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De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput III: De inimicis dei non per naturam, sed per contrariam uoluntatem, quae cum ipsis nocet, bonae utique naturae nocet, quia uitium, si non nocet, non est.

Dicuntur autem in scripturis inimici dei, qui non natura, sed uitiis aduersantur eius imperio, nihil ei ualentes nocere, sed sibi. inimici enim sunt resistendi uoluntate, non potestate laedendi. deus namque inmutabilis est et omni modo incorruptibilis. idcirco uitium, quo resistunt deo qui eius appellantur inimici, non est deo, sed ipsis malum, neque hoc ob aliud, nisi quia corrumpit in eis naturae bonum. natura igitur contraria non est deo sed uitium, quia malum contrarium est bono. quis autem neget deum summe bonum? uitium ergo contrarium est deo, tamquam malum bono. porro autem bonum est et natura quam uitiat; unde et huic bono utique contrarium est; sed deo tantummodo tamquam bono malum, naturae uero, quam uitiat, non tantum malum, sed etiam noxium. nulla quippe mala deo noxia sed mutabilibus corruptibilibus que naturis, bonis tamen ipsorum quoque testimonio uitiorum. si enim bonae non essent, eis uitia nocere non possent. nam quid eis nocendo faciunt, nisi adimunt integritatem pulchritudinem, salutem uirtutem et quidquid boni naturae per uitium detrahi siue minui consueuit? quod si omnino desit, nihil boni adimendo non nocet ac per hoc nec uitium est. nam esse uitium et non nocere non potest. unde colligitur, quamuis non possit uitium nocere incommutabili bono, non tamen posse nocere nisi bono, quia non inest, nisi ubi nocet. hoc etiam isto modo dici potest, uitium esse nec in summo posse bono nec nisi in aliquo bono. sola ergo bona alicubi esse possunt, sola mala nusquam; quoniam naturae etiam illae, quae ex malae uoluntatis initio uitiatae sunt, in quantum uitiosae sunt, malae sunt, in quantum autem naturae sunt, bonae sunt. et cum in poenis est natura uitiosa, excepto eo, quod natura est, etiam hoc ibi bonum est, quod inpunita non est. hoc enim est iustum et omne iustum procul dubio bonum. non enim quisquam de uitiis naturalibus, sed de uoluntariis poenas luit. nam etiam quod uitium consuetudine nimioue progressu roboratum uelut naturaliter inoleuit, a uoluntate sumpsit exordium. de uitiis quippe nunc loquimur eius naturae, cui mens inest capax intellegibilis lucis, qua discernitur iustum ab iniusto.

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The City of God

Chapter 3.--That the Enemies of God are So, Not by Nature, But by Will, Which, as It Injures Them, Injures a Good Nature; For If Vice Does Not Injure, It is Not Vice.

In Scripture they are called God's enemies who oppose His rule, not by nature, but by vice; having no power to hurt Him, but only themselves. For they are His enemies, not through their power to hurt, but by their will to oppose Him. For God is unchangeable, and wholly proof against injury. Therefore the vice which makes those who are called His enemies resist Him, is an evil not to God, but to themselves. And to them it is an evil, solely because it corrupts the good of their nature. It is not nature, therefore, but vice, which is contrary to God. For that which is evil is contrary to the good. And who will deny that God is the supreme good? Vice, therefore, is contrary to God, as evil to good. Further, the nature it vitiates is a good, and therefore to this good also it is contrary. But while it is contrary to God only as evil to good, it is contrary to the nature it vitiates, both as evil and as hurtful. For to God no evils are hurtful; but only to natures mutable and corruptible, though, by the testimony of the vices themselves, originally good. For were they not good, vices could not hurt them. For how do they hurt them but by depriving them of integrity, beauty, welfare, virtue, and, in short, whatever natural good vice is wont to diminish or destroy? But if there be no good to take away, then no injury can be done, and consequently there can be no vice. For it is impossible that there should be a harmless vice. Whence we gather, that though vice cannot injure the unchangeable good, it can injure nothing but good; because it does not exist where it does not injure. This, then, may be thus formulated: Vice cannot be in the highest good, and cannot be but in some good. Things solely good, therefore, can in some circumstances exist; things solely evil, never; for even those natures which are vitiated by an evil will, so far indeed as they are vitiated, are evil, but in so far as they are natures they are good. And when a vitiated nature is punished, besides the good it has in being a nature, it has this also, that it is not unpunished. ¹ For this is just, and certainly everything just is a good. For no one is punished for natural, but for voluntary vices. For even the vice which by the force of habit and long continuance has become a second nature, had its origin in the will. For at present we are speaking of the vices of the nature, which has a mental capacity for that enlightenment which discriminates between what is just and what is unjust.