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The Seven Books of Arnobius Against the Heathen
24.
Why, O Plato, do you in the Meno 1 put to a young slave certain questions relating to the doctrines of number, and strive to prove by his answers that what we learn we do not learn, but that we merely call back to memory those things which we knew in former times? Now, if he answers you correctly,--for it would not be becoming that we should refuse credit to what you say,--he is led to do so not by his real knowledge, 2 but by his intelligence; and it results from his having some acquaintance with numbers, through using them every day, that when questioned he follows your meaning, and that the very process of multiplication always prompts him. But if you are really assured that the souls of men are immortal and endowed with knowledge when they fly hither, cease to question that youth whom you see to be ignorant 3 and accustomed to the ways of men; 4 call to you that man of forty years, and ask of him, not anything out of the way or obscure about triangles, about squares, not what a cube is, or a second power, 5 the ratio of nine to eight, or finally, of four to three; but ask him that with which all are acquainted--what twice two are, or twice three. We wish to see, we wish to know, what answer he gives when questioned--whether he solves the desired problem. In such a case will he perceive, although his ears are open, whether you are saying anything, or asking anything, or requiring some answer from him? and will he not stand like a stock, or the Marpesian rock, 6 as the saying is, dumb and speechless, not understanding or knowing even this--whether you are talking with him or with another, conversing with another or with him; 7 whether that is intelligible speech which you utter, or merely a cry having no meaning, but drawn out and protracted to no purpose?
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In this dialogue (st. p. 81) Socrates brings forward the doctrine of reminiscence as giving a reasonable ground for the pursuit of knowledge, and then proceeds to give a practical illustration of it by leading an uneducated slave to solve a mathematical problem by means of question and answer. ↩
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Lit., "his knowledge of things." ↩
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So the ms. and edd., reading i-gnarum rerum, except LB., which by merely omitting the i gives the more natural meaning, "acquainted with the things," etc. ↩
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Lit., "established in the limits of humanity." ↩
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i.e., a square numerically or algebraically. The ms., both Roman edd., and Canterus read di-bus aut dynam-us, the former word being defended by Meursius as equivalent to binio, "a doubling,"--a sense, however, in which it does not occur. In the other edd., cubus aut dynamis has been received from the margin of Ursinus. ↩
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AEneid, vi. 472. ↩
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This clause is with reason rejected by Meursius as a gloss. ↩
Translation
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Gegen die Heiden (BKV)
Nr. 24
Was forschest du o Platon im Menon (S. 82 flg. Stephan.) durch die Kenntniß der Zahlenkunde bei dem Knaben nach etwas Abhandengekommenen und bemühest dich aus seinen Antworten zu erweisen, was wir lernten sey nicht Lernen, sondern nur ein Erinnern an das ehedem Gewußte? Insofern er dir in Wahrheit antwortet: denn nicht schickt es sich für uns, dem was du sagst den Glauben abzusprechen; so verursacht dieß nicht das Wissen, sondern die Kenntniß; daher nämlich, weil ihm einige Zahlen durch den täglichen Gebrauch bekannt waren, geschah es, daß er befragt folgen konnte, und das Hinzufügen selbst führte ihn immer zur Vervielfältigung. Vertraust du nun wahrhaftig, daß die Seelen unsterblich und vollkommenen Wissens herabfliegen, so höre auf, diesen Knaben zu befragen, der, wie du siehst, unkundig und am Ende menschlicher Wissenschaft ist. Jenen Vierzigjährigen rufe zu dir, und forsche bei ihm nicht nach etwas Verborgenem, Geheinmisvollem, nicht wegen des Dreiecks, des Quadrats, nicht was der Kubus endlich oder dass achtfüßige Viereck sey; sondern frage, was Allen vor Augen liegt, welche Zahl zwei mal zwei, zwei mal drei auswirft. Wir wollen sehen, wir wollen S. 69 erfahren, was der Befragte entgegnen, ob er die aufgestellte Frage lösen kann? Wird er, obschon ihm auch die Ohren offen stehen, wohl dafür halten, du habest Etwas gesagt, Etwas gefragt, eine Antwort von ihm verlangt? wird er nicht irgend einen Stock, oder wie man sagt, dem Fels Marpesia gleich, sprachlos und stumm dastehen, unkundig und nicht wissend selbst, ob du mit ihm oder einem Andern dich unterredest? ja ob die von dir vorgebrachte Rede nur ein nichtssagender Schall, durch nichtige Zusammenfügung andauernd, sey?