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De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput XIII: De pace uniuersali, quae inter quaslibet perturbationes priuari non potest lege naturae, dum sub iusto iudice ad id quisque peruenit ordinatione, quod meruit uoluntate.

Pax itaque corporis est ordinata temperatura partium, pax animae inrationalis ordinata requies adpetitionum, pax animae rationalis ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio, pax corporis et animae ordinata uita et salus animantis, pax hominis mortalis et dei ordinata in fide sub aeterna lege oboedientia, pax hominum ordinata concordia, pax domus ordinata imperandi oboediendique concordia cohabitantium, pax ciuitatis ordinata imperandi atque oboediendi concordia ciuium, pax caelestis ciuitatis ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi deo et inuicem in deo, pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis. ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. proinde miseri, quia, in quantum miseri sunt, utique in pace non sunt, tranquillitate quidem ordinis carent, ubi perturbatio nulla est; uerumtamen quia merito iusteque sunt miseri, in ea quoque ipsa miseria sua praeter ordinem esse non possunt; non quidem coniuncti beatis, sed ab eis tamen ordinis lege seiuncti. qui cum sine perturbatione sunt, rebus, in quibus sunt, quantacumque congruentia coaptantur; ac per hoc inest eis ordinis nonnulla tranquillitas, inest ergo nonnulla pax. uerum ideo miseri sunt, quia, etsi in aliqua securitate non dolent, non tamen ibi sunt, ubi securi esse ac dolere non debeant; miseriores autem, si pax eis cum ipsa lege non est, qua naturalis ordo administratur. cum autem dolent, ex qua parte dolent, pacis perturbatio facta est; in illa uero adhuc pax est, in qua nec dolor urit nec conpago ipsa dissoluitur. sicut ergo est quaedam uita sine dolore, dolor autem sine aliqua uita esse non potest: sic est quaedam pax sine ullo bello, bellum uero esse sine aliqua pace non potest; non secundum id, quod bellum est, sed secundum id, quod ab eis uel in eis geritur, quae aliquae naturae sunt; quod nullo modo essent, si non qualicumque pace subsisterent. quapropter est natura, in qua nullum malum est uel etiam in qua nullum esse malum potest; esse autem natura, in qua nullum bonum sit, non potest. proinde nec ipsius diaboli natura, in quantum natura est, malum est; sed peruersitas eam malam facit. itaque in ueritate non stetit, sed ueritatis iudicium non euasit; in ordinis tranquillitate non mansit, nec ideo tamen a potestate ordinatoris effugit. bonum dei, quod illi est in natura, non eum subtrahit iustitiae dei, qua ordinatur in poena; nec ibi deus bonum insequitur quod creauit, sed malum quod ille commisit. neque enim totum aufert quod naturae dedit, sed aliquid adimit, aliquid relinquit ut sit qui doleat quod ademit. et ipse dolor testimonium est boni adempti et boni relicti. nisi enim bonum relictum esset, bonum amissum dolere non posset. nam qui peccat, peior est, si laetatur in damno aequitatis; qui uero cruciatur, si nihil inde adquirat boni, dolet damnum salutis. et quoniam aequitas ac salus utrumque bonum est bonique amissione dolendum est potius quam laetandum - si tamen non sit conpensatio melioris; melior est autem animi aequitas quam corporis sanitas - , profecto conuenientius iniustus dolet in supplicio, quam laetatus est in delicto. sicut ergo laetitia deserti boni in peccato testis est uoluntatis malae, ita dolor amissi boni in supplicio testis est naturae bonae. qui enim dolet amissam naturae suae pacem, ex aliquibus reliquiis pacis id dolet, quibus fit, ut sibi amica natura sit. hoc autem in extremo supplicio recte fit, ut iniqui et inpii naturalium bonorum damna in cruciatibus defleant, sentientes eorum ablatorem iustissimum deum, quem contempserunt benignissimum largitorem. deus ergo naturarum omnium sapientissimus conditor et iustissimus ordinator, qui terrenorum ornamentorum maximum instituit mortale genus humanum, dedit hominibus quaedam bona huic uitae congrua, id est pacem temporalem pro modulo mortalis uitae in ipsa salute et incolumitate ac societate sui generis, et quaeque huic paci uel tuendae uel recuperandae necessaria sunt - sicut ea, quae apte et conuenienter adiacent sensibus, lux uox, aurae spirabiles aquae potabiles, et quidquid ad alendum tegendum curandum ornandumque corpus congruit - , eo pacto aequissimo, ut, qui mortalis talibus bonis paci mortalium adcommodatis recte usus fuerit, accipiat ampliora atque meliora, ipsam scilicet inmortalitatis pacem eique conuenientem gloriam et honorem in uita aeterna ad fruendum deo et proximo in deo; qui autem perperam, nec illa accipiat et haec amittat.

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The City of God

Chapter 13.--Of the Universal Peace Which the Law of Nature Preserves Through All Disturbances, and by Which Every One Reaches His Desert in a Way Regulated by the Just Judge.

The peace of the body then consists in the duly proportioned arrangement of its parts. The peace of the irrational soul is the harmonious repose of the appetites, and that of the rational soul the harmony of knowledge and action. The peace of body and soul is the well-ordered and harmonious life and health of the living creature. Peace between man and God is the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord. Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those of the family who rule and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and of one another in God. The peace of all things is the tranquillity of order. Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place. And hence, though the miserable, in so far as they are such, do certainly not enjoy peace, but are severed from that tranquillity of order in which there is no disturbance, nevertheless, inasmuch as they are deservedly and justly miserable, they are by their very misery connected with order. They are not, indeed, conjoined with the blessed, but they are disjoined from them by the law of order. And though they are disquieted, their circumstances are notwithstanding adjusted to them, and consequently they have some tranquillity of order, and therefore some peace. But they are wretched because, although not wholly miserable, they are not in that place where any mixture of misery is impossible. They would, however, be more wretched if they had not that peace which arises from being in harmony with the natural order of things. When they suffer, their peace is in so far disturbed; but their peace continues in so far as they do not suffer, and in so far as their nature continues to exist. As, then, there may be life without pain, while there cannot be pain without some kind of life, so there may be peace without war, but there cannot be war without some kind of peace, because war supposes the existence of some natures to wage it, and these natures cannot exist without peace of one kind or other.

And therefore there is a nature in which evil does not or even cannot exist; but there cannot be a nature in which there is no good. Hence not even the nature of the devil himself is evil, in so far as it is nature, but it was made evil by being perverted. Thus he did not abide in the truth, ¹ but could not escape the judgment of the Truth; he did not abide in the tranquillity of order, but did not therefore escape the power of the Ordainer. The good imparted by God to his nature did not screen him from the justice of God by which order was preserved in his punishment; neither did God punish the good which He had created, but the evil which the devil had committed. God did not take back all He had imparted to his nature, but something He took and something He left, that there might remain enough to be sensible of the loss of what was taken. And this very sensibility to pain is evidence of the good which has been taken away and the good which has been left. For, were nothing good left, there could be no pain on account of the good which had been lost. For he who sins is still worse if he rejoices in his loss of righteousness. But he who is in pain, if he derives no benefit from it, mourns at least the loss of health. And as righteousness and health are both good things, and as the loss of any good thing is matter of grief, not of joy,--if, at least, there is no compensation, as spiritual righteousness may compensate for the loss of bodily health,--certainly it is more suitable for a wicked man to grieve in punishment than to rejoice in his fault. As, then, the joy of a sinner who has abandoned what is good is evidence of a bad will, so his grief for the good he has lost when he is punished is evidence of a good nature. For he who laments the peace his nature has lost is stirred to do so by some relics of peace which make his nature friendly to itself. And it is very just that in the final punishment the wicked and godless should in anguish bewail the loss of the natural advantages they enjoyed, and should perceive that they were most justly taken from them by that God whose benign liberality they had despised. God, then, the most wise Creator and most just Ordainer of all natures, who placed the human race upon earth as its greatest ornament, imparted to men some good things adapted to this life, to wit, temporal peace, such as we can enjoy in this life from health and safety and human fellowship, and all things needful for the preservation and recovery of this peace, such as the objects which are accommodated to our outward senses, light, night, the air, and waters suitable for us, and everything the body requires to sustain, shelter, heal, or beautify it: and all under this most equitable condition, that every man who made a good use of these advantages suited to the peace of this mortal condition, should receive ampler and better blessings, namely, the peace of immortality, accompanied by glory and honor in an endless life made fit for the enjoyment of God and of one another in God; but that he who used the present blessings badly should both lose them and should not receive the others.