore, whether they have sought the good of man from the mind or from the body, or from both together, it is still only from man they have supposed that it must be sought. But they who have sought it from the body have sought it from the inferior part of man; they who have sought it from the mind, from the superior part; and they who have sought it from both, from the whole man. Whether therefore, they have sought it from any part, or from the whole man, still they have only sought it from man; nor have these differences, being three, given rise only to three dissentient sects of philosophers, but to many. For diverse philosophers have held diverse opinions, both concerning the good of the body, and the good of the mind, and the good of both together. Let, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who have not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment of the body, or by the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment of God,--enjoying Him, however, not as the mind does the body or itself, or as one friend enjoys another, but as the eye enjoys light, if, indeed, we may draw any comparison between these things. But what the nature of this comparison is, will, if God help me, be shown in another place, to the best of my ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention that Plato determined the final good to be to live according to virtue, and affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who knows and imitates God,--which knowledge and imitation are the only cause of blessedness. Therefore he did not doubt that to philosophize is to love God, whose nature is incorporeal. Whence it certainly follows that the student of wisdom, that is, the philosopher, will then become blessed when he shall have begun to enjoy God. For though he is not necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for many are miserable by loving that which ought not to be loved, and still more miserable when they enjoy it), nevertheless no one is blessed who does not enjoy that which he loves. For even they who love things which ought not to be loved do not count themselves blessed by loving merely, but by enjoying them. Who, then, but the most miserable will deny that he is blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves the true and highest good? But the true and highest good, according to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher who loves God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed life, and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God.

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De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput VIII: Quod etiam in morali philosophia Platonici obtineant principatum.

Reliqua est pars moralis, quam Graeco uocabulo dicunt ethicam, ubi quaeritur de summo bono, quo referentes omnia quae agimus, et quod non propter aliud, sed propter se ipsum adpetentes idque adipiscentes nihil, quo beati simus, ulterius requiramus. ideo quippe et finis est dictus, quia propter hunc cetera uolumus, ipsum autem nonnisi propter ipsum. hoc ergo beatificum bonum alii a corpore, alii ab animo, alii ab utroque homini esse dixerunt. uidebant quippe ipsum hominem constare ex animo et corpore et ideo ab alterutro istorum duorum aut ab utroque bene sibi esse posse credebant, finali quodam bono, quo beati essent, quo cuncta quae agebant referrent atque id quo referendum esset non ultra quaererent. unde illi, qui dicuntur addidisse tertium genus bonorum, quod appellatur extrinsecus, sicuti est honor gloria pecunia et si quid huiusmodi, non sic addiderunt, ut finale esset, id est propter se ipsum adpetendum, sed propter aliud; bonum que esse hoc genus bonis, malum autem malis. ita bonum hominis qui uel ab animo uel a corpore uel ab utroque expetiuerunt, nihil aliud quam ab homine expetendum esse putauerunt; sed qui id adpetiuerunt a corpore, a parte hominis deteriore; qui uero ab animo, a parte meliore; qui autem ab utroque, a toto homine. siue ergo a parte qualibet siue a toto, nonnisi ab homine. nec istae differentiae, quoniam tres sunt, ideo tres, sed multas dissensiones philosophorum sectasque fecerunt, quia et de bono corporis et de bono animi et de bono utriusque diuersi diuersa opinati sunt. cedant igitur omnes illis philosophis, qui non dixerunt beatum esse hominem fruentem corpore uel fruentem animo, sed fruentem deo; non sicut corpore uel se ipso animus aut sicut amico amicus, sed sicut luce oculus, si aliquid ab his ad illa similitudinis adferendum est, quod quale sit, si deus ipse adiuuerit, alio loco, quantum per nos fieri poterit, apparebit. nunc satis sit commemorare Platonem determinasse finem boni esse secundum uirtutem uiuere et ei soli euenire posse, qui notitiam dei habeat et imitationem nec esse aliam ob causam beatum; ideoque non dubitat hoc esse philosophari, amare deum, cuius natura sit incorporalis. unde utique colligitur tunc fore beatum studiosum sapientiae - id enim est philosophus - , cum frui deo coeperit. quamuis enim non continuo beatus sit, qui eo fruitur quod amat - multi enim amando ea, quae amanda non sunt, miseri sunt et miseriores cum fruuntur - : nemo tamen beatus est, qui eo quod amat non fruitur. nam et ipsi, qui res non amandas amant, non se beatos putant amando, sed fruendo. quisquis ergo fruitur eo, quod amat, uerumque et summum bonum amat, quis eum beatum nisi miserrimus negat? ipsum autem uerum ac summum bonum Plato dicit deum, unde uult esse philosophum amatorem dei, ut, quoniam philosophia ad beatam uitam tendit, fruens deo sit beatus qui deum amauerit.