Traduction Masquer
Reply to Faustus the Manichaean

22.

But supposing that there is some one so deluded by carnality as to worship not the God whom we worship, who is one and true, but the fiction of your suspicions or your slanders, whom you say we worship, is not even this god better than yours? Observe, I beseech you, what must be plain to the feeblest understanding; for here there is no need of great perspicacity. I address all, wise and unwise. I appeal to the common sense and judgment of all alike. Hear, consider, judge. Would it not have been better for your god to have remained in darkness from eternity, than to have plunged the light coeternal with him and cognate to him into darkness? Would it not have been better to have expressed admiration in surprise at the appearance of a new light coming to scatter the darkness, than to have been unable to baffle the assault of darkness except by the concession of his own light? Unhappy if he did this in alarm, and cruel if there was no need of it. Surely it would have been better to see light, made by himself, and to admire it as good, than to make the light begotten by himself evil; better than that his own light should become hostile to himself in repelling the forces of darkness. For this will be the accusation against those who will be condemned for ever to the mass of darkness, that they suffered themselves to lose their original brightness, and became the enemies of sacred light. If they did not know from eternity that they would be thus condemned, they must have suffered the darkness of eternal ignorance; or if they did know, the darkness of eternal fear. Thus part of the substance of your god really did remain from eternity in its own darkness; and instead of admiring new light on its appearance, it only met with another and a hostile darkness, of which it had always been in fear. Indeed, God himself must have been in the darkness of fear for this part of himself, if he was dreading the evil coming upon it. If he did not foresee the evil, he must have been in the darkness of ignorance. If he foresaw it, and was not in fear, the darkness of such cruelty is worse than the darkness either of ignorance or of fear. Your god appears to be destitute of the quality which the apostle commends in the body, which you insanely believe to be made not by God, but by Hyle: "If one member suffers, all the members suffer with it." ¹ But suppose he did suffer; he foresaw, he feared, he suffered, but he could not help himself. Thus he remained from eternity in the darkness of his own misery; and then, instead of admiring a new light which was to drive away the darkness, he came in contact, to the injury of his own light, with another darkness which he had always dreaded. Again, would it not have been much better, I say, not to have given a commandment like God, but even to have received a commandment like Adam, which he would be rewarded for keeping and punished for breaking, acting either way by his own free-will, than to be forced by inevitable necessity to admit darkness into his light in spite of himself? Surely it would have been better to have given a precept to human nature, not knowing that it would become sinful, than to have been driven by necessity to sin contrary to his own divine nature. Think for a moment, and say how darkness could be conquered by one who was himself conquered by necessity. Conquered already by this greater enemy, he fought under his conqueror's orders against a less formidable opponent. Would it not have been better not to know where Adam had hid himself, than to have been himself destitute of any means of escape, first from a hard and hateful necessity, and then from a dissimilar and hostile race? Would it not have been better to grudge eternal life to human nature, than to consign to misery the divine nature; to desire the blood and fat of sacrifices, than to be himself slaughtered in so many forms, on account of his mixture with the blood and fat of every victim; to be disturbed by jealousy at these sacrifices being offered to other gods as well as to himself, than to be himself offered on all altars to all devils, as mixed up not only with all fruits, but also with all animals? Would it not have been much better to be affected even with human anger, so as to be enraged against both his friends and his enemies for their sins, than to be himself influenced by fear as well as by anger wherever these passions exist, or than to share in all the sin that is committed, and in all punishment that is suffered? For this is the doom of that part of your god which is in confinement everywhere, condemned to this by himself, not as guilty, but in order to conquer his dreaded enemy. Doomed himself to such a fatal necessity, the part of himself which he has given over to condemnation might pardon him, if he were as humble as he is miserable. But how can you pretend to find fault with God for His anger against both friends and enemies when they sin, when the god of your fancies first under compulsion compels his own members to go to be devoured by sin, and then condemns them to remain in darkness? Though he does this, you say that it will not be in anger. But will he not be ashamed to punish, or to appear to punish, those from whom he should ask pardon in words such as these: "Forgive me, I beseech you. You are my members; could I treat you thus, except from necessity? You know yourselves, that you were sent here because a formidable enemy had arisen; and now you must remain here to prevent his rising again"? Again, is it not better to slay thousands of men for trifling faults, or for nothing, than to cast into the abyss of sin, and to condemn to the punishment of eternal imprisonment, God's own members, his substance--in fact, God himself? It cannot properly be said of the real substance of God that it has the choice of sinning or not sinning, for God's substance is absolutely unchangeable. God cannot sin, as He cannot deny Himself. Man, on the contrary, can sin and deny God, or he can choose not to do so. But suppose the members of your god had, like a rational human soul, the choice of sinning or not sinning; they might perhaps be justly punished for heinous offenses by confinement in the mass of darkness. But you cannot attribute to these parts a liberty which you deny to God himself. For if God had not given them up to sin, he would have been forced to sin himself, by the prevalence of the race of darkness. But if there was no danger of being thus forced, it was a sin to send these parts to a place where they incurred this danger. To do so, indeed, from free choice is a crime deserving the torment which your god unnaturally inflicts upon his own parts, more than the conduct of these parts in going by his command to a place where they lost the power of living in righteousness. But if God himself was in danger of being forced to sin by invasion and capture, unless he had secured himself first by the misconduct and then by the punishment of his own parts, there can have been no free-will either in your god or in his parts. Let him not set himself up as judge, but confess himself a criminal. For though he was forced against his own will, he professes to pass a righteous sentence in condemning those whom he knows to have suffered evil rather than done it; making this profession that he may not be thought of as having been conquered; as if it could do a beggar any good to be called prosperous and happy. Surely it would have been better for your god to have spared neither righteous nor wicked in indiscriminate punishment (which is Faustus' last charge against our God), than to have been so cruel to his own members,--first giving them up to incurable contamination, and then, as if that was not enough, accusing them falsely of misconduct. Faustus declares that they justly suffer this severe and eternal punishment, because they allowed themselves to be led astray from their original brightness, and became hostile to sacred light. But the reason of this, as Faustus says, was that they were so greedily devoured in the first assault of the princes of darkness, that they were unable to recover themselves, or to separate themselves from the hostile principle. These souls, therefore, did no evil themselves, but in all this were innocent sufferers. The real agent was he who sent them away from himself into this wretchedness. They suffered more from their father than from their enemy. Their father sent them into all this misery; while their enemy desired them as something good, wishing not to hurt them, but to enjoy them. The one injured them knowingly, the other in ignorance. This god was so weak and helpless that he could not otherwise secure himself first against an enemy threatening attack, and then against the same enemy in confinement. Let him, then, not condemn those parts whose obedience defended him, and whose death secures his safety. If he could not avoid the conflict, why slander his defenders? When these parts allowed themselves to be led astray from their original brightness, and became hostile to sacred light, this must have been from the force of the enemy; and if they were forced against their will, they are innocent; while, if they could have resisted had they chosen, there is no need of the origin of evil in an imaginary evil nature, since it is to be found in free-will. Their not resisting, when they could have done so, is plainly their own fault, and not owing to any force from without. For, supposing them able to do a thing, to do which is right, while not to do it is great and heinous sin, their not doing it is their own choice. So, then, if they choose not to do it, the fault is in their will not in necessity. The origin of sin is in the will; therefore in the will is also the origin of evil, both in the sense of acting against a just precept, and in the sense of suffering under a just sentence. There is thus no reason why, in your search for the origin of evil, you should fall into so great an evil as that of calling a nature so rich in good things the nature of evil, and of attributing the terrible evil of necessity to the nature of perfect good, before any commixture with evil. The cause of this erroneous belief is your pride, which you need not have unless you choose; but in your wish to defend at all hazards the error into which you have fallen, you take away the origin of evil from free-will, and place it in a fabulous nature of evil. And thus you come at last to say, that the souls which are to be doomed to eternal confinement in the mass of darkness became enemies to sacred light not from choice, but by necessity; and to make your god a judge with whom it is of no use to prove, in behalf of your clients. that they were under compulsion, and a king who will make no allowance for your brethren, his own sons and members, whose hostility against you and against himself you ascribe not to choice, but to necessity. What shocking cruelty! unless you proceed in the next place to defend your god, as also acting not from choice, but by necessity. So, if there could be found another judge free from necessity, who could decide the question on the principles of equity, he would sentence your god to be bound to this mass, not by being fastened on the outside, but by being shut up inside along with the formidable enemy. The first in the guilt of necessity ought to be first in the sentence of condemnation. Would it not be much better, then, in comparison with such a god as this, to choose the god whom we indeed do not worship, but whom you think or pretend to think we worship? Though he spares not his servants, whether righteous or sinful, making no proper separation, and not distinguishing between punishment and discipline, is he not better than the god who spares not his own members though innocent, if necessity is no crime, or guilty from their obedience to him, if necessity itself is criminal; so that they are condemned eternally by him, along with whom they should have been released, if any liberty was recovered by the victory, while he should have been condemned along with them if the victory reduced the force of necessity even so far as to give this small amount of force to justice? Thus the god whom you represent us as worshipping, though he is not the one true God whom we really worship, is far better than your god. Neither, indeed, has any existence; but both are the creatures of your imaginations. But, according to your own representations, the one whom you call ours, and find fault with, is better than the one whom you call your own, and whom you worship. ²

Edition Masquer
Contra Faustum Manichaeum libri triginta tres

22.

Sed facite aliquem prorsus carnaliter ita desipientem, ut deum colat, non qualem colimus, qui unus et verus est, sed qualem nos colere dicitis, qui vestris vel calumniis vel suspicionibus fictus est! Nonne etiam iste meliorem colit quam vos? Quaeso enim, advertite et qualescumque oculos aperite; neque enim opus est magno acumine ingenii, ut hoc, quod dicam, perspici possit. Omnes prudentes imprudentesque appello: audite, advertite, iudicate! Quanto enim melius deus vester ex aeternitate versatus esset in tenebris quam coaeternam sibi et cognatam lucem mersisset in tenebras! 611,28 Quanto melius exortam sibi novam lucem ad fugandas tenebras miratus laudaret quam irruentes sibi veteres tenebras nisi sua luce contenebrata evitare non posset, infelix, si perturbatus, crudelis, si securus hoc fecit! Melius enim certe a se factam lucem videret bonam quam a se genitam faceret malam, quae sic ab eo reppulit tenebras inimicas, ut ei fieret inimica. Hoc enim culpae imputabitur damnandis in globo illis reliquiis, quod errare se a priore lucida sua natura passae sunt et inimicae lumini sancto exstiterunt, quod antequam eis accideret ex aeternitate si nesciebant hoc sibi futurum, aeternas ignorantiae tenebras, si autem sciebant, aeternas timoris tenebras patiebantur. p. 612,11 Ecce vere pars et substantia dei vestri in suis tenebris ex aeternitate versata est nec postea lucem novam mirata est, sed alias tenebras alienas, quas semper timebat, incurrit. Porro ipse deus, cuius illa pars erat, si eidem parti suae futurum tantum malum timebat, etiam ipsum occupaverant timoris tenebrae, si autem hoc futurum nesciebat, ignorantiae tenebris caecabatur; si autem hoc parti suae futurum sciebat et non timebat, peiores sunt tenebrae tantae crudelitatis quam vel ignorantiae vel timoris; neque enim habebat deus vester, quod in ipsa carne, quam non a deo, sed ab hyle factam dementissime creditis, sic laudat apostolus: Si patitur unum membrum, compatiuntur omnia membra. p. 612,23 Sed non accusamus: praesciebat, timebat, dolebat, sed quid faceret non habebat. In his ergo suae miseriae tenebris ex aeternitate versatus est nec postea novam lucem, quae ab illo tenebras fugaret, miratus est, sed alias tenebras, quas semper timuit, magno malo suae lucis expertus est. Quanto melius, non dicam, praeceptum daret sicut deus, sed praeceptum acciperet sicut homo, quod bono suo custodiret, malo suo contemneret, in utroque tamen motu animi libera voluntate uteretur potius quam contra voluntatem ad contenebrandam lucem suam inevitabili necessitate premeretur! Nam illud multo utique melius esset, ut praeceptum daret humanae naturae, quam peccaturam esse nesciret, quam naturam suam divinam necessitate pressus peccare compelleret. p. 613,7 Evigilate et dicite nobis, quomodo vincit tenebras, quem vincit necessitas! Haec iam erat apud illum hostis maior, a qua victus et iussus cum minore pugnavit. Quanto melius nesciret, quo ab eius facie fugisset Adam, quam ipse primo a facie durae ac dirae necessitatis et postea a facie diversae atque adversae gentis quo fugeret non haberet! Quanto melius naturae humanae invideret vitam beatam quam naturam divinam daret in miseriam, desideraret sanguinem et adipem sacrificiorum potius, quam ipse totiens etiam idolis mactaretur, mixtus adipi et sanguini omnium victimarum, perturbaretur zelo, si illa sacrificia et diis aliis offerrentur, potius quam ipse ligatus non solum in omnibus frugibus, verum etiam in omnibus carnibus per omnes aras omnibus daemonibus offerretur! p. 613,20 Quanto meliusvel humana indignatione commotus ac turbidus peccantibus et suis et alienis irasceretur, quam ipse non solum in omnibus irascentibus, sed etiam in omnibus timentibus turbaretur, in peccantibus omnibus coinquinaretur, in damnatis omnibus puniretur ubique ligatus ex illa sua parte, quam ad tale dedecus innocentem ipse damnavit, ut per illam vinceret, quod timebat, etiam ipse sub tam exitiosa necessitate damnatus, ut ei damnata pars eius posset ignoscere, si cum iam miser sit, vel humilis esset! Nunc autem quis ferat reprehendi a vobis deum irascentem suis alienisque peccantibus, cum deus, quem fingitis, membra sua, quae coactus coegit ire in fauces peccati, postea damnet in globo? p. 614,5 Quod quidem cum faciet, ut dicitis, iram non habebit. Sed miror, si frontem habebit inferendo in eos quasi vindictam, a quibus petere deberet veniam et dicere: obsecro, ignoscite, membra mea estis; quando ego in vos istuc nisi victus necessitate facere possum? Scitis et vos, quod tunc, quando vos huc misi, horrendus hostis eruperat; quod autem nunc vos hic illigo, timeo, ne rursus erumpat. Iam certe etiam illud fatemini multo melius esse hominum milia ob nullam vel levem culpam temporali morte interficere quam membra sua, id est membra dei, substantiam dei et plane deum et in peccati voraginem tradere et poenae sempiternae colligatione damnare. p. 614,16 Si enim esset illis membris peccandi vel non peccandi liberum arbitrium, quamquam de substantia dei, quae vere substantia dei est ac per hoc omnino incommutabilis, quemadmodum hoc dicatur, non invenitur; deus enim omnino peccare non potest, sicut negare se ipsum non potest; homo autem potest peccare et deum negare, sed si nolit, non facit -, si ergo istis membris dei vestri velut animae humanae ac rationali esset, ut dixi, peccandi vel non peccandi liberum voluntatis arbitrium, recte fortasse pro gravibus criminibus illo globi supplicio plecterentur. Nunc autem libertatem voluntatis illas particulas habuisse dicere non potestis, quam totus deus ipse non habuit, quia si eas non mitteret in peccatum, totus a tenebrarum gente pervasus peccare cogeretur; quod si cogi non posset, peccavit, cum eas eo misit, ubi cogi possent, et ideo magis ipse illo velut parricidali culleo dignus, qui hoc fecit libero imperio, quam illae, quae obtemperando illuc ierunt, ubi recte vivendi arbitrium liberum perdiderunt. p. 615,5 Si autem ad peccandum et ipse invasus atque possessus cogi posset, nisi per suae partis primo flagitium, deinde supplicium sibi providisset _nulla[que]_fuit in deo vestro nec in eius partibus libera voluntas, nec se fingat iudicem, sed agnoscat reum, nec quia passus est, quod nolebat, sed quia se simulat iusta retribuere damnando eos, quos novit malum passos esse potius quam fecisse, quod ad hoc tantum simulat, ne victus inveniatur, quasi aliquid prosit alicui misero, si felix aut fortunatus vocetur. p. 615,13 Nempe iam et hoc melius erat, ut deus vester sine ullo aequitatis examine hominibus nec iustis nec peccatoribus parceret – quod in reprehensione dei nostri Faustus nihil intellegens ultimum posuit – quam in membra sua sic saeviret, ut parum sit, quod ea inexpiabiliter venenanda hostibus obtulit, nisi etiam falso crimine iniquitatis accuset, quae ideo merito dicit pendere tam immane ac sine fine supplicium, quod errare se a priore sua lucida natura passa sunt et inimica lumini sancto exstiterunt. Unde, nisi quia, ut ipse dicit, ita erant inviscerata primae aviditati principum tenebrarum, ut originem suam recolere seque ab hostili natura discernere non valerent? Ergo animae huiusmodi nihil mali ipsae fecerunt, sed innocentes tantum malum perpessae sunt, quo faciente nisi illo, primitus qui, ut a se in tantum malum procederent, imperavit! p. 616,1 Peiorem ergo expertae sunt patrem quam hostem. Pater enim eas ad tantum malum misit, hostis autem tamquam bonum appetivit cupiens perfrui, non nocere; ille sciens nocuit, ille nesciens. Sed deus infirmus atque inops aliter sibi consulere non valebat, prius adversus hostem improbum et post adversus inclusum. Saltem ergo non accuset eas, quarum oboedientia tutus est, quarum morte securus est. Si enim coactus est proeliari, numquid et calumniari? Nam quando se errare a priore sua lucida natura passae sunt et inimicae lumini sancto exstiterunt, ad hoc utique ab hoste coactae sunt, cui si resistere non valuerunt, innocentes damnantur, si autem valuerunt nec voluerunt, quid adhuc tam fabulose inducitis naturam mali, cum a propria voluntate sit origo peccati? p. 616,14 Hoc enim certe sua culpa, non vi aliena fecerunt, quod, cum possent malo resistere, noluerunt. Quod enim si facerent, bene facerent, si autem non facerent, graviter immaniterque peccarent; si potuerunt et non fecerunt, utique noluerunt. Si ergo noluerunt, voluntatis crimen est, non necessitatis; a voluntate igitur initium peccati. Unde autem initium peccati, inde initium mali vel faciendi contra iustum praeceptum vel patiendi secundum iustum iudicium. Proinde nulla causa est, cur quaerentes, unde sit malum, irrueritis in huius erroris tam magnum malum, ut naturam tot bonis abundantem naturam mali diceretis et in natura summi boni ante commixtionem naturae mali horrendum necessitatis malum poneretis. p. 616,26 Et huius enim erroris vestri causa superbia est, quam non habebitis, si nolitis. Sed vos dum vultis illud, quo irruistis, quoquo modo defendere, aufertis originem peccati a voluntatis arbitrio et ponitis in vana et falsa fabula naturam mali. Ac per hoc restat, ut dicatis etiam illas animas in horribili globo aeterna colligatione damnandas non voluntate, sed necessitate inimicas lumini sancto exstitisse talemque deum vestrum iudicem constituatis, apud quem nihil prodesse possitis eis, quarum causam demonstrata necessitate defenditis, et talem regem, a quo fratribus vestris, filiis et membris illius, quorum inimicitias adversus vos et ipsum non voluntate, sed necessitate exstitisse perhibetis, nec indulgentiam impetrare valeatis. p. 617,11 O immanissimam crudelitatem! Nisi quod convertitis vos ad ipsius defensionem, ut eum quoque ista quod necessitate faciat excusetis. Si ergo possetis invenire alterum iudicem, qui liber vinculo necessitatis moderator exsisteret aequitatis, istum certe in illo globo non forinsecus figeret, sed cum ipso terribili hoste intus includeret. Cur enim non iuste prior sit ad poenam damnationis, qui prior est ad crimen necessitatis? Quanto ergo melius eligeretis deum in comparatione peioris, non qualem colimus, sed qualem nos colere vel fingitis vel putatis, qui sine ullo aequitatis examine, sine ulla distinctione damnationis et disciplinae non parceret in servis suis nec iusto nec peccatori, p. 617,22 potius quam non parceret membris suis vel innocentibus, si necessitas crimen non est, vel illi obtemperando factis nocentibus, si et necessitas crimen est, ut ab illo in aeternum damnarentur, cum quo vel simul absolvi, si post victoriam respiraret libertas, vel simul damnari debuerunt, si et post victoriam tantum saltem valeret necessitas, ut aliquid valeret et aequitas, sicut autem deum, non illum verum et summum, quem colimus, sed alium nescio quem falsum confingitis, quem nos colere vel arbitramini vel calumniamini, qui tamen etiam ipse multo est melior deo vestro; ambo enim non sunt et a vobis ambo finguntur, sed meliorem fingitis eum, quem tamquam nostrum accusatis, quam eum, quem vestrum adoratis.