Traduction
Masquer
The Divine Institutes
Chap. XIX.--Of the Affections and Their Use; And of the Three Furies.
When the Stoics attempt to uproot the affections from man as diseases, they are opposed by the Peripatetics, who not only retain, but also defend them, and say that there is nothing in man which is not produced in him with great reason and foresight. They say this indeed rightly, if they know the true limits of each subject. Accordingly they say that this very affection of anger is the whetstone of virtue, as though no one could fight bravely against enemies unless he were excited by anger; by which they plainly show that they neither know what virtue is, nor why God gave anger to man. And if this was given to us for this purpose, that we may employ it for the slaying of men, what is to be thought more savage than man, what more resembling the wild beasts, than that animal which God formed for communion and innocence? There are, then, three affections which drive men headlong to all crimes: (1) anger, (2) desire, and (3) lust. 1 On which account the poets have said that there are three furies which harass the minds of men: anger longs for revenge, desire for riches, lust for pleasures. But God has appointed fixed limits to all of these; and if they pass these limits and begin to be too great, they must necessarily pervert their nature, and be changed into diseases and vices. And it is a matter of no great labour to show what these limits are. 2 Cupidity 3 is given us for providing those things which are necessary for life; concupiscence, 4 for the procreation of offspring; the affection of indignation, 5 for restraining the faults of those who are in our power, that is, in order that tender age may be formed by a severer discipline to integrity and justice: for if this time of life is not restrained by fear, 6 licence will produce boldness, and this will break out into every disgraceful and daring action. Therefore, as it is both just and necessary to employ anger towards the young, so it is both pernicious and impious to use it towards those of our own age. It is impious, because humanity is injured; pernicious, because if they oppose, it is necessary either to destroy them or to perish. But that this which I have spoken of is the reason why the affection of anger has been given to man, may be understood from the precepts of God Himself, who commands that we should not be angry with those who revile and injure us, but that we should always have our hands over the young; that is, that when they err, we should correct them with continual stripes, 7 lest by useless love and excessive indulgence they should be trained to evil and nourished to vices. But those who are inexperienced in affairs and ignorant of reason, have expelled those affections which have been given to man for good uses, and they wander more widely than reason demands. From this cause they live unjustly and impiously. They employ anger against their equals in age: hence disagreements, hence banishments, hence wars have arisen contrary to justice. They use desire for the amassing of riches: hence frauds, hence robberies, hence all kinds of crimes have originated. They use lust only for the enjoyment of pleasures: hence debaucheries, hence adulteries, hence all corruptions have proceeded. Whoever, therefore, has reduced those affections within their proper limits, which they who are ignorant of God cannot do, he is patient, he is brave, he is just. 8
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[Rather, indignation, cupidity, and concupiscence, answering to our author's "ira, cupiditas, libido." The difference involved in this choice of words, I shall have occasion to point out.] ↩
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[Here he treats the "three furies" as not in themselves vices, but implanted for good purposes, and becoming "diseases" only when they pass the limits he now defines. Hence, while indignation is virtuous anger, it is not a disease; cupidity, while amounting to honest thrift, is not evil; and concupiscence, until it becomes "evil concupiscence" (epithumi'an kake`n, Col. iii. 5), is but natural appetite, working to good ends.] ↩
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Desire. [See note 6, supra.] ↩
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Lust. ↩
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Anger. ↩
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[Quae, nisi in metu cohibetur.] ↩
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[Assiduis verberibus. This might be rendered "careful punishments."] ↩
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[Quod ignorantes Deum facere non possunt. In a later age Lactantius might have been charged with Semi-Pelagianism, many of his expressions about human nature being unstudied. But I note this passage, as, like many others, proving that he recognizes the need of divine grace.] ↩
Traduction
Masquer
Institutions Divines
XIX.
Lorsque les stoïciens tâchent d'ôter à l'homme les passions comme les maladies qui ruinent la santé de l'âme, les péripatéticiens s'y opposent, et soutiennent que la nature ne les lui a pas données sans une très grande raison. Ils n'auraient pas tort en cela, s'ils savaient quelles sont les justes bornes des choses. Ils disent que la colère est comme le foyer de la valeur, comme si pour se battre avec courage il fallait nécessairement être transporté de colère. Il faut bien voir par là qu'ils ne savent ni ce que c'est que la vertu, ni pourquoi Dieu a donné la colère à l'homme. Si elle a été donnée pour tuer des hommes, il n'y a rien de si cruel que l'homme, que Dieu a créé pour vivre dans l'innocence et dans la société, il n'y a rien de si semblable aux bêtes les plus farouches. Il y a trois passions qui l'engagent en toute sorte de crimes: la colère, le désir et le plaisir. C'est pour cela que les poètes ont feint qu'il y avait trois furies qui agitaient son âme. La colère demande la vengeance, le désir demande les richesses, et le plaisir demande la volupté. Dieu a mis à toutes ces choses certaines bornes qu'elles ne peuvent passer sans corrompre leur nature et sans devenir vicieuses. Il est aisé de les marquer. Le désir nous a été donné pour acquérir les choses qui sont nécessaires à la conservation de notre vie ; le plaisir nous a été donné pour la production des enfants, et la colère pour retenir dans le devoir ceux qui sont sous notre puissance, pour imprimer de la crainte aux jeunes gens, et pour empêcher qu'ils ne prennent une licence effrénée de se porter a toutes sortes de vices. S'il est juste, et même nécessaire, d'entrer en colère contre ceux qui sont au-dessous de nous, il est dangereux et impie d'y entrer contre nos égaux : cela est impie, parce que l'on ne le saurait faire sans violer l'humanité ; et cela est dangereux, parce que s'ils se défendent il faut ou périr ou les perdre. Le commandement que Dieu nous fait de ne nous point mettre en colère contre ceux qui nous offensent et qui nous disent des injures, montre clairement que cette passion ne nous a été donnée que pour l'usage que j'ai marqué, qui est de ne point souffrir, par une pernicieuse indulgence, les fautes de ceux qui sont au-dessous de nous, et de les corriger sans cesse, de peur que leurs vicieuses habitudes se fortifient. Quelques philosophes ont étendu, par ignorance, les bornes de ces passions, et les autres les ont absolument rejetées, bien que l'on en puisse faire un fort bon usage. C'est une des grandes sources des injustices et des impiétés qui se commettent dans le monde. Quand on entre en colère contre ses égaux, on excite des contestations, des querelles et des guerres. Quand on désire amasser de grandes richesses, on use de tromperies, et on commet des brigandages et des meurtres. Quand on ne cherche ce plaisir que pour le plaisir, on est porté aux fornications, aux adultères et à d'autres abominations. Il faut contenir ces commandements dans les bornes qui leur sont prescrites ; ce que ne peuvent faire ceux qui ne connaissent pas Dieu ; mais ceux qui le font sont patients, courageux et justes.