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Confessiones
Caput 27
Insiste, anime meus, et adtende fortiter: deus adiutor noster; ipse fecit nos, et non nos. adtende, ubi albescet veritas. ecce puta vox corporis incipit sonare et sonat et ecce desinit, iamque silentium est, et vox illa praeterita est et non est iam vox. futura erat, antequam sonaret, et non poterat metiri, quia nondum erat, et nunc non potest, quia tunc erat, quae metiri posset. sed et tunc non stabat; ibat enim et praeteriebat. an ideo magis poterat? praeteriens enim tendebatur in aliquod spatium temporis, quo metiri posset, quoniam praesens nullum habet spatium. si ergo tunc poterat, ecce puta altera coepit sonare et adhuc sonat continuato tenore sine ulla distinctione: metiamur eam, dum sonat; cum enim sonare cessaverit, iam praeterita erit et non erit, quae possit metiri. metiamur plane et dicamus, quanta sit. sed adhuc sonat, nec metiri potest nisi ab initio sui, quo sonare coepit, usque ad finem, quo desinit. ipsum quippe intervallum metimur ab aliquo initio usque ad aliquem finem. quapropter vox, quae numquam finita est, metiri non potest, ut dicatur, quam longa vel brevis sit, nec dici aut aequalis alicui, aut ad aliquam simpla vel dupla, vel quid aliud. cum autem finita fuerit, iam non erit. quo pacto igitur metiri poterit? et metimur tamen tempora, nec ea, quae nondum sunt, nec ea, quae iam non sunt, nec ea, quae nulla mora extenduntur, nec ea, quae terminos non habent. nec futura ergo nec praeterita nec praesentia nec praetereuntia tempora metimur, et metimur tamen tempora. Deus creator omnium: versus iste octo syllabarum brevibus et longis alternat syllabis: quattuor itaque breves, prima, tertia, quinta, septima, simplae sunt ad quattuor longas, secundam, quartam, sextam, octavam. hae singulae ad illas singulas duplum habent temporis; pronuntio et renuntio, et ita est, quantum sentitur sensu manifesto. quantum sensus manifestus est, brevi syllaba longam metior eamque sentio habere bis tantum. sed cum altera post alteram sonat, si prior brevis, longa posterior, quomodo tenebo brevem, et quomodo eam longae metiens applicabo, ut inveniam, quod bis tantum habeat, quandoquidem longa sonare non incipit, nisi brevis sonare destiterit? ipsamque longam num praesentem metior, quando nisi finitam non metior? eius enim finitio praeteritio est. quid ergo est, quod metior? ubi est qua metior brevis? ubi est longa, quam metior? ambae sonuerunt, avolaverunt, praeterierunt, iam non sunt: et ego metior, fidenterque respondeo, quantum exercitato sensu fiditur, illam simplam esse, illam duplam, in spatio scilicet temporis. neque hoc possum, nisi quia praeterierunt et finitae sunt. non ergo ipsas, quae iam non sunt, sed aliquid in memoria mea metior, quod infixum manet. In te, anime meus, tempora mea metior. noli mihi obstrepere; quod est, noli tibi obstrepere turbis affectionum tuarum. in te, inquam, tempora metior. affectionem, quam res praetereuntes in te faciunt, et cum illae praeterierint, manet, ipsam metior praesentem, non ea quae praeterierunt, ut fieret; ipsam metior, cum tempora metior. ergo aut ipsa sunt tempora, aut non tempora metior. quid cum metimur silentia, et dicimus illud silentium tantum tenuisse temporis, quantum illa vox tenuit, nonne cogitationem tendimus ad mensuram vocis, quasi sonaret, ut aliquid de intervallis silentiorum in spatio temporis renuntiare possimus? nam et voce atque ore cessante, peragimus cogitando carmina et versus, et quemque sermonem motionumque dimensiones quaslibet, et de spatiis temporum, quantum illud ad illud sit, renuntiamus non aliter, ac si ea sonando diceremus. si voluerit aliquis edere longiusculam vocem, et constituerit praemeditando, quam longa futura sit, egit utique iste spatium temporis in silentio, memoriaeque commendans coepit edere illam vocem, quae sonat, donec ad propositum terminum perducatur: immo sonuit et sonabit; nam quod eius iam peractum est, utique sonuit, quod autem restat, sonabit, atque ita peragitur, dum praesens intentio futurum in praeteritum traicit, deminutione futuri crescente praeterito, donec consumptione futuri sit totum praeteritum.
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The Confessions of St. Augustin In Thirteen Books
Chapter XXVII.--Times are Measured in Proportion as They Pass by.
34. Persevere, O my mind, and give earnest heed. od is our helper; He made us, and not we ourselves. 1 Give heed, where truth dawns. Lo, suppose the voice of a body begins to sound, and does sound, and sounds on, and lo! it ceases,--it is now silence, and that voice is past and is no longer a voice. It was future before it sounded, and could not be measured, because as yet it was not; and now it cannot, because it no longer is. Then, therefore, while it was sounding, it might, because there was then that which might be measured. But even then it did not stand still, for it was going and passing away. Could it, then, on that account be measured the more? For, while passing, it was being extended into some space of time, in which it might be measured, since the present hath no space. If, therefore, then it might be measured, lo! suppose another voice hath begun to sound, and still soundeth, in a continued tenor without any interruption, we can measure it while it is sounding; for when it shall have ceased to sound, it will be already past, and there will not be that which can be measured. Let us measure it truly, and let us say how much it is. But as yet it sounds, nor can it be measured, save from that instant in which it began to sound, even to the end in which it left off. For the interval itself we measure from some beginning unto some end. On which account, a voice which is not yet ended cannot be measured, so that it may be said how long or how short it may be; nor can it be said to be equal to another, or single or double in respect of it, or the like. But when it is ended, it no longer is. In what manner, therefore, may it be measured? And yet we measure times; still not those which as yet are not, nor those which no longer are, nor those which are protracted by some delay, nor those which have no limits. We, therefore, measure neither future times, nor past, nor present, nor those passing by; and yet we do measure times.
35. Deus Creator omnium; this verse of eight syllables alternates between short and long syllables. The four short, then, the first, third, fifth and seventh, are single in respect of the four long, the second, fourth, sixth, and eighth. Each of these hath a double time to every one of those. I pronounce them, report on them, and thus it is, as is perceived by common sense. By common sense, then, I measure a long by a short syllable, and I find that it has twice as much. But when one sounds after another, if the former be short the latter long, how shall I hold the short one, and how measuring shall I apply it to the long, so that I may find out that this has twice as much, when indeed the long does not begin to sound unless the short leaves off sounding? That very long one I measure not as present, since I measure it not save when ended. But its ending is its passing away. What, then, is it that I can measure? Where is the short syllable by which I measure? Where is the long one which I measure? Both have sounded, have flown, have passed away, and are no longer; and still I measure, and I confidently answer (so far as is trusted to a practised sense), that as to space of time this syllable is single, that double. Nor could I do this, unless because they have past, and are ended. Therefore do I not measure themselves, which now are not, but something in my memory, which remains fixed.
36. In thee, O my mind, I measure times. 2 Do not overwhelm me with thy clamour. That is, do not overwhelm thyself with the multitude of thy impressions. In thee, I say, I measure times; the impression which things as they pass by make on thee, and which, when they have passed by, remains, that I measure as time present, not those things which have passed by, that the impression should be made. This I measure when I measure times. Either, then, these are times, or I do not measure times. What when we measure silence, and say that this silence hath lasted as long as that voice lasts? Do we not extend our thought to the measure of a voice, as if it sounded, so that we may be able to declare something concerning the intervals of silence in a given space of time? For when both the voice and tongue are still, we go over in thought poems and verses, and any discourse, or dimensions of motions; and declare concerning the spaces of times, how much this may be in respect of that, not otherwise than if uttering them we should pronounce them. Should any one wish to utter a lengthened sound, and had with forethought determined how long it should be, that man hath in silence verily gone through a space of time, and, committing it to memory, he begins to utter that speech, which sounds until it be extended to the end proposed; truly it hath sounded, and will sound. For what of it is already finished hath verily sounded, but what remains will sound; and thus does it pass on, until the present intention carry over the future into the past; the past increasing by the diminution of the future, until, by the consumption of the future, all be past.
Ps. c. 3. ↩
With the argument in this and the previous sections, compare Dr. Reid's remarks in his Intellectual Powers, iii. 5: "We may measure duration by the succession of thoughts in the mind, as we measure length by inches or feet, but the notion or idea of duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the notion of length is antecedent to its being measured....Reason, from the contemplation of finite extended things, leads us necessarily to the belief of an immensity that contains them. In like manner, memory gives us the conception and belief of finite intervals of duration. From the contemplation of these, reason leads us necessarily to the belief of an eternity, which comprehends all things that have a beginning and an end." The student will with advantage examine a monograph on this subject by C. Fortlage, entitled, Aurelii Augustini doctrina de tempore ex libro xi. Confessionum depromta, Aristotelicae, Kantianae, aliarumque theoriarium recensione aucta, et congruis hodiernae philosophiae ideis amplificata (Heidelbergae, 1836). He says that amongst all the philosophers none have so nearly approached truth as Augustin. ↩