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On Repentance

Chapter III.--Sins May Be Divided into Corporeal and Spiritual. Both Equally Subject, If Not to Human, Yet to Divine Investigation and Punishment. ¹

What things, then, they be for which repentance seems just and due--that is, what things are to be set down under the head of sin--the occasion indeed demands that I should note down; but (to do so) may seem to be unnecessary. For when the Lord is known, our spirit, having been "looked back upon" ² by its own Author, emerges unbidden into the knowledge of the truth; and being admitted to (an acquaintance with) the divine precepts, is by them forthwith instructed that "that from which God bids us abstain is to be accounted sin:" inasmuch as, since it is generally agreed that God is some great essence of good, of course nothing but evil would be displeasing to good; in that, between things mutually contrary, friendship there is none. Still it will not be irksome briefly to touch upon the fact ³ that, of sins, some are carnal, that is, corporeal; some spiritual. For since man is composed of this combination of a two-fold substance, the sources of his sins are no other than the sources of his composition. But it is not the fact that body and spirit are two things that constitute the sins mutually different--otherwise they are on this account rather equal, because the two make up one--lest any make the distinction between their sins proportionate to the difference between their substances, so as to esteem the one lighter, or else heavier, than the other: if it be true, (as it is,) that both flesh and spirit are creatures of God; one wrought by His hand, one consummated by His afflatus. Since, then, they equally pertain to the Lord, whichever of them sins equally offends the Lord. Is it for you to distinguish the acts of the flesh and the spirit, whose communion and conjunction in life, in death, and in resurrection, are so intimate, that "at that time" ⁴ they are equally raised up either for life or else for judgment; because, to wit, they have equally either sinned or lived innocently? This we would (once for all) premise, in order that we may understand that no less necessity for repentance is incumbent on either part of man, if in anything it have sinned, than on both. The guilt of both is common; common, too, is the Judge--God to wit; common, therefore, is withal the healing medicine of repentance. The source whence sins are named "spiritual" and "corporeal" is the fact that every sin is matter either of act or else of thought: so that what is in deed is "corporeal," because a deed, like a body, is capable of being seen and touched; what is in the mind is "spiritual," because spirit is neither seen nor handled: by which consideration is shown that sins not of deed only, but of will too, are to be shunned, and by repentance purged. For if human finitude ⁵ judges only sins of deed, because it is not equal to (piercing) the lurking-places of the will, let us not on that account make light of crimes of the will in God's sight. God is all-sufficient. Nothing from whence any sin whatsoever proceeds is remote from His sight; because He is neither ignorant, nor does He omit to decree it to judgment. He is no dissembler of, nor double-dealer with, ⁶ His own clear-sightedness. What (shall we say of the fact) that will is the origin of deed? For if any sins are imputed to chance, or to necessity, or to ignorance, let them see to themselves: if these be excepted, there is no sinning save by will. Since, then, will is the origin of deed, is it not so much the rather amenable to penalty as it is first in guilt? Nor, if some difficulty interferes with its full accomplishment, is it even in that case exonerated; for it is itself imputed to itself: nor; having done the work which lay in its own power, will it be excusable by reason of that miscarriage of its accomplishment. In fact, how does the Lord demonstrate Himself as adding a superstructure to the Law, except by interdicting sins of the will as well (as other sins); while He defines not only the man who had actually invaded another's wedlock to be an adulterer, but likewise him who had contaminated (a woman) by the concupiscence of his gaze? ⁷ Accordingly it is dangerous enough for the mind to set before itself what it is forbidden to perform, and rashly through the will to perfect its execution. And since the power of this will is such that, even without fully sating its self-gratification, it stands for a deed; as a deed, therefore, it shall be punished. It is utterly vain to say, "I willed, but yet I did not." Rather you ought to carry the thing through, because you will; or else not to will, because you do not carry it through. But, by the confession of your consciousness, you pronounce your own condemnation. For if you eagerly desired a good thing, you would have been anxious to carry it through; in like manner, as you do not carry an evil thing through, you ought not to have eagerly desired it. Wherever you take your stand, you are fast bound by guilt; because you have either willed evil, or else have not fulfilled good.

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De Paenitentia

III.

[1] Quorum ergo paenitentia iusta et debita videatur, id est quae delicto deputanda sint, locus quidem expostulat denotare, sed otiosum videri potest. [2] Domino enim cognito ultro spiritus a suo auctore respectus emergit ad notitiam veritatis et admissus ad dominica praecepta ex ipsis statim eruditur id peccato deputandum, a quo deus arceat: quoniam, cum deum grande quid boni constet esse, utique bono nisi malum non displiceret, quod inter contraria sibi nulla amicitia est. [3] Praestringere tamen non pigebit delictorum quaedam esse carnalia, id est corporalia, quaedam vero spiritalia — nam cum ex hac duplicis substantiae eongregatione confectus homo sit, non aliunde delinquit quam unde constat —; [4] sed non eo inter se differunt, quod corpus et spiritus duo sunt, atquin eo magis paria sunt, quia duo unum efficiunt, ne quis pro diversitate materiarum peccata earum discernat ut alterum altero levius aut gravius existimet. [5] Siquidem et caro et spiritus dei res, alia manu eius expressa, alia adflatu [eius] consummata; cum ergo ex pari ad dominum pertineant, quodcumque eorum deliquerit ex pari dominum offendit. [6] An tu discernas actus carnis et spiritus, quorum et in vita et in morte et in resurrectione tantum communionis atque consortii est, ut pariter tunc aut in vitam aut in iudicium suscitentur, quia scilicet pariter aut deliquerint aut innocenter egerint?

[7] Hoc eo praemisimus ut non minorem alteri quam utrique parti, si quid deliquerit, paenitentiae necessitatem intellegamus inpendere; communis reatus amborum est, communis et iudex, deus scilicet: communis igitur et paenitentiae medella. [8] Exinde spiritalia et corporalia nominantur, quod delictum omne aut agitur aut cogitatur, ut corporale sit quod in facto est quia factum ut corpus et videri et contingi habet, spiritale vero quod in animo est quia ut spiritus neque videtur neque tenetur. [9] Per quod ostenditur non facti solum, verum et voluntatis delicta vitanda et paenitentia purganda esse. Neque enim, si mediocritas humana facti solummodo iudicat quia voluntatis latebris par non est, idcirco [etiam] crimina eius etiam sub deo neglegamus. [10] Deus in omnia sufficit; nihil a conspectu eius remotum unde omnino delinquitur; quia non ignorat, nec omittit quominus in iudicium decernat: dissimulator et praevaricator perspicaciae suae non est! [11] Quid quod voluntas facti origo est? Viderint enim, si qua casui aut necessitati aut ignorantiae inputantur, quibus exceptis iam non nisi voluntate delinquitur. [12] Cum ergo facti origo sit, non tanto potior ad poenam est quanto principalis ad culpam? Qua ne tunc quidem liberatur cum aliqua difficultas perpetrationem eius intercipit: ipsa enim sibi inputatur nec excusari poterit per illam perficiendi infelicitatem, operata quod suum fuerat. [13] Denique dominus quemadmodum se adiectionem legi superstruere demonstrat nisi et voluntatis interdicendo delicta? Cum adulterum non eum solum definit qui comminus in alienum matrimonium cecidisset, verum etiam illum qui adspectus concupiscentia contaminasset. [14] Adeo quod prohibetur administrare, satis periculose animus sibi repraesentat et temere per voluntatem expungit effectum. Cuius voluntatis cum vis tanta sit ut nos solatio sui saturans pro facto cedat, pro facto ergo plectetur. [15] Vanissimum est dicere: 'volui nec tamen feci'; atquin perficere debes quia vis, aut nec velle quia nec perficis. [16] Sed ipse conscientiae tuae confessionem pronuntias, nam si bonum concupisceres, perficere gestisses; porro si ut malum non perficis, nec concupiscere debueras: quaqua te constitueris, crimini adstringeris qua aut malum volueris aut bonum non adinpleveris!