Edition Masquer
De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput IX: De praescientia dei et libera hominis uoluntate.

Contra Ciceronis definitionem. hos Cicero ita redarguere nititur, ut non existimet aliquid se aduersus eos ualere, nisi auferat diuinationem. quam sic conatur auferre, ut neget esse scientiam futurorum, eamque omnibus uiribus nullam esse omnino contendat, uel in homine uel in deo, nullamque rerum praedictionem. ita et dei praescientiam negat et omnem prophetiam luce clariorem conatur euertere uanis argumentationibus et obponendo sibi quaedam oracula, quae facile possunt refelli; quae tamen nec ipsa conuincit. in his autem mathematicorum coniecturis refutandis eius regnat oratio, quia uere tales sunt, ut se ipsae destruant et refellant. multo sunt autem tolerabiliores, qui uel siderea fata constituunt, quam iste qui tollit praescientiam futurorum. nam et confiteri esse deum et negare praescium futurorum apertissima insania est. quod et ipse cum uideret, etiam illud tentauit quod scriptum est: dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est deus; sed non ex sua persona. uidit enim quam esset inuidiosum et molestum, ideoque Cottam fecit disputantem de hac re aduersus Stoicos in libris de deorum natura et pro Lucilio Balbo, cui Stoicorum partes defendendas dedit, maluit ferre sententiam quam pro Cotta, qui nullam diuinam naturam esse contendit. in libris uero de diuinatione ex se ipso apertissime obpugnat praescientiam futurorum. hoc autem totum facere uidetur, ne fatum esse consentiat et perdat liberam uoluntatem. putat enim concessa scientia futurorum ita esse consequens fatum, ut negari omnino non possit. sed quoquo modo se habeant tortuosissimae concertationes et disputationes philosophorum, nos ut confitemur summum et uerum deum, ita uoluntatem summamque potestatem ac praescientiam eius confitemur; nec timemus ne ideo non uoluntate faciamus, quod uoluntate facimus, quia id nos facturos ille praesciuit, cuius praescientia falli non potest; quod Cicero timuit, ut obpugnaret praescientiam, et Stoici, ut non omnia necessitate fieri dicerent, quamuis omnia fato fieri contenderent. quid est ergo, quod Cicero timuit in praescientia futurorum, ut eam labefactare disputatione detestabili niteretur? uidelicet quia, si praescita sunt omnia futura, hoc ordine uenient, quo uentura esse praescita sunt; et si hoc ordine uenient, certus est ordo rerum praescienti deo; et si certus est ordo rerum certus est ordo causarum; non enim fieri aliquid potest, quod non aliqua efficiens causa praecesserit; si autem certus est ordo causarum, quo fit omne quod fit, fato, inquit, fiunt omnia quae fiunt. quod si ita est, nihil est in nostra potestate nullumque est arbitrium uoluntatis; quod si concedimus, inquit, omnis humana uita subuertitur, frustra leges dantur, frustra obiurgationes laudes, uituperationes exhortationes adhibentur, neque ulla iustitia bonis praemia et malis supplicia constituta sunt. haec ergo ne consequantur indigna et absurda et perniciosa rebus humanis, non uult esse praescientiam futurorum; atque in has angustias coartat animum religiosum, ut unum eligat e duobus, aut esse aliquid in nostra uoluntate, aut esse praescientiam futurorum, quoniam utrumque arbitratur esse non posse, sed si alterum confirmabitur, alterum tolli; si elegerimus praescientiam futurorum, tolli uoluntatis arbitrium; si elegerimus uoluntatis arbitrium, tolli praescientiam futurorum. ipse itaque, ut uir magnus et doctus et uitae humanae plurimum ac peritissime consulens, ex his duobus elegit liberum uoluntatis arbitrium; quod ut confirmaretur, negauit praescientiam futurorum atque ita, dum uult facere liberos, fecit sacrilegos. religiosus autem animus utrumque eligit, utrumque confitetur et fide pietatis utrumque confirmat. quomodo? inquit; nam si est praescientia futurorum, sequentur illa omnia, quae conexa sunt, donec eo perueniatur, ut nihil sit in nostra uoluntate. porro si est aliquid in nostra uoluntate, eisdem recursis gradibus eo peruenitur, ut non sit praescientia futurorum. nam per illa omnia sic recurritur: si est uoluntatis arbitrium, non omnia fato fiunt; si non omnia fato fiunt, non est omnium certus ordo causarum; si certus ordo causarum non est, nec rerum certus est ordo praescienti deo, quae fieri non possunt, nisi praecedentibus et efficientibus causis; si rerum ordo praescienti deo certus non est, non omnia sic ueniunt, ut ea uentura praesciuit; porro si non omnia sic ueniunt, ut ab illo uentura praescita sunt, non est, inquit, in deo praescientia omnium futurorum. nos aduersus istos sacrilegos ausus atque inpios et deum dicimus omnia scire antequam fiant, et uoluntate nos facere, quidquid a nobis nonnisi uolentibus fieri sentimus et nouimus. omnia uero fieri fato non dicimus, immo nulla fieri fato dicimus; quoniam fati nomen ubi solet a loquentibus poni, id est in constitutione siderum cum quisque conceptus aut natus est, quoniam res ipsa inaniter adseritur, nihil ualere monstramus. ordinem autem causarum, ubi uoluntas dei plurimum potest, neque negamus, neque fati uocabulo nuncupamus, nisi forte ut fatum a fando dictum intellegamus, id est a loquendo; non enim abnuere possumus esse scriptum in litteris sanctis: semel locutus est deus, duo haec audiui, quoniam potestas dei est, et tibi, domine, misericordia, qui reddis unicuique secundum opera eius. quod enim dictum est: semel locutus est, intellegitur inmobiliter, hoc est incommutabiliter, est locutus, sicut nouit incommutabiliter omnia quae futura sunt et quae ipse facturus est. hac itaque ratione possemus a fando fatum appellare, nisi hoc nomen iam in alia re soleret intellegi, quo corda hominum nolumus inclinari. non est autem consequens, ut, si deo certus est omnium ordo causarum, ideo nihil sit in nostrae uoluntatis arbitrio. et ipse quippe nostrae uoluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est deo eiusque praescientia continetur, quoniam et humanae uoluntates humanorum operum causae sunt. atque ita, qui omnes rerum causas praesciuit, profecto in eis causis etiam nostras uoluntates ignorare non potuit, quas nostrorum operum causas esse praesciuit. nam et illud, quod idem Cicero concedit, nihil fieri si causa efficiens non praecedat, satis est ad eum in hac quaestione redarguendum. quid enim eum adiuuat, quod dicit nihil quidem fieri sine causa, sed non omnem causam esse fatalem, quia est causa fortuita, est naturalis, est uoluntaria? sufficit, quia omne, quod fit, nonnisi causa praecedente fieri confitetur. nos enim eas causas, quae dicuntur fortuitae, unde etiam fortuna nomen accepit, non esse dicimus nullas, sed latentes, easque tribuimus uel dei ueri uel quorumlibet spirituum uoluntati, ipsasque naturales nequaquam ab illius uoluntate seiungimus, qui est auctor omnis conditorque naturae. iam uero causae uoluntariae aut dei sunt aut angelorum aut hominum aut quorumque animalium, si tamen uoluntates appellandae sunt animarum rationis expertium motus illi, quibus aliqua faciunt secundum naturam suam, cum quid uel adpetunt uel euitant. angelorum autem uoluntates dico seu bonorum, quos angelos dei dicimus, seu malorum, quos angelos diaboli uel etiam daemones appellamus: sic et hominum, et bonorum scilicet et malorum. ac per hoc colligitur non esse causas efficientes omnium quae fiunt nisi uoluntarias, illius naturae scilicet, quae spiritus uitae est. nam et aer iste seu uentus dicitur spiritus; sed quoniam corpus est, non est spiritus uitae. spiritus ergo uitae, qui uiuificat omnia creatorque est omnis corporis et omnis creati spiritus, ipse est deus, spiritus utique non creatus. in eius uoluntate summa potestas est, quae creatorum spirituum bonas uoluntates adiuuat, malas iudicat, omnes ordinat et quibusdam tribuit potestates, quibusdam non tribuit. sicut enim omnium naturarum creator est, ita omnium potestatum dator, non uoluntatum. malae quippe uoluntates ab illo non sunt, quoniam contra naturam sunt, quae ab illo est. corpora igitur magis subiacent uoluntatibus, quaedam nostris, id est omnium animantium mortalium et magis hominum quam bestiarum; quaedam uero angelorum; sed omnia maxime dei uoluntati subdita sunt, cui etiam uoluntates omnes subiciuntur, quia non habent potestatem nisi quam ille concedit. causa itaque rerum, quae facit nec fit, deus est; aliae uero causae et faciunt et fiunt, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales. corporales autem causae, quae magis fiunt quam faciunt, non sunt inter causas efficientes adnumerandae, quoniam hoc possunt, quod ex ipsis faciunt spirituum uoluntates. quomodo igitur ordo causarum, qui praescienti certus est deo, id efficit, ut nihil sit in nostra uoluntate, cum in ipso causarum ordine magnum habeant locum nostrae uoluntates? contendat ergo Cicero cum eis, qui hunc causarum ordinem dicunt esse fatalem uel potius ipsum fati nomine appellant, quod nos abhorremus praecipue propter uocabulum, quod non in re uera consueuit intellegi. quod uero negat ordinem omnium causarum esse certissimum et dei praescientiae notissimum, plus eum quam Stoici detestamur. aut enim esse deum negat, quod quidem inducta alterius persona in libris de deorum natura facere molitus est; aut si esse confitetur deum, quem negat praescium futurorum, etiam sic nihil dicit aliud, quam quod ille dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est deus. qui enim non est praescius omnium futurorum, non est utique deus. quapropter et uoluntates nostrae tantum ualent, quantum deus eas ualere uoluit atque praesciuit; et ideo quidquid ualent, certissime ualent, et quod facturae sunt, ipsae omnino facturae sunt, quia ualituras atque facturas ille praesciuit, cuius praescientia falli non potest. quapropter si mihi fati nomen alicui rei adhibendum placeret, magis dicerem fatum esse infirmioris potentioris uoluntatem, qui eum habet in potestate, quam illo causarum ordine, quem non usitato sed suo more Stoici fatum appellant, arbitrium nostrae uoluntatis auferri.

Traduction Masquer
The City of God

Chapter 9.--Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in Opposition to the Definition of Cicero.

The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect anything against them in argument unless he had first demolished divination. ¹ And this he attempts to accomplish by denying that there is any knowledge of future things, and maintains with all his might that there is no such knowledge either in God or man, and that there is no prediction of events. Thus he both denies the foreknowledge of God, and attempts by vain arguments, and by opposing to himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted, to overthrow all prophecy, even such as is clearer than the light (though even these oracles are not refuted by him).

But, in refuting these conjectures of the mathematicians, his argument is triumphant, because truly these are such as destroy and refute themselves. Nevertheless, they are far more tolerable who assert the fatal influence of the stars than they who deny the foreknowledge of future events. For, to confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly. This Cicero himself saw, and therefore attempted to assert the doctrine embodied in the words of Scripture, "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God." ² That, however, he did not do in his own person, for he saw how odious and offensive such an opinion would be; and therefore, in his book on the nature of the gods, ³ he makes Cotta dispute concerning this against the Stoics, and preferred to give his own opinion in favor of Lucilius Balbus, to whom he assigned the defence of the Stoical position, rather than in favor of Cotta, who maintained that no divinity exists. However, in his book on divination, he in his own person most openly opposes the doctrine of the prescience of future things. But all this he seems to do in order that he may not grant the doctrine of fate, and by so doing destroy free will. For he thinks that, the knowledge of future things being once conceded, fate follows as so necessary a consequence that it cannot be denied.

But, let these perplexing debatings and disputations of the philosophers go on as they may, we, in order that we may confess the most high and true God Himself, do confess His will, supreme power, and prescience. Neither let us be afraid lest, after all, we do not do by will that which we do by will, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew that we would do it. It was this which Cicero was afraid of, and therefore opposed foreknowledge. The Stoics also maintained that all things do not come to pass by necessity, although they contended that all things happen according to destiny. What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things? Doubtless it was this,--that if all future things have been foreknown, they will happen in the order in which they have been foreknown; and if they come to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown by God; and if a certain order of things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient cause. But if there is a certain order of causes according to which everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he, all things happen which do happen. But if this be so, then is there nothing in our own power, and there is no such thing as freedom of will; and if we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human life is subverted. In vain are laws enacted. In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations had recourse to; and there is no justice whatever in the appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments for the wicked. And that consequences so disgraceful, and absurd, and pernicious to humanity may not follow, Cicero chooses to reject the foreknowledge of future things, and shuts up the religious mind to this alternative, to make choice between two things, either that something is in our own power, or that there is foreknowledge,--both of which cannot be true; but if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied. He therefore, like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted very much and very skillfully for the good of humanity, of those two chose the freedom of the will, to confirm which he denied the foreknowledge of future things; and thus, wishing to make men free he makes them sacrilegious. But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety. But how so? says Cicero; for the knowledge of future things being granted, there follows a chain of consequences which ends in this, that there can be nothing depending on our own free wills. And further, if there is anything depending on our wills, we must go backwards by the same steps of reasoning till we arrive at the conclusion that there is no foreknowledge of future things. For we go backwards through all the steps in the following order:--If there is free will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do not happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown by God,--for things cannot come to pass except they are preceded by efficient causes,--but, if there is no fixed and certain order of causes foreknown by God, all things cannot be said to happen according as He foreknew that they would happen. And further, if it is not true that all things happen just as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any foreknowledge of future events.

Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done by us only because we will it. But that all things come to pass by fate, we do not say; nay we affirm that nothing comes to pass by fate; for we demonstrate that the name of fate, as it is wont to be used by those who speak of fate, meaning thereby the position of the stars at the time of each one's conception or birth, is an unmeaning word, for astrology itself is a delusion. But an order of causes in which the highest efficiency is attributed to the will of God, we neither deny nor do we designate it by the name of fate, unless, perhaps, we may understand fate to mean that which is spoken, deriving it from fari, to speak; for we cannot deny that it is written in the sacred Scriptures, "God hath spoken once; these two things have I heard, that power belongeth unto God. Also unto Thee, O God, belongeth mercy: for Thou wilt render unto every man according to his works." ⁴ Now the expression, "Once hath He spoken," is to be understood as meaning "immovably," that is, unchangeably hath He spoken, inasmuch as He knows unchangeably all things which shall be, and all things which He will do. We might, then, use the word fate in the sense it bears when derived from fari, to speak, had it not already come to be understood in another sense, into which I am unwilling that the hearts of men should unconsciously slide. But it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our wills. For even that very concession which Cicero himself makes is enough to refute him in this argument. For what does it help him to say that nothing takes place without a cause, but that every cause is not fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause? It is sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded by a cause. For we say that those causes which are called fortuitous are not a mere name for the absence of causes, but are only latent, and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that of spirits of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we by no means separate them from the will of Him who is the author and framer of all nature. But now as to voluntary causes. They are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men, or to animals of whatever description, if indeed those instinctive movements of animals devoid of reason, by which, in accordance with their own nature, they seek or shun various things, are to be called wills. And when I speak of the wills of angels, I mean either the wills of good angels, whom we call the angels of God, or of the wicked angels, whom we call the angels of the devil, or demons. Also by the wills of men I mean the wills either of the good or of the wicked. And from this we conclude that there are no efficient causes of all things which come to pass unless voluntary causes, that is, such as belong to that nature which is the spirit of life. For the air or wind is called spirit, but, inasmuch as it is a body, it is not the spirit of life. The spirit of life, therefore, which quickens all things, and is the creator of every body, and of every created spirit, is God Himself, the uncreated spirit. In His supreme will resides the power which acts on the wills of all created spirits, helping the good, judging the evil, controlling all, granting power to some, not granting it to others. For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked wills are not from Him, being contrary to nature, which is from Him. As to bodies, they are more subject to wills: some to our wills, by which I mean the wills of all living mortal creatures, but more to the wills of men than of beasts. But all of them are most of all subject to the will of God, to whom all wills also are subject, since they have no power except what He has bestowed upon them. The cause of things, therefore, which makes but is not made, is God; but all other causes both make and are made. Such are all created spirits, and especially the rational. Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what the wills of spirits do by them. How, then, does an order of causes which is certain to the foreknowledge of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place in the order of causes? Cicero, then, contends with those who call this order of causes fatal, or rather designate this order itself by the name of fate; to which we have an abhorrence, especially on account of the word, which men have become accustomed to understand as meaning what is not true. But, whereas he denies that the order of all causes is most certain, and perfectly clear to the prescience of God, we detest his opinion more than the Stoics do. For he either denies that God exists,--which, indeed, in an assumed personage, he has labored to do, in his book De Natura Deorum,--or if he confesses that He exists, but denies that He is prescient of future things, what is that but just "the fool saying in his heart there is no God?" For one who is not prescient of all future things is not God. Wherefore our wills also have just so much power as God willed and foreknew that they should have; and therefore whatever power they have, they have it within most certain limits; and whatever they are to do, they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew that they would have the power to do it, and would do it. Wherefore, if I should choose to apply the name of fate to anything at all, I should rather say that fate belongs to the weaker of two parties, will to the stronger, who has the other in his power, than that the freedom of our will is excluded by that order of causes, which, by an unusual application of the word peculiar to themselves, the Stoics call Fate.