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The City of God

Chapter 21.--Of God's Eternal and Unchangeable Knowledge and Will, Whereby All He Has Made Pleased Him in the Eternal Design as Well as in the Actual Result.

For what else is to be understood by that invariable refrain, "And God saw that it was good," than the approval of the work in its design, which is the wisdom of God? For certainly God did not in the actual achievement of the work first learn that it was good, but, on the contrary, nothing would have been made had it not been first known by Him. While, therefore, He sees that that is good which, had He not seen it before it was made, would never have been made, it is plain that He is not discovering, but teaching that it is good. Plato, indeed, was bold enough to say that, when the universe was completed, God was, as it were, elated with joy. ¹ And Plato was not so foolish as to mean by this that God was rendered more blessed by the novelty of His creation; but he wished thus to indicate that the work now completed met with its Maker's approval, as it had while yet in design. It is not as if the knowledge of God were of various kinds, knowing in different ways things which as yet are not, things which are, and things which have been. For not in our fashion does He look forward to what is future, nor at what is present, nor back upon what is past; but in a manner quite different and far and profoundly remote from our way of thinking. For He does not pass from this to that by transition of thought, but beholds all things with absolute unchangeableness; so that of those things which emerge in time, the future, indeed, are not yet, and the present are now, and the past no longer are; but all of these are by Him comprehended in His stable and eternal presence. Neither does He see in one fashion by the eye, in another by the mind, for He is not composed of mind and body; nor does His present knowledge differ from that which it ever was or shall be, for those variations of time, past, present, and future, though they alter our knowledge, do not affect His, "with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning." ² Neither is there any growth from thought to thought in the conceptions of Him in whose spiritual vision all things which He knows are at once embraced. For as without any movement that time can measure, He Himself moves all temporal things, so He knows all times with a knowledge that time cannot measure. And therefore He saw that what He had made was good, when He saw that it was good to make it. And when He saw it made, He had not on that account a twofold nor any way increased knowledge of it; as if He had less knowledge before He made what He saw. For certainly He would not be the perfect worker He is, unless His knowledge were so perfect as to receive no addition from His finished works. Wherefore, if the only object had been to inform us who made the light, it had been enough to say, "God made the light;" and if further information regarding the means by which it was made had been intended, it would have sufficed to say, "And God said, Let there be light, and there was light," that we might know not only that God had made the world, but also that He had made it by the word. But because it was right that three leading truths regarding the creature be intimated to us, viz., who made it, by what means, and why, it is written, "God said, Let there be light, and there was light. And God saw the light that it was good." If, then, we ask who made it, it was "God." If, by what means, He said "Let it be," and it was. If we ask, why He made it, "it was good." Neither is there any author more excellent than God, nor any skill more efficacious than the word of God, nor any cause better than that good might be created by the good God. This also Plato has assigned as the most sufficient reason for the creation of the world, that good works might be made by a good God; ³ whether he read this passage, or, perhaps, was informed of these things by those who had read them, or, by his quick-sighted genius, penetrated to things spiritual and invisible through the things that are created, or was instructed regarding them by those who had discerned them.

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De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput XXI: De aeterna et incommutabili scientia dei ac uoluntate, qua semper illi uniuersa quae fecit sic placuerunt facienda, quemadmodum facta.

Quid est enim aliud intellegendum in eo, quod per omnia dicitur: uidit deus quia bonum est, nisi operis adprobatio secundum artem facti, quae sapientia dei est? deus autem usque adeo non, cum factum est, tunc didicit bonum, ut nihil eorum fieret, si ei fuisset incognitum. dum ergo uidet quia bonum est, quod, nisi uidisset antequam fieret, non utique fieret: docet bonum esse, non discit. et Plato quidem plus ausus est dicere, elatum esse scilicet deum gaudio mundi uniuersitate perfecta. ubi et ipse non usque adeo desipiebat, ut putaret deum sui operis nouitate factum beatiorem; sed sic ostendere uoluit artifici suo placuisse iam factum, quod placuerat in arte faciendum; non quod ullo modo dei scientia uarietur, ut aliud in ea faciant quae nondum sunt, aliud quae iam sunt, aliud quae fuerunt; non enim more nostro ille uel quod futurum est prospicit, uel quod praesens est aspicit, uel quod praeteritum est respicit; sed alio modo quodam a nostrarum cogitationum consuetudine longe alteque diuerso. ille quippe non ex hoc in illud cogitatione mutata, sed omnino incommutabiliter uidet; ita ut illa quidem, quae temporaliter fiunt, et futura nondum sint et praesentia iam sint et praeterita iam non sint, ipse uero haec omnia stabili ac sempiterna praesentia conprehendat; nec aliter oculis, aliter mente; non enim ex animo constat et corpore; nec aliter nunc et aliter antea et aliter postea; quoniam non sicut nostra, ita eius quoque scientia trium temporum, praesentis uidelicet et praeteriti uel futuri, uarietate mutatur, apud quem non est inmutatio nec momenti obumbratio. neque enim eius intentio de cogitatione in cogitationem transit, in cuius incorporeo contuitu simul adsunt cuncta quae nouit; quoniam tempora ita nouit nullis suis temporalibus notionibus, quemadmodum temporalia mouet nullis suis temporalibus motibus. ibi ergo uidit bonum esse quod fecit, ubi bonum esse uidit ut faceret; nec quia factum uidit scientiam duplicauit uel ex aliqua parte auxit, tamquam minoris scientiae fuerit priusquam faceret quod uideret, qui tam perfecte non operaretur, nisi tam perfecta scientia, cui nihil ex eius operibus adderetur. quapropter, si tantummodo nobis insinuandum esset quis fecerit lucem, sufficeret dicere, fecit deus lucem; si autem non solum quis fecerit, uerum etiam per quid fecerit, satis esset ita enuntiari: et dixit deus: fiat lux, et facta est lux; ut non tantum deum, sed etiam per uerbum lucem fecisse nossemus. quia uero tria quaedam maxime scienda de creatura nobis oportuit intimari, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit: dixit deus, inquit: fiat lux, et facta est lux. et uidit deus lucem quia bona est. si ergo quaerimus, quis fecerit: deus est; si per quid fecerit: dixit: fiat, et facta est; si quare fecerit: quia bona est. nec auctor est excellentior deo, nec ars efficacior dei uerbo, nec causa melior quam ut bonum crearetur a deo bono. hanc etiam Plato causam condendi mundi iustissimam dicit, ut a bono deo bona opera fierent; siue ista legerit, siue ab his qui legerant forte cognouerit; siue acerrimo ingenio inuisibilia dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspexerit, siue ab his qui ista conspexerant et ipse didicerit.