Edition Masquer
De Trinitate

III.

[III 4] Ecce iterum vide si potes. Non amas certe nisi bonum, quia bona est terra altitudine montium et temperamento collium et planitie camporum, et bonum praedium amoenum ac fertile, et bona domus paribus membris disposita et ampla et lucida, et bona animalia animata corpora, et bonus aer modestus et salubris, et bonus cibus suavis atque aptus valetudini, et bona valetudo sine doloribus et lassitudine, et bona facies hominis dimensa pariliter et affecta hilariter et luculente colorata, et bonus animus amici consensionis dulcedine et amoris fide, et bonus vir iustus, et bonae divitiae quia facile expediunt, et bonum caelum cum sole et luna et stellis suis, et boni angeli sancta oboedientia, et bona locutio suaviter docens et congruenter movens audientem, et bonum carmen canorum numeris et sententiis grave. Quid plura et plura? Bonum hoc et bonum illud. Tolle hoc et illud, et vide ipsum bonum si potes; ita deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni. Neque enim in his omnibus bonis, vel quae commemoravi vel quae alia cernuntur sive cogitantur, diceremus aliud alio melius cum vere iudicamus, nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni secundum quod et probaremus aliquid et aliud alii praeponeremus. Sic amandus est deus, non hoc et illud bonum, sed ipsum bonum; quaerendum enim bonum animae, non cui supervolitet iudicando, sed cui haereat amando, et quid hoc nisi deus? Non bonus animus aut bonus angelus aut bonum caelum, sed bonum bonum.

Sic enim forte facilius advertitur quid velim dicere. Cum enim audio verbi gratia quod dicitur animus bonus, sicut duo verba sunt ita ex eis verbis duo quaedam intellego, aliud quo animus est, aliud quo bonus. Et quidem ut animus esset, non egit ipse aliquid; non enim iam erat qui ageret ut esset. Ut autem sit bonus animus, video agendum esse voluntate, non quia id ipsum quo animus est non est aliquid boni (nam unde iam dicitur et verissime dicitur corpore melior?), sed ideo nondum dicitur bonus animus quia restat ei actio voluntatis qua sit praestantior. Quam si neglexerit, iure culpatur recteque dicitur non bonus animus; distat enim ab eo qui hoc agit, et quia ille laudabilis, profecto iste qui hoc non agit vituperabilis est. Cum vero agit hoc studio et fit bonus animus, nisi se ad aliquid convertat quod ipse non est, non potest hoc assequi. Quo se autem convertit ut fiat bonus animus nisi ad bonum, cum hoc amat et appetit et adipiscitur? Unde se si rursus avertat fiatque non bonus, hoc ipso quod se avertit a bono, nisi maneat in se illud bonum unde se avertit, non est quo se iterum, si voluerit emendare, convertat.

[5] Quapropter nulla essent mutabilia bona nisi esset incommutabile bonum. Cum itaque audis bonum hoc et bonum illud quae possunt alias dici etiam non bona, si potueris sine illis quae participatione boni bona sunt perspicere ipsum bonum cuius participatione bona sunt (simul enim et ipsum intellegis, cum audis hoc aut illud bonum), si ergo potueris illis detractis per se ipsum perspicere bonum, perspexeris deum. Et si amore inhaeseris, continuo beatificaberis. Pudeat autem, cum alia non amentur nisi quia bona sunt, eis inhaerendo non amare bonum ipsum unde bona sunt. Illud etiam quod animus tantum quia est animus, etiam nondum eo modo bonus quo se convertit ad incommutabile bonum, sed, ut dixi, tantum animus, cum ita nobis placet ut eum omni etiam luci corporeae, cum bene intellegimus, praeferamus, non in se ipso nobis placet sed in illa arte qua factus est. Inde enim approbatur factus ubi videtur fuisse faciendus. Haec est veritas et simplex bonum; non enim est aliud aliquid quam ipsum bonum ac per hoc etiam summum bonum. Non enim minui vel augeri bonum potest nisi quod ex alio bono bonum est.

Ad hoc se igitur animus convertit ut bonus sit, a quo habet ut animus sit. Tunc ergo voluntas naturae congruit ut perficiatur in bono animus, cum illud bonum diligitur conversione voluntatis unde est et illud quod non amittitur nec aversione voluntatis. Avertendo enim se a summo bono amittit animus ut sit bonus animus; non autem amittit ut sit animus, cum et hoc iam bonum sit corpore melius. Hoc ergo amittit voluntas quod voluntas adipiscitur; iam enim erat animus qui converti ad id vellet a quo erat; qui autem vellet esse antequam esset, nodum erat. Et hoc est bonum nostrum ubi videmus utrum esse debuerit aut debeat quidquid esse debuisse aut debere comprehendimus, et ubi videmus esse non potuisse, nisi esse debuisset, quidquid etiam quomodo esse debuerit non comprehendimus. Hoc ergo bonum non longe positum est ab unoquoque nostrum. In illo enim vivimus et movemur et sumus.

Traduction Masquer
The Fifteen Books of Aurelius Augustinus, Bishop of Hippo, on the Trinity

Chapter 3.--How God May Be Known to Be the Chief Good. The Mind Does Not Become Good Unless by Turning to God.

4. Behold again, and see if thou canst. Thou certainly dost not love anything except what is good, since good is the earth, with the loftiness of its mountains, and the due measure of its hills, and the level surface of its plains; and good is an estate that is pleasant and fertile; and good is a house that is arranged in due proportions, and is spacious and bright; and good are animal and animate bodies; and good is air that is temperate, and salubrious; and good is food that is agreeable and fit for health; and good is health, without pains or lassitude; and good is the countenance of man that is disposed in fit proportions, and is cheerful in look, and bright in color; and good is the mind of a friend, with the sweetness of agreement, and with the confidence of love; and good is a righteous man; and good are riches, since they are readily useful; and good is the heaven, with its sun, and moon, and stars; and good are the angels, by their holy obedience; and good is discourse that sweetly teaches and suitably admonishes the hearer; and good is a poem that is harmonious in its numbers and weighty in its sense. And why add yet more and more? This thing is good and that good, but take away this and that, and regard good itself if thou canst; so wilt thou see God, not good by a good that is other than Himself, but the good of all good. For in all these good things, whether those which I have mentioned, or any else that are to be discerned or thought, we could not say that one was better than another, when we judge truly, unless a conception of the good itself had been impressed upon us, such that according to it we might both approve some things as good, and prefer one good to another. So God is to be loved, not this and that good, but the good itself. For the good that must be sought for the soul is not one above which it is to fly by judging, but to which it is to cleave by loving; and what can this be except God? Not a good mind, or a good angel, or the good heaven, but the good good. For perhaps what I wish to say may be more easily perceived in this way. For when, for instance, a mind is called good, as there are two words, so from these words I understand two things--one whereby it is mind, and another whereby it is good. And itself had no share in making itself a mind, for there was nothing as yet to make itself to be anything; but to make itself to be a good mind, I see, must be brought about by the will: not because that by which it is mind is not itself anything good;--for how else is it already called, and most truly called, better than the body?--but it is not yet called a good mind, for this reason, that the action of the will still is wanted, by which it is to become more excellent; and if it has neglected this, then it is justly blamed, and is rightly called not a good mind. For it then differs from the mind which does perform this; and since the latter is praiseworthy, the former doubtless, which does not perform, it is blameable. But when it does this of set purpose, and becomes a good mind, it yet cannot attain to being so unless it turn itself to something which itself is not. And to what can it turn itself that it may become a good mind, except to the good which it loves, and seeks, and obtains? And if it turns itself back again from this, and becomes not good, then by the very act of turning away from the good, unless that good remain in it from which it turns away, it cannot again turn itself back thither if it should wish to amend.

5. Wherefore there would be no changeable goods, unless there were the unchangeable good. Whenever then thou art told of this good thing and that good thing, which things can also in other respects be called not good, if thou canst put aside those things which are good by the participation of the good, and discern that good itself by the participation of which they are good (for when this or that good thing is spoken of, thou understandest together with them the good itself also): if, then, I say thou canst remove these things, and canst discern the good in itself, then thou wilt have discerned God. And if thou shalt cleave to Him with love, thou shalt be forthwith blessed. But whereas other things are not loved, except because they are good, be ashamed, in cleaving to them, not to love the good itself whence they are good. That also, which is a mind, only because it is a mind, while it is not yet also good by the turning itself to the unchangeable good, but, as I said, is only a mind; whenever it so pleases us, as that we prefer it even, if we understand aright, to all corporeal light, does not please us in itself, but in that skill by which it was made. For it is thence approved as made, wherein it is seen to have been to be made. This is truth, and simple good: for it is nothing else than the good itself, and for this reason also the chief good. For no good can be diminished or increased, except that which is good from some other good. Therefore the mind turns itself, in order to be good, to that by which it comes to be a mind. Therefore the will is then in harmony with nature, so that the mind may be perfected in good, when that good is loved by the turning of the will to it, whence that other good also comes which is not lost by the turning away of the will from it. For by turning itself from the chief good, the mind loses the being a good mind; but it does not lose the being a mind. And this, too, is a good already, and one better than the body. The will, therefore, loses that which the will obtains. For the mind already was, that could wish to be turned to that from which it was: but that as yet was not, that could wish to be before it was. And herein is our [supreme] good, when we see whether the thing ought to be or to have been, respecting which we comprehend that it ought to be or to have been, and when we see that the thing could not have been unless it ought to have been, of which we also do not comprehend in what manner it ought to have been. This good then is not far from every one of us: for in it we live, and move, and have our being. ¹