Edition Masquer
De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput IV: Quod ex disputatione Varronis apud cultores deorum antiquiores res humanae quam diuinae reperiantur.

In hac tota serie pulcherrimae ac subtilissimae distributionis et distinctionis uitam aeternam frustra quaeri et sperari inpudentissime uel optari, ex his, quae iam diximus et quae deinceps dicenda sunt, cuiuis hominum, qui corde obstinato sibi non fuerit inimicus, facillime apparet. uel hominum enim sunt ista instituta uel daemonum, non quales uocant illi daemones bonos, sed, ut loquar apertius, inmundorum spirituum et sine controuersia malignorum, qui noxias opiniones, quibus anima humana magis magisque uanescat et incommutabili aeternaeque ueritati coaptari atque inhaerere non possit, inuidentia mirabili et occulte inserunt cogitationibus inpiorum et aperte aliquando ingerunt sensibus et qua possunt fallaci adtestatione confirmant. iste ipse Varro propterea se prius de rebus humanis, de diuinis autem postea scripsisse testatur, quod prius extiterint ciuitates, deinde ab eis haec instituta sint. uera autem religio non a terrena aliqua ciuitate instituta est, sed plane caelestem ipsa instituit ciuitatem, eam uero inspirat et docet uerus deus, dator uitae aeternae, ueris cultoribus suis. Varronis igitur confitentis ideo se prius de rebus humanis scripsisse, postea de diuinis, quia diuinae istae ab hominibus institutae sunt, haec ratio est: sicut prior est, inquit, pictor quam tabula picta, prior faber quam aedificium: ita priores sunt ciuitates quam ea, quae a ciuitatibus instituta sunt. dicit autem prius se scripturum fuisse de dis, postea de hominibus, si de omni natura deorum scriberet, quasi hic de aliqua scribat et non de omni, aut uero etiam aliqua, licet non omnis, deorum natura non prior debeat esse quam hominum. quid, quod in illis tribus nouissimis libris deos certos et incertos et selectos diligenter explicans nullam deorum naturam praetermittere uidetur? quid est ergo, quod ait: si de omni natura deorum et hominum scriberemus, prius diuina absoluissemus, quam humana adtigissemus? aut enim de omni natura deorum scribit, aut de aliqua, aut omnino de nulla. si de omni, praeponenda utique est rebus humanis; si de aliqua, cur non etiam ipsa res praecedat humanas? an indigna est praeferri etiam uniuersae naturae hominum pars aliqua deorum? quod si multum est, ut aliqua pars diuina praeponatur uniuersis rebus humanis, saltem digna est uel Romanis. rerum quippe humanarum libros, non quantum ad orbem terrarum, sed quantum ad solam Romam pertinet, scripsit, quos tamen rerum diuinarum libris se dixit scribendi ordine merito praetulisse, sicut pictorem tabulae pictae, sicut fabrum aedificio, apertissime confitens, quod etiam istae res diuinae, sicut pictura, sicut structura, ab hominibus institutae sint. restat ut de nulla deorum natura scripsisse intellegatur, neque hoc aperte dicere uoluisse, sed intellegentibus reliquisse. ubi enim dicitur non omnis, usitate quidem intellegitur aliqua; sed potest intellegi et nulla, quoniam quae nulla est nec omnis nec aliqua est. nam, ut ipse dicit, si omnis esset natura deorum, de qua scriberet, scribendi ordine rebus humanis praeponenda esset; ut autem et ipso tacente ueritas clamat, praeponenda esset certe rebus Romanis, etiamsi non omnis, sed saltem aliqua esset: recte autem postponitur; ergo nulla est. non itaque rebus diuinis anteferre uoluit res humanas, sed rebus ueris noluit anteferre res falsas. in his enim, quae scripsit de rebus humanis, secutus est historiam rerum gestarum; quae autem de his, quas diuinas uocat, quid nisi opiniones rerum uanarum? hoc est nimirum, quod uoluit subtili significatione monstrare, non solum scribens de his posterius quam de illis, sed etiam rationem reddens cur id fecerit. quam si tacuisset, aliter hoc factum eius ab aliis fortasse defenderetur. in ea uero ipsa ratione, quam reddidit, nec aliis quidquam reliquit pro arbitrio suspicari et satis probauit homines se praeposuisse institutis hominum, non naturam hominum naturae deorum. ita se libros rerum diuinarum non de ueritate quae pertinet ad naturam, sed de falsitate quae pertinet ad errorem scripsisse confessus est. quod apertius alibi posuit, sicut in quarto libro commemoraui, ex naturae formula se scripturum fuisse, si nouam ipse conderet ciuitatem; quia uero iam ueterem inuenerat, non se potuisse nisi eius consuetudinem sequi.

Traduction Masquer
The City of God

Chapter 4.--That from the Disputation of Varro, It Follows that the Worshippers of the Gods Regard Human Things as More Ancient Than Divine Things.

In this whole series of most beautiful and most subtle distributions and distinctions, it will most easily appear evident from the things we have said already, and from what is to be said hereafter, to any man who is not, in the obstinacy of his heart, an enemy to himself, that it is vain to seek and to hope for, and even most impudent to wish for eternal life. For these institutions are either the work of men or of demons,--not of those whom they call good demons, but, to speak more plainly, of unclean, and, without controversy, malign spirits, who with wonderful slyness and secretness suggest to the thoughts of the impious, and sometimes openly present to their understandings, noxious opinions, by which the human mind grows more and more foolish, and becomes unable to adapt itself to and abide in the immutable and eternal truth, and seek to confirm these opinions by every kind of fallacious attestation in their power. This very same Varro testifies that he wrote first concerning human things, but afterwards concerning divine things, because the states existed first, and afterward these things were instituted by them. But the true religion was not instituted by any earthly state, but plainly it established the celestial city. It, however, is inspired and taught by the true God, the giver of eternal life to His true worshippers.

The following is the reason Varro gives when he confesses that he had written first concerning human things, and afterwards of divine things, because these divine things were instituted by men:--"As the painter is before the painted tablet, the mason before the edifice, so states are before those things which are instituted by states." But he says that he would have written first concerning the gods, afterwards concerning men, if he had been writing concerning the whole nature of the gods,--as if he were really writing concerning some portion of, and not all, the nature of the gods; or as if, indeed, some portion of, though not all, the nature of the gods ought not to be put before that of men. How, then, comes it that in those three last books, when he is diligently explaining the certain, uncertain and select gods, he seems to pass over no portion of the nature of the gods? Why, then, does he say, "If we had been writing on the whole nature of the gods, we would first have finished the divine things before we touched the human?" For he either writes concerning the whole nature of the gods, or concerning some portion of it, or concerning no part of it at all. If concerning it all, it is certainly to be put before human things; if concerning some part of it, why should it not, from the very nature of the case, precede human things? Is not even some part of the gods to be preferred to the whole of humanity? But if it is too much to prefer a part of the divine to all human things, that part is certainly worthy to be preferred to the Romans at least. For he writes the books concerning human things, not with reference to the whole world, but only to Rome; which books he says he had properly placed, in the order of writing, before the books on divine things, like a painter before the painted tablet, or a mason before the building, most openly confessing that, as a picture or a structure, even these divine things were instituted by men. There remains only the third supposition, that he is to be understood to have written concerning no divine nature, but that he did not wish to say this openly, but left it to the intelligent to infer; for when one says "not all," usage understands that to mean "some," but it may be understood as meaning none, because that which is none is neither all nor some. In fact, as he himself says, if he had been writing concerning all the nature of the gods, its due place would have been before human things in the order of writing. But, as the truth declares, even though Varro is silent, the divine nature should have taken precedence of Roman things, though it were not all, but only some. But it is properly put after, therefore it is none. His arrangement, therefore, was due, not to a desire to give human things priority to divine things, but to his unwillingness to prefer false things to true. For in what he wrote on human things, he followed the history of affairs; but in what he wrote concerning those things which they call divine, what else did he follow but mere conjectures about vain things? This, doubtless, is what, in a subtle manner, he wished to signify; not only writing concerning divine things after the human, but even giving a reason why he did so; for if he had suppressed this, some, perchance, would have defended his doing so in one way, and some in another. But in that very reason he has rendered, he has left nothing for men to conjecture at will, and has sufficiently proved that he preferred men to the institutions of men, not the nature of men to the nature of the gods. Thus he confessed that, in writing the books concerning divine things, he did not write concerning the truth which belongs to nature, but the falseness which belongs to error; which he has elsewhere expressed more openly (as I have mentioned in the fourth book ¹ ), saying that, had he been founding a new city himself, he would have written according to the order of nature; but as he had only found an old one, he could not but follow its custom.