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De Trinitate

XIV.

[XIV] Habet enim et scientia modum suum bonum si quod in ea inflat vel inflare assolet aeternorum caritate vincatur, quae non inflat sed, ut scimus, aedificat. Sine scientia quippe nec virtutes ipsae quibus recte vivitur possunt haberi per quas haec vita misera sic gubernetur ut ad illam quae vere beata est perveniatur aeternam.

[22] Distat tamen ab aeternorum contemplatione actio qua bene utimur temporalibus rebus, et illa sapientiae, haec scientiae deputatur. Quamvis enim et illa quae sapientia est possit scientia nuncupari sicut et apostolus loquitur ubi dicit: Nunc scio ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum, quam scientiam profecto contemplationis dei vult intellegi quod sanctorum summum erit praemium; tamen ubi dicit: Alii quidem datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum, haec utique duo sine dubitatione distinguit, licet non ibi explicet quid intersit et unde possit utrumque dinosci. Verum scripturarum sanctarum multiplicem copiam scrutatus invenio scriptum esse in libro Iob eodem sancto viro loquente: Ecce pietas est sapientia; abstinere autem a malis scientia est. In hac differentia intellegendum est ad contemplationem sapientiam, ad actionem scientiam pertinere. ‚Pietatem‘ quippe hoc loco posuit ‚dei cultum‘ quae Graece dicitur θεοσέβεια; nam hoc verbum habet ista sententia in codicibus Graecis. Et quid est in aeternis excellentius quam deus cuius solius immutabilis est natura? Et quis cultus eius nisi amor eius quo nunc desideramus eum videre credimusque et speramus nos esse visuros, et quantum proficimus videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem ‚in manifestatione‘? Hoc est enim quod ait apostolus Paulus, facie ad faciem; hoc etiam quod Iohannes: Dilectissimi, nunc filii dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quod erimus. Scimus quia cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. De his atque huiusmodi sermo ipse mihi videtur esse sermo sapientiae. Abstinere autem a malis quam Iob scientiam dixit esse rerum procul dubio temporalium est quoniam secundum tempus in malis sumus, a quibus abstinere debemus ut ad illa bona aeterna veniamus. Quamobrem quidquid prudenter, fortiter, temperanter et iuste agimus ad eam pertinet scientiam sive disciplinam qua in evitandis malis bonisque appetendis actio nostra versatur, et quidquid propter exempla vel cavenda vel imitanda et propter quarumque rerum quae nostris adcommodata sunt usibus necessaria documenta historica cognitione colligimus.

[23] De his ergo sermo cum fit, eum scientiae sermonem puto discernendum a sermone sapientiae ad quam pertinent ea quae nec fuerunt nec futura sunt sed sunt, et propter eam aeternitatem in qua sunt et fuisse et esse et futura esse dicuntur sine ulla mutabilitate temporum. Non enim sic fuerunt ut esse desinerent aut sic futura sunt quasi nunc non sint, sed id ipsum esse semper habuerunt, semper habitura sunt. Manent autem non tamquam in spatiis locorum fixa veluti corpora, sed in natura incorporali sic intellegibilia praesto sunt mentis aspectibus sicut ista in locis visibilia vel contrectabilia corporis sensibus. Non autem solum rerum sensibilium in locis positarum sine spatiis localibus manent intellegibiles incorporalesque rationes, verum etiam motionum in temporibus transeuntium sine temporali transitu stant etiam ipsae utique intellegibiles, non sensibiles. Ad quas mentis acie pervenire paucorum est, et cum pervenitur quantum fieri potest, non in eis manet ipse perventor, sed veluti acies ipsa reverberata repellitur et fit rei non transitoriae transitoria cogitatio. Quae tamen cogitatio transiens per disciplinas quibus eruditur animus memoriae commendatur ut sit quo redire possit quae cogitur inde transire, quamvis si ad memoriam cogitatio non rediret atque ibi quod commendaverat inveniret, velut rudis ad hoc sicut ducta fuerat duceretur idque inveniret ubi primum invenerat, in illa incorporea veritate unde rursus quasi descriptum in memoria figeretur. Neque enim sicut manet verbi gratia quadrati corporis incorporalis et immutabilis ratio sic in ea manet hominis cogitatio, si tamen ad eam sine phantasia spatii localis potuit pervenire. Aut si alicuius artificiosi et musici soni per moras temporis transeuntis numerositas comprehendatur sine tempore stans in quodam secreto altoque silentio, tamdiu saltem cogitari potest quamdiu potest ille cantus audiri; tamen quod inde rapuerit etsi transiens mentis aspectus et quasi glutiens in ventre ita in memoria reposuerit, poterit recordando quodam modo ruminare et in disciplinam quod sic didicerit traicere. Quod si fuerit omnimoda oblivione deletum, rursus doctrina duce ad id venietur quod penitus exciderat et sic invenietur ut erat.

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The Fifteen Books of Aurelius Augustinus, Bishop of Hippo, on the Trinity

Chapter 14.--What is the Difference Between Wisdom and Knowledge. The Worship of God is the Love of Him. How the Intellectual Cognizance of Eternal Things Comes to Pass Through Wisdom.

For knowledge also has its own good measure, if that in it which puffs up, or is wont to puff up, is conquered by love of eternal things, which does not puff up, but, as we know, edifieth. ¹ Certainly without knowledge the virtues themselves, by which one lives rightly, cannot be possessed, by which this miserable life may be so governed, that we may attain to that eternal life which is truly blessed.

22. Yet action, by which we use temporal things well, differs from contemplation of eternal things; and the latter is reckoned to wisdom, the former to knowledge. For although that which is wisdom can also be called knowledge, as the apostle too speaks, where he says, "Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known;" ² when doubtless he meant his words to be understood of the knowledge of the contemplation of God, which will be the highest reward of the saints; yet where he says, "For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit," ³ certainly he distinguishes without doubt these two things, although he does not there explain the difference, nor in what way one may be discerned from the other. But having examined a great number of passages from the Holy Scriptures, I find it written in the Book of Job, that holy man being the speaker, "Behold, piety, that is wisdom; but to depart from evil is knowledge." ⁴ In thus distinguishing, it must be understood that wisdom belongs to contemplation, knowledge to action. For in this place he meant by piety the worship of God, which in Greek is called theosebeia. For the sentence in the Greek mss. has that word. And what is there in eternal things more excellent than God, of whom alone the nature is unchangeable? And what is the worship of Him except the love of Him, by which we now desire to see Him, and we believe and hope that we shall see Him; and in proportion as we make progress, see now through a glass in an enigma, but then in clearness? For this is what the Apostle Paul means by "face to face." ⁵ This is also what John says, "Beloved, now we are the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is." ⁶ Discourse about these and the like subjects seems to me to be the discourse itself of wisdom. But to depart from evil, which Job says is knowledge, is without doubt of temporal things. Since it is in reference to time [and this world] that we are in evil, from which we ought to abstain that we may come to those good eternal things. And therefore, whatsoever we do prudently, boldly, temperately, and justly, belongs to that knowledge or discipline wherewith our action is conversant in avoiding evil and desiring good; and so also, whatsoever we gather by the knowledge that comes from inquiry, in the way of examples either to be guarded against or to be imitated, and in the way of necessary proofs respecting any subject, accommodated to our use.

23. When a discourse then relates to these things, I hold it to be a discourse belonging to knowledge, and to be distinguished from a discourse belonging to wisdom, to which those things belong, which neither have been, nor shall be, but are; and on account of that eternity in which they are, are said to have been, and to be, and to be about to be, without any changeableness of times. For neither have they been in such way as that they should cease to be, nor are they about to be in such way as if they were not now; but they have always had and always will have that very absolute being. And they abide, but not as if fixed in some place as are bodies; but as intelligible things in incorporeal nature, they are so at hand to the glance of the mind, as things visible or tangible in place are to the sense of the body. And not only in the case of sensible things posited in place, there abide also intelligible and incorporeal reasons of them apart from local space; but also of motions that pass by in successive times, apart from any transit in time, there stand also like reasons, themselves certainly intelligible, and not sensible. And to attain to these with the eye of the mind is the lot of few; and when they are attained as much as they can be, he himself who attains to them does not abide in them, but is as it were repelled by the rebounding of the eye itself of the mind, and so there comes to be a transitory thought of a thing not transitory. And yet this transient thought is committed to the memory through the instructions by which the mind is taught; that the mind which is compelled to pass from thence, may be able to return thither again; although, if the thought should not return to the memory and find there what it had committed to it, it would be led thereto like an uninstructed person, as it had been led before, and would find it where it had first found it, that is to say, in that incorporeal truth, whence yet once more it may be as it were written down and fixed in the mind. For the thought of man, for example, does not so abide in that incorporeal and unchangeable reason of a square body, as that reason itself abides: if, to be sure, it could attain to it at all without the phantasy of local space. Or if one were to apprehend the rhythm of any artificial or musical sound, passing through certain intervals of time, as it rested without time in some secret and deep silence, it could at least be thought as long as that song could be heard; yet what the glance of the mind, transient though it was, caught from thence, and, absorbing as it were into a belly, so laid up in the memory, over this it will be able to rumiuate in some measure by recollection, and to transfer what it has thus learned into systematic knowledge. But if this has been blotted out by absolute forgetfulness, yet once again, under the guidance of teaching, one will come to that which had altogether dropped away, and it will be found such as it was.