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De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput III: De tribus sectis summum hominis bonum quaerentibus quam eligendam Varro definiat sequens ueteris Academiae Antiocho auctore sententiam.

Quid ergo istorum trium sit uerum atque sectandum, isto modo persuadere conatur. primum, quia summum bonum in philosophia non arboris, non pecoris, non dei, sed hominis quaeritur, quid sit ipse homo, quaerendum putat. sentit quippe in eius natura duo esse quaedam, corpus et animam, et horum quidem duorum melius esse animam longeque praestabilius omnino non dubitat, sed utrum anima sola sit homo, ut ita sit ei corpus tamquam equus equiti - eques enim non homo et equus, sed solus homo est; ideo tamen eques dicitur, quod aliquo modo se habeat ad equum - , an corpus solum sit homo, aliquo modo se habens ad animam, sicut poculum ad potionem - non enim calix et potio, quam continet calix, simul dicitur poculum, sed calix solus; ideo tamen quod potioni continendae sit adcommodatus - , an uero nec anima sola nec solum corpus, sed simul utrumque sit homo, cuius sit pars una siue anima siue corpus, ille autem totus ex utroque constet, ut homo sit, sicut duos equos iunctos bigas uocamus, quorum siue dexter siue sinister pars est bigarum, unum uero eorum, quoquo modo se habeat ad alterum, bigas non dicimus, sed ambo simul. horum autem trium hoc elegit tertium hominemque nec animam solam nec solum corpus, sed animam simul et corpus esse arbitratur. proinde summum bonum hominis, quo fit beatus, ex utriusque rei bonis constare dicit, et animae scilicet et corporis. ac per hoc prima illa naturae propter se ipsa existimat expetenda ipsamque uirtutem, quam doctrina inserit uelut artem uiuendi, quae in animae bonis est excellentissimum bonum. quapropter eadem uirtus, id est ars agendae uitae, cum acceperit prima naturae, quae sine illa erant, sed tamen erant etiam quando eis doctrina adhuc deerat, omnia propter se ipsa adpetit simulque etiam se ipsam, omnibusque simul et se ipsa utitur, eo fine, ut omnibus delectetur atque perfruatur, magis minus que, ut quaeque inter se maiora atque minora sunt, tamen omnibus gaudens et quaedam minora, si necessitas postulat, propter maiora uel adipiscenda uel tenenda contemnens. omnium autem bonorum uel animi uel corporis nihil sibi uirtus omnino praeponit. haec enim bene utitur et se ipsa et ceteris, quae hominem faciunt beatum, bonis. ubi uero ipsa non est, quamlibet multa sint bona, non bono eius sunt, cuius sunt, ac per hoc iam nec eius bona dicenda sunt, cui male utenti utilia esse non possunt. haec ergo uita hominis, quae uirtute et aliis animi et corporis bonis, sine quibus uirtus esse non potest, fruitur, beata esse dicitur; si uero et aliis, sine quibus esse uirtus potest, uel ullis uel pluribus, beatior; si autem prorsus omnibus, ut nullum omnino bonum desit uel animi uel corporis, beatissima. non enim hoc est uita, quod uirtus, quoniam non omnis uita, sed sapiens uita uirtus est; et tamen qualiscumque uita sine ulla uirtute potest esse; uirtus uero sine ulla uita non potest esse. hoc et de memoria dixerim atque ratione, et si quid tale aliud est in homine. sunt enim haec et ante doctrinam, sine his autem non potest esse ulla doctrina, ac per hoc nec uirtus, quae utique discitur. bene autem currere, pulchrum esse corpore, uiribus ingentibus praeualere et cetera huiusmodi talia sunt, ut et uirtus sine his esse possit et ipsa sine uirtute; bona sunt tamen, et secundum istos etiam ipsa propter se ipsam diligit uirtus, utiturque illis et fruitur, sicut uirtutem decet. hanc uitam beatam etiam socialem perhibent esse, quae amicorum bona propter se ipsa diligat sicut sua eisque propter ipsos hoc uelit quod sibi; siue in domo sint, sicut coniux et liberi et quicumque domestici, siue in loco, ubi domus est eius, sicuti est urbs, ut sunt hi qui ciues uocantur, siue in orbe toto, ut sunt gentes quas ei societas humana coniungit, siue in ipso mundo, qui censetur nomine caeli et terrae, sicut esse dicunt deos, quos uolunt amicos esse homini sapienti, quos nos familiarius angelos dicimus. de bonorum autem et e contrario malorum finibus negant ullo modo esse dubitandum et hanc inter se et nouos Academicos adfirmant esse distantiam, nec eorum interest quidquam, siue Cynico siue alio quolibet habitu et uictu in his finibus, quos ueros putant, quisque philosophetur. ex tribus porro illis uitae generibus, otioso, actuoso et quod ex utroque conpositum est, hoc tertium sibi placere adseuerant. haec sensisse atque docuisse Academicos ueteres Varro adserit, auctore Antiocho, magistro Ciceronis et suo, quem sane Cicero in pluribus fuisse Stoicorum quam ueterem Academicum uult uideri. sed quid ad nos, qui potius de rebus ipsis iudicare debemus, quam pro magno de hominibus quid quisque senserit scire?

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The City of God

Chapter 3.--Which of the Three Leading Opinions Regarding the Chief Good Should Be Preferred, According to Varro, Who Follows Antiochus and the Old Academy.

Which of these three is true and to be adopted he attempts to show in the following manner. As it is the supreme good, not of a tree, or of a beast, or of a god, but of man that philosophy is in quest of, he thinks that, first of all, we must define man. He is of opinion that there are two parts in human nature, body and soul, and makes no doubt that of these two the soul is the better and by far the more worthy part. But whether the soul alone is the man, so that the body holds the same relation to it as a horse to the horseman, this he thinks has to be ascertained. The horseman is not a horse and a man, but only a man, yet he is called a horseman, because he is in some relation to the horse. Again, is the body alone the man, having a relation to the soul such as the cup has to the drink? For it is not the cup and the drink it contains which are called the cup, but the cup alone; yet it is so called because it is made to hold the drink. Or, lastly, is it neither the soul alone nor the body alone, but both together, which are man, the body and the soul being each a part, but the whole man being both together, as we call two horses yoked together a pair, of which pair the near and the off horse is each a part, but we do not call either of them, no matter how connected with the other, a pair, but only both together? Of these three alternatives, then, Varro chooses the third, that man is neither the body alone, nor the soul alone, but both together. And therefore the highest good, in which lies the happiness of man, is composed of goods of both kinds, both bodily and spiritual. And consequently he thinks that the primary objects of nature are to be sought for their own sake, and that virtue, which is the art of living, and can be communicated by instruction, is the most excellent of spiritual goods. This virtue, then, or art of regulating life, when it has received these primary objects of nature which existed independently of it, and prior to any instruction, seeks them all, and itself also, for its own sake; and it uses them, as it also uses itself, that from them all it may derive profit and enjoyment, greater or less, according as they are themselves greater or less; and while it takes pleasure in all of them, it despises the less that it may obtain or retain the greater when occasion demands. Now, of all goods, spiritual or bodily, there is none at all to compare with virtue. For virtue makes a good use both of itself and of all other goods in which lies man's happiness; and where it is absent, no matter how many good things a man has, they are not for his good, and consequently should not be called good things while they belong to one who makes them useless by using them badly. The life of man, then, is called happy when it enjoys virtue and these other spiritual and bodily good things without which virtue is impossible. It is called happier if it enjoys some or many other good things which are not essential to virtue; and happiest of all, if it lacks not one of the good things which pertain to the body and the soul. For life is not the same thing as virtue, since not every life, but a wisely regulated life, is virtue; and yet, while there can be life of some kind without virtue, there cannot be virtue without life. This I might apply to memory and reason, and such mental faculties; for these exist prior to instruction, and without them there cannot be any instruction, and consequently no virtue, since virtue is learned. But bodily advantages, such as swiftness of foot, beauty, or strength, are not essential to virtue, neither is virtue essential to them, and yet they are good things; and, according to our philosophers, even these advantages are desired by virtue for its own sake, and are used and enjoyed by it in a becoming manner.

They say that this happy life is also social, and loves the advantages of its friends as its own, and for their sake wishes for them what it desires for itself, whether these friends live in the same family, as a wife, children, domestics; or in the locality where one's home is, as the citizens of the same town; or in the world at large, as the nations bound in common human brotherhood; or in the universe itself, comprehended in the heavens and the earth, as those whom they call gods, and provide as friends for the wise man, and whom we more familiarly call angels. Moreover, they say that, regarding the supreme good and evil, there is no room for doubt, and that they therefore differ from the New Academy in this respect, and they are not concerned whether a philosopher pursues those ends which they think true in the Cynic dress and manner of life or in some other. And, lastly, in regard to the three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, and the composite, they declare in favor of the third. That these were the opinions and doctrines of the Old Academy, Varro asserts on the authority of Antiochus, Cicero's master and his own, though Cicero makes him out to have been more frequently in accordance with the Stoics than with the Old Academy. But of what importance is this to us, who ought to judge the matter on its own merits, rather than to understand accurately what different men have thought about it?