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De Exhortatione Castitatis

III.

[1] Quae enim in manifesto, scimus omnes, eaque ipsa qualiter in manifesto sint perspiciendum est. Nam etsi quaedam uidentur uoluntatem dei sapere, dum ab eo permittuntur, non statim omne quod permittitur ex mera et tota uoluntate procedit eius qui permittit. [2] Ex indulgentia est quodcumque permittitur. Quae etsi sine uoluntate non est, quia tamen aliquam habet causam in illo cui indulgetur, quasi de inuita uenit uoluntate, passa causam sui quae cogit uoluntatem. Vide qualis sit uoluntas cuius alter est causa. [3] Secunda item species consideranda est, purae uoluntatis. Vult nos deus agere quaedam placita sibi, in quibus non indulgentia patrocinatur, sed disciplina dominatur. Si tamen alia istis praeposuit, utique quae magis uult, dubiumne est ea nobis sectanda esse quae mauult, cum quae minus uult, quia alia magis uult, perinde habenda sunt atque si nolit? [4] Nam ostendens quid magis uelit, minorem uoluntatem maiore deleuit, quantoque notitiae tuae utramque proposuit, tanto definiit id te sectari debere quod declarauit se magis uelle. Ergo si ideo declarauit, ut id secteris quod magis uult, sine dubio, nisi ita facis, contra uoluntatem eius sapis, sapiendo contra potiorem eius uoluntatem, magisque offendis quam promereris, quod uult quidem faciendo et quod mauult respuendo. [5] Ex parte delinquis; ex parte, si non delinquis, non tamen promereris. Non porro et promereri nolle delinquere est? Secundum igitur matrimonium si ex illa dei uoluntate quae indulgentia uocatur, negabimus meram uoluntatem cui indulgentia est causa, si ex ea cui potior alia praeponitur continentiae magis appetendae, didicerimus non potiorem a potiore rescindi. [6] Haec praestruxerim, ut iam apostoli uoces decurram. In primis autem non uidebor inreligiosus, si quod ipse profitetur animaduertam, omnem illum indulgentiam nuptiarum de suo, id est de humano sensu, non de diuino praescripto induxisse. Nam et cum de uiduis et innuptis definiit uti nubant, si continere non possunt, quia melius sit nubere quam uri, conuersus ad alteram speciem: Nuptis autem denuntio, inquit, non quidem ego, sed dominus. Ita ostendit ex translatione personae suae in dominum id quod supra dixerat non ex domini persona, sed ex sua pronuntiasse: Melius est nubere quam uri. [7] Quae uox licet ad eos pertineat qui innupti uel uidui a fide deprehenduntur, quia tamen omnes eam ad nubendi licentiam amplectuntur, uelim retractare quale bonum ostendat quod melius est poena, quod non potest uideri bonum nisi pessimo comparatum, ut ideo bonum sit nubere, quia deterius sit ardere. [8] Bonum ita est, si perseueret nomen obtinens sine comparatione, non dico mali, sed etiam boni alterius, ut, etsi bono alii comparatur et alio adumbratur, nihilominus remaneat in boni nomine. Ceterum si per mali collationem cogitur bonum dici, non tam bonum est quam genus mali inferioris, quod a superiore malo obscuratum ad nomen boni impellitur. [9] Aufer denique condicionem comparationis, ut non dicas: Melius est nubere quam uri, et quaero an dicere audeas: Melius est nubere, non adiciens quid sit id quo melius est. Ergo quod non melius, utique nec bonum, quia abstulisti et remouisti condicionem comparationis, quae dum melius illud facit, ita bonum haberi cogit. [10] Melius est nubere quam uri sic accipiendum est, quomodo melius est uno oculo quam duobus carere: si tamen a comparatione discedas, non erit melius unum oculum habere quia nec bonum. Nemo igitur captet ex hoc capitulo defensionem, quod proprie ad innuptos et uiduos spectat, quibus nulla adhuc coniunctio numeratur. Quamquam ostenderim etiam illis intellegendam esse permissi condicionem.

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On Exhortation to Chastity

Chapter III.--Of Indulgence and Pure Volition. The Question Illustrated. ¹

For what things are manifest we all know; and in what sense these very things are manifest must be thoroughly examined. For, albeit some things seem to savour of "the will of God," seeing that they are allowed by Him, it does not forthwith follow that everything which is permitted proceeds out of the mere and absolute will of him who permits. Indulgence is the source of all permission. And albeit indulgence is not independent of volition, still, inasmuch as it has its cause in him to whom the indulgence is granted, it comes (as it were) from unwilling volition, having experienced a producing cause of itself which constrains volition. See what is the nature of a volition of which some second party is the cause. There is, again, a second species of pure volition to be considered. God wills us to do some acts pleasing to ² Himself, in which it is not indulgence which patronizes, but discipline which lords it. If, however, He has given a preference over these to some other acts--(acts), of course, which He more wills--is there a doubt that the acts which we are to pursue are those which He more wills; since those which He less wills (because He wills others more) are to be similarly regarded as if He did not will them? For, by showing what He more wills, He has effaced the lesser volition by the greater. And in as far as He has proposed each (volition) to your knowledge, in so far has He defined it to be your duty to pursue that which He has declared that He more wills. Then, if the object of His declaring has been that you may pursue that which He more wills; doubtless, unless you do so, you savour of contrariety to His volition, by savouring of contrariety to His superior volition; and you rather offend than merit reward, by doing what He wills indeed, and rejecting what He more wills. Partly, you sin; partly, if you sin not, still you deserve no reward. Moreover, is not even the unwillingness to deserve reward a sin?

If, therefore, second marriage finds the source of its allowance in that "will of God" which is called indulgence, we shall deny that that which has indulgence for its cause is volition pure; if in that to which some other--that, namely, which regards continence as more desirable--is preferred as superior, we shall have learned (by what has been argued above), that the not-superior is rescinded by the superior. Suffer me to have touched upon these considerations, in order that I may now follow the course of the apostle's words. But, in the first place, I shall not be thought irreligious if I remark on what he himself professes; (namely), that he has introduced all indulgence in regard to marriage from his own (judgment)--that is, from human sense, not from divine prescript. For, withal, when he has laid down the definitive rule with reference to "the widowed and the unwedded," that they are to "marry if they cannot contain," because "better it is to marry than to burn," ³ he turns round to the other class, and says: "But to the wedded I make official declaration--not indeed I, but the Lord." Thus he shows, by the transfer of his own personality to the Lord, that what he had said above he had pronounced not in the Lord's person, but in his own: "Better it is to marry than to burn." Now, although that expression pertain to such as are "apprehended" by the faith in an unwedded or widowed condition, still, inasmuch as all cling to it with a view to licence in the way of marrying, I should wish to give a thorough treatment to the inquiry what kind of good he is pointing out which is "better than" a penalty; which cannot seem good but by comparison with something very bad; so that the reason why "marrying" is good, is that "burning" is worse. "Good" is worthy of the name if it continue to keep that name without comparison, I say not with evil, but even with some second good; so that, even if it is compared to some other good, and is by some other cast into the shade, it do nevertheless remain in possession of the name "good." If, however, it is the nature of an evil which is the means which compels the predicating "good," it is not so much "good" as a species of inferior evil, which by being obscured by a superior evil is driven to the name of good. Take away, in short, the condition of comparison, so as not to say, "Better it is to marry than to burn;" and I question whether you will have the hardihood to say, "Better it is to marry," not adding what that is which is better. Therefore what is not better, of course is not good either; inasmuch as you have taken away and removed the condition of comparison, which, while it makes the thing "better," so compels it to be regarded as "good." "Better it is to marry than to burn" is to be understood in the same way as, "Better it is to lack one eye than two:" if, however, you withdraw from the comparison, it will not be "better" to have one eye, inasmuch as it is not "good" either. Let none therefore catch at a defence (of marriage) from this paragraph, which properly refers to "the unmarried and widows," for whom no (matrimonial) conjunction is yet reckoned: although I hope I have shown that even such must understand the nature of the permission.