Traduction Masquer
The City of God

Chapter 21.--Whether There Ever Was a Roman Republic Answering to the Definitions of Scipio in Cicero's Dialogue.

This, then, is the place where I should fulfill the promise gave in the second book of this work, ¹ and explain, as briefly and clearly as possible, that if we are to accept the definitions laid down by Scipio in Cicero's De Republica, there never was a Roman republic; for he briefly defines a republic as the weal of the people. And if this definition be true, there never was a Roman republic, for the people's weal was never attained among the Romans. For the people, according to his definition, is an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right and by a community of interests. And what he means by a common acknowledgment of right he explains at large, showing that a republic cannot be administered without justice. Where, therefore, there is no true justice there can be no right. For that which is done by right is justly done, and what is unjustly done cannot be done by right. For the unjust inventions of men are neither to be considered nor spoken of as rights; for even they themselves say that right is that which flows from the fountain of justice, and deny the definition which is commonly given by those who misconceive the matter, that right is that which is useful to the stronger party. Thus, where there is not true justice there can be no assemblage of men associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and therefore there can be no people, as defined by Scipio or Cicero; and if no people, then no weal of the people, but only of some promiscuous multitude unworthy of the name of people. Consequently, if the republic is the weal of the people, and there is no people if it be not associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and if there is no right where there is no justice, then most certainly it follows that there is no republic where there is no justice. Further, justice is that virtue which gives every one his due. Where, then, is the justice of man, when he deserts the true God and yields himself to impure demons? Is this to give every one his due? Or is he who keeps back a piece of ground from the purchaser, and gives it to a man who has no right to it, unjust, while he who keeps back himself from the God who made him, and serves wicked spirits, is just?

This same book, De Republica, advocates the cause of justice against injustice with great force and keenness. The pleading for injustice against justice was first heard, and it was asserted that without injustice a republic could neither increase nor even subsist, for it was laid down as an absolutely unassailable position that it is unjust for some men to rule and some to serve; and yet the imperial city to which the republic belongs cannot rule her provinces without having recourse to this injustice. It was replied in behalf of justice, that this ruling of the provinces is just, because servitude may be advantageous to the provincials, and is so when rightly administered,--that is to say, when lawless men are prevented from doing harm. And further, as they became worse and worse so long as they were free, they will improve by subjection. To confirm this reasoning, there is added an eminent example drawn from nature: for "why," it is asked, "does God rule man, the soul the body, the reason the passions and other vicious parts of the soul?" This example leaves no doubt that, to some, servitude is useful; and, indeed, to serve God is useful to all. And it is when the soul serves God that it exercises a right control over the body; and in the soul itself the reason must be subject to God if it is to govern as it ought the passions and other vices. Hence, when a man does not serve God, what justice can we ascribe to him, since in this case his soul cannot exercise a just control over the body, nor his reason over his vices? And if there is no justice in such an individual, certainly there can be none in a community composed of such persons. Here, therefore, there is not that common acknowledgment of right which makes an assemblage of men a people whose affairs we call a republic. And why need I speak of the advantageousness, the common participation in which, according to the definition, makes a people? For although, if you choose to regard the matter attentively, you will see that there is nothing advantageous to those who live godlessly, as every one lives who does not serve God but demons, whose wickedness you may measure by their desire to receive the worship of men though they are most impure spirits, yet what I have said of the common acknowledgment of right is enough to demonstrate that, according to the above definition, there can be no people, and therefore no republic, where there is no justice. For if they assert that in their republic the Romans did not serve unclean spirits, but good and holy gods, must we therefore again reply to this evasion, though already we have said enough, and more than enough, to expose it? He must be an uncommonly stupid, or a shamelessly contentious person, who has read through the foregoing books to this point, and can yet question whether the Romans served wicked and impure demons. But, not to speak of their character, it is written in the law of the true God, "He that sacrificeth unto any god save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed." ² He, therefore, who uttered so menacing a commandment decreed that no worship should be given either to good or bad gods.

Edition Masquer
De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput XXI: An secundum definitiones Scipionis, quae in dialogo Ciceronis sunt, umquam fuerit Romana respublica.

Quapropter nunc est locus, ut quam potero breuiter ac dilucide expediam, quod in secundo huius operis libro me demonstraturum esse promissi, secundum definitiones, quibus apud Ciceronem utitur Scipio in libris de republica, numquam rempublicam fuisse Romanam. breuiter enim rempublicam definit esse rem populi. quae definitio si uera est, numquam fuit Romana respublica, quia numquam fuit res populi, quam definitionem uoluit esse reipublicae. populum . enim esse definiuit coetum multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatum. quid autem dicat iuris consensum, disputando explicat, per hoc ostendens geri sine iustitia non posse rempublicam; ubi ergo iustitia uera non est, nec ius potest esse. quod enim iure fit, profecto iuste fit; quod autem fit iniuste, nec iure fieri potest. non enim iura dicenda sunt uel putanda iniqua hominum constituta, cum illud etiam ipsi ius esse dicant, quod de iustitiae fonte manauerit, falsumque esse, quod a quibusdam non recte sentientibus dici solet, id esse ius, quod ei, qui plus potest, utile est. quocirca ubi non est uera iustitia, iuris consensu sociatus coetus hominum non potest esse et ideo nec populus iuxta illam Scipionis uel Ciceronis definitionem; et si non populus, nec res populi, sed qualiscumque multitudinis, quae populi nomine digna non est. ac per hoc, si respublica res est populi et populus non est, qui consensu non sociatus est iuris, non est autem ius, ubi nulla iustitia est, procul dubio colligitur, ubi iustitia non est, non esse rempublicam. iustitia porro ea uirtus est, quae sua cuique distribuit. quae igitur iustitia est hominis, quae ipsum hominem deo uero tollit et inmundis daemonibus subdit? hocine est sua cuique distribuere? an qui fundum aufert eius, a quo emptus est, et tradit ei, qui nihil habet in eo iuris, iniustus est; et qui se ipsum aufert dominanti deo, a quo factus est, et malignis seruit spiritibus, iustus est? disputatur certe acerrime atque fortissime in eisdem ipsis de republica libris aduersus iniustitiam pro iustitia. et quoniam, cum prius ageretur pro iniustitiae partibus contra iustitiam et diceretur nisi per iniustitiam rempublicam stare augerique non posse, hoc ueluti ualidissimum positum erat, iniustum esse, ut homines hominibus dominantibus seruiant; quam tamen iniustitiam nisi sequatur imperiosa ciuitas, cuius est magna respublica, non eam posse prouinciis imperare: responsum est a parte iustitiae ideo iustum esse, quod talibus hominibus sit utilis seruitus, et pro utilitate eorum fieri, cum recte fit, id est cum inprobis aufertur iniuriarum licentia, et domiti melius se habebunt, quia indomiti deterius se habuerunt; subditumque est, ut ista ratio firmaretur, ueluti a natura sumptum nobile exemplum atque dictum est: cur igitur deus homini, animus imperat corpori, ratio libidini ceterisque uitiosis animi partibus? plane hoc exemplo satis edoctum est quibusdam esse utilem seruitutem, et deo quidem ut seruiatur utile esse omnibus. seruiens autem deo animus recte imperat corpori, inque ipso animo ratio deo domino subdita recte imperat libidini uitiisque ceteris. quapropter ubi homo deo non seruit, quid in eo putandum est esse iustitiae, quandoquidem deo non seruiens nullo modo potest iuste animus corpori aut humana ratio uitiis imperare? et si in homine tali non est ulla iustitia, procul dubio nec in hominum coetu, qui ex hominibus talibus constat. non est hic ergo iuris ille consensus, qui hominum multitudinem populum facit, cuius res dicitur esse respublica. nam de utilitate quid dicam, cuius etiam communione sociatus coetus hominum, sicut sese habet ista definitio, populus nuncupatur? quamuis enim, si diligenter adtendas, nec utilitas sit ulla uiuentium, qui uiuunt inpie, sicut uiuit omnis, qui non seruit deo seruitque daemonibus, tanto magis inpiis, quanto magis sibi, cum sint inmundissimi spiritus, tamquam dis sacrificari uolunt, tamen quod de iuris consensu diximus satis esse arbitror, unde appareat per hanc definitionem non esse populum, cuius respublica esse dicatur, in quo iustitia non est. si enim dicunt non spiritibus inmundis, sed dis bonis atque sanctis in sua republica seruisse Romanos, numquid eadem totiens repetenda sunt, quae iam satis, immo ultra quam satis est diximus? quis enim ad hunc locum per superiores huius operis libros peruenit, qui dubitare adhuc possit malis et inpuris daemonibus seruisse Romanos, nisi uel nimium stolidus uel inpudentissime contentiosus? sed ut taceam quales sint, quos sacrificiis colebant, in lege ueri dei scriptum est: sacrificans dis eradicabitur nisi domino tantum. nec bonis igitur nec malis dis sacrificari uoluit, qui hoc cum tanta comminatione praecepit.