Edition Masquer
De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput XIX: Quod partes irae atque libidinis, quae in homine tam uitiose mouentur, ut eas necesse sit frenis sapientiae cohiberi, in illa ante peccatum naturae sanitate non fuerint.

Hinc est quod et illi philosophi, qui ueritati propius accesserunt, iram atque libidinem uitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, eo quod turbide atque inordinate mouerentur ad ea etiam, quae sapientia perpetrari uetat, ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente atque ratione. quam partem animi tertiam uelut in arce quadam ad istas regendas perhibent conlocatam, ut illa imperante, istis seruientibus possit in homine iustitia ex omni animi parte seruari. hae igitur partes, quas et in homine sapiente ac temperante fatentur esse uitiosas, ut eas ab his rebus, ad quas iniuste mouentur, mens conpescendo et cohibendo refrenet ac reuocet atque ad ea permittat, quae sapientiae lege concessa sunt - sicut iram ad exercendam iustam cohercitionem, sicut libidinem ad propagandae prolis officium - hae, inquam, partes in paradiso ante peccatum uitiosae non erant. non enim contra rectam uoluntatem ad aliquid mouebantur, unde necesse esset eas rationis tamquam frenis regentibus abstinere. nam quod nunc ita mouentur et ab eis, qui temperanter et iuste et pie uiuunt, alias facilius, alias difficilius, tamen cohibendo et repugnando modificantur, non est utique sanitas ex natura, sed languor ex culpa. quod autem irae opera aliarumque adfectionum in quibusque dictis atque factis non sic abscondit uerecundia, ut opera libidinis, quae fiunt genitalibus membris, quid causae est, nisi quia in ceteris membra corporis non ipsae adfectiones, sed, cum eis consenserit, uoluntas mouet, quae in usu eorum omnino dominatur? nam quisquis uerbum emittit iratus uel etiam quemquam percutit, non posset hoc facere, nisi lingua et manus iubente quodammodo uoluntate mouerentur; quae membra, etiam cum ira nulla est, mouentur eadem uoluntate. at uero genitales corporis partes ita libido suo iuri quodammodo mancipauit, ut moueri non ualeant, si ipsa defuerit et nisi ipsa uel ultro uel excitata surrexerit. hoc est quod pudet, hoc est quod intuentium oculos erubescendo deuitat; magisque fert homo spectantium multitudinem, quando iniuste irascitur homini, quam uel unius aspectum et quando iuste miscetur uxori.

Traduction Masquer
The City of God

Chapter 19.--That It is Now Necessary, as It Was Not Before Man Sinned, to Bridle Anger and Lust by the Restraining Influence of Wisdom.

Hence it is that even the philosophers who have approximated to the truth have avowed that anger and lust are vicious mental emotions, because, even when exercised towards objects which wisdom does not prohibit, they are moved in an ungoverned and inordinate manner, and consequently need the regulation of mind and reason. And they assert that this third part of the mind is posted as it were in a kind of citadel, to give rule to these other parts, so that, while it rules and they serve, man's righteousness is preserved without a breach. ¹ These parts, then, which they acknowledge to be vicious even in a wise and temperate man, so that the mind, by its composing and restraining influence, must bridle and recall them from those objects towards which they are unlawfully moved, and give them access to those which the law of wisdom sanctions,--that anger, e.g., may be allowed for the enforcement of a just authority, and lust for the duty of propagating offspring,--these parts, I say, were not vicious in Paradise before sin, for they were never moved in opposition to a holy will towards any object from which it was necessary that they should be withheld by the restraining bridle of reason. For though now they are moved in this way, and are regulated by a bridling and restraining power, which those who live temperately, justly, and godly exercise, sometimes with ease, and sometimes with greater difficulty, this is not the sound health of nature, but the weakness which results from sin. And how is it that shame does not hide the acts and words dictated by anger or other emotions, as it covers the motions of lust, unless because the members of the body which we employ for accomplishing them are moved, not by the emotions themselves, but by the authority of the consenting will? For he who in his anger rails at or even strikes some one, could not do so were not his tongue and hand moved by the authority of the will, as also they are moved when there is no anger. But the organs of generation are so subjected to the rule of lust, that they have no motion but what it communicates. It is this we are ashamed of; it is this which blushingly hides from the eyes of onlookers. And rather will a man endure a crowd of witnesses when he is unjustly venting his anger on some one, than the eye of one man when he innocently copulates with his wife.