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De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput V: Tam non esse cogitandum de infinitis temporum spatiis ante mundum, quam nec de infinitis locorum spatiis extra mundum, quia, sicut nulla ante ipsum sunt tempora, ita nulla extra ipsum sunt loca.

Deinde uidendum est, isti, qui deum conditorem mundi esse consentiunt et tamen quaerunt de mundi tempore quid respondeamus, quid ipsi respondeant de mundi loco. ita enim quaeritur, cur potius tunc et non antea factus sit, quemadmodum quaeri potest, cur hic potius ubi est et non alibi. nam si infinita spatia temporis ante mundum cogitant, in quibus eis non uidetur deus ab opere cessare potuisse, similiter cogitent extra mundum infinita spatia locorum, in quibus si quisquam dicat non potuisse uacare omnipotentem, nonne consequens erit, ut innumerabiles mundos cum Epicuro somniare cogantur - ea tantum differentia, quod eos ille fortuitis motibus atomorum gigni adserit et resolui, isti autem opere dei factos dicturi sunt - , si eum per interminabilem inmensitatem locorum extra mundum circumquaque patentium uacare noluerint, nec eosdem mundos, quod etiam de isto sentiunt, ulla causa posse dissolui? cum his enim agimus, qui et deum incorporeum et omnium naturarum, quae non sunt quod ipse, creatorem nobis cum sentiunt; alios autem nimis indignum est ad istam disputationem religionis admittere, maxime quod apud eos, qui multis dis sacrorum obsequium deferendum putant, isti philosophos ceteros nobilitate atque auctoritate uicerunt, non ob aliud, nisi quia longo quidem interuallo, uerumtamen reliquis propinquiores sunt ueritati. an forte substantiam dei, quam nec includunt nec determinant nec distendunt loco, sed eam, sicut de deo sentire dignum est, fatentur incorporea praesentia ubique totam, a tantis locorum extra mundum spatiis absentem esse dicturi sunt, et uno tantum atque in conparationem illius infinitatis tam exiguo loco, in quo mundus est, occupatam? non opinor eos in haec uaniloquia progressuros. cum igitur unum mundum ingenti quidem mole corporea, finitum tamen et loco suo determinatum et operante deo factum esse dicant: quod respondent de infinitis extra mundum locis, cur in eis ab opere deus cesset, hoc sibi respondeant de infinitis ante mundum temporibus, cur in eis ab opere deus cessauerit. et sicut non est consequens, ut fortuito potius quam ratione diuina deus non alio, sed isto in quo est loco mundum constituerit, cum pariter infinitis ubique patentibus nullo excellentiore merito posset hic eligi, quamuis eandem diuinam rationem, qua id factum est, nulla possit humana conprehendere: ita non est consequens, ut deo aliquid existimemus accidisse fortuitum, quod illo potius quam anteriore tempore condidit mundum, cum aequaliter anteriora tempora per infinitum retro spatium praeterissent nec fuisset aliqua differentia, unde tempus tempori eligendo praeponeretur. quodsi dicunt inanes esse hominum cogitationes, quibus infinita imaginantur loca, cum locus nullus sit praeter mundum, respondetur eis isto modo: inaniter homines cogitare praeterita tempora uacationis dei, cum tempus nullum sit ante mundum.

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The City of God

Chapter 5.--That We Ought Not to Seek to Comprehend the Infinite Ages of Time Before the World, Nor the Infinite Realms of Space.

Next, we must see what reply can be made to those who agree that God is the Creator of the world, but have difficulties about the time of its creation, and what reply, also, they can make to difficulties we might raise about the place of its creation. For, as they demand why the world was created then and no sooner, we may ask why it was created just here where it is, and not elsewhere. For if they imagine infinite spaces of time before the world, during which God could not have been idle, in like manner they may conceive outside the world infinite realms of space, in which, if any one says that the Omnipotent cannot hold His hand from working, will it not follow that they must adopt Epicurus' dream of innumerable worlds? with this difference only, that he asserts that they are formed and destroyed by the fortuitous movements of atoms, while they will hold that they are made by God's hand, if they maintain that, throughout the boundless immensity of space, stretching interminably in every direction round the world, God cannot rest, and that the worlds which they suppose Him to make cannot be destroyed. For here the question is with those who, with ourselves, believe that God is spiritual, and the Creator of all existences but Himself. As for others, it is a condescension to dispute with them on a religious ques tion, for they have acquired a reputation only among men who pay divine honors to a number of gods, and have become conspicuous among the other philosophers for no other reason than that, though they are still far from the truth, they are near it in comparison with the rest. While these, then, neither confine in any place, nor limit, nor distribute the divine substance, but, as is worthy of God, own it to be wholly though spiritually present everywhere, will they perchance say that this substance is absent from such immense spaces outside the world, and is occupied in one only, (and that a very little one compared with the infinity beyond), the one, namely, in which is the world? I think they will not proceed to this absurdity. Since they maintain that there is but one world, of vast material bulk, indeed, yet finite, and in its own determinate position, and that this was made by the working of God, let them give the same account of God's resting in the infinite times before the world as they give of His resting in the infinite spaces outside of it. And as it does not follow that God set the world in the very spot it occupies and no other by accident rather than by divine reason, although no human reason can comprehend why it was so set, and though there was no merit in the spot chosen to give it the precedence of infinite others, so neither does it follow that we should suppose that God was guided by chance when He created the world in that and no earlier time, although previous times had been running by during an infinite past, and though there was no difference by which one time could be chosen in preference to another. But if they say that the thoughts of men are idle when they conceive infinite places, since there is no place beside the world, we reply that, by the same showing, it is vain to conceive of the past times of God's rest, since there is no time before the world.