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De civitate Dei (CCSL)

Caput X: De simplici et incommutabili trinitate dei patris et dei filii et dei spiritus sancti, unius dei, cui non est aliud qualitas aliudque substantia.

Est itaque bonum solum simplex et ob hoc solum incommutabile, quod est deus. ab hoc bono creata sunt omnia bona, sed non simplicia et ob hoc mutabilia. creata sane, inquam, id est facta, non genita. quod enim de simplici bono genitum est, pariter simplex est et hoc est quod illud de quo genitum est; quae duo patrem et filium dicimus; et utrumque hoc cum spiritu suo unus deus est; qui spiritus patris et filii spiritus sanctus propria quadam notione huius nominis in sacris litteris nuncupatur. alius est autem quam pater et filius, quia nec pater est nec filius; sed alius. dixi, non .aliud, quia et hoc pariter simplex pariterque incommutabile bonum est et coaeternum. et haec trinitas unus est deus; nec ideo non simplex, quia trinitas. neque enim propter hoc naturam istam boni simplicem dicimus, quia pater in ea solus aut solus filius aut solus spiritus sanctus, aut uero sola est ista nominis trinitas sine subsistentia personarum, sicut Sabelliani haeretici putauerunt; sed ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet hoc est, excepto quod relatiue quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur. nam utique pater habet filium, nec tamen ipse est filius et filius habet patrem, nec tamen ipse est pater. in quo ergo ad se met ipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet; sicut ad se ipsum dicitur uiuus habendo utique uitam, et eadem uita ipse est. propter hoc utique natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod uel possit amittere; uel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet; sicut uas aliquem liquorem aut corpus colorem aut aer lucem siue feruorem aut anima sapientiam. nihil enim horum est id quod habet; nam neque uas liquor est, nec corpus color, nec aer lux siue feruor, neque anima sapientia est. hinc est quod etiam priuari possunt rebus quas habent, et in alios habitus uel qualitates uerti atque mutari, ut et uas euacuetur umore quo plenum est, et corpus decoloretur et aer tenebrescat siue frigescat et anima desipiat. sed etsi sit corpus incorruptibile, quale sanctis in resurrectione promittitur, habet quidem ipsius incorruptionis inamissibilem qualitatem, sed manente substantia corporali non hoc est, quod ipsa incorruptio. nam illa etiam per singulas partes corporis tota est nec alibi maior, alibi minor; neque enim ulla pars est incorruptior quam altera; corpus uero ipsum maius est in toto quam in parte; et cum aliqua pars est in eo amplior, alia minor, non ea quae amplior est incorruptior quam ea quae minor. aliud est itaque corpus, quod non ubique sui totum est, alia incorruptio, quae ubique eius tota est, quia omnis pars incorruptibilis corporis etiam ceteris inaequalis aequaliter incorrupta est. neque enim uerbi gratia, quia digitus minor est quam tota manus, ideo incorruptibilior manus quam digitus. ita cum sint inaequales manus et digitus, aequalis est tamen incorruptibilitas manus et digiti. ac per hoc quamuis a corpore incorruptibili inseparabilis incorruptibilitas sit, aliud est tamen substantia, qua corpus dicitur, aliud qualitas eius, qua incorruptibile nuncupatur. et ideo etiam sic non hoc est quod habet. anima quoque ipsa, etiamsi semper sit sapiens, sicut erit cum liberabitur in aeternum, participatione tamen incommutabilis sapientiae sapiens erit, quae non est quod ipsa. neque enim si aer infusa luce numquam deseratur, ideo non aliud est ipse, aliud lux qua inluminatur. neque hoc ita dixerim, quasi aer sit anima, quod putauerunt quidam qui non potuerunt incorpoream cogitare naturam. sed habent haec ad illa etiam in magna disparilitate quandam similitudinem, ut non inconuenienter dicatur sic inluminari animam incorpoream luce incorporea simplicis sapientiae dei, sicut inluminatur aeris corpus luce corporea; et sicut aer tenebrescit ista luce desertus - nam nihil sunt aliud quae dicuntur locorum quorumcumque corporalium tenebrae quam aer carens luce - , ita tenebrescere animam sapientiae luce priuatam. secundum hoc ergo dicuntur illa simplicia, quae principaliter uereque diuina sunt, quod non aliud est in eis qualitas, aliud substantia, nec aliorum participatione uel diuina uel sapientia uel beata sunt. ceterum dictus est in scripturis sanctis spiritus sapientiae multiplex, eo quod multa in sese habeat; sed quae habet, haec et est, et ea omnia unus est. neque enim multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infiniti quidam eique finiti thensauri rerum intellegibilium, in quibus sunt omnes inuisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum etiam uisibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt. quoniam deus non aliquid nesciens fecit, quod nec de quolibet homine artifice recte dici potest; porro si sciens fecit omnia, ea utique fecit quae nouerat. ex quo occurrit animo quiddam mirum, sed tamen uerum, quod iste mundus nobis notus esse non posset, nisi esset; deo autem nisi notus esset, esse non posset.

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The City of God

Chapter 10.--Of the Simple and Unchangeable Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, One God, in Whom Substance and Quality are Identical.

There is, accordingly, a good which is alone simple, and therefore alone unchangeable, and this is God. By this Good have all others been created, but not simple, and therefore not unchangeable. "Created," I say,--that is, made, not begotten. For that which is begotten of the simple Good is simple as itself, and the same as itself. These two we call the Father and the Son; and both together with the Holy Spirit are one God; and to this Spirit the epithet Holy is in Scripture, as it were, appropriated. And He is another than the Father and the Son, for He is neither the Father nor the Son. I say "another," not "another thing," because He is equally with them the simple Good, unchangeable and co-eternal. And this Trinity is one God; and none the less simple because a Trinity. For we do not say that the nature of the good is simple, because the Father alone possesses it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Ghost alone; nor do we say, with the Sabellian heretics, that it is only nominally a Trinity, and has no real distinction of persons; but we say it is simple, because it is what it has, with the exception of the relation of the persons to one another. For, in regard to this relation, it is true that the Father has a Son, and yet is not Himself the Son; and the Son has a Father, and is not Himself the Father. But, as regards Himself, irrespective of relation to the other, each is what He has; thus, He is in Himself living, for He has life, and is Himself the Life which He has.

It is for this reason, then, that the nature of the Trinity is called simple, because it has not anything which it can lose, and because it is not one thing and its contents another, as a cup and the liquor, or a body and its color, or the air and the light or heat of it, or a mind and its wisdom. For none of these is what it has: the cup is not liquor, nor the body color, nor the air light and heat, nor the mind wisdom. And hence they can be deprived of what they have, and can be turned or changed into other qualities and states, so that the cup may be emptied of the liquid of which it is full, the body be discolored, the air darken, the mind grow silly. The incorruptible body which is promised to the saints in the resurrection cannot, indeed, lose its quality of incorruption, but the bodily substance and the quality of incorruption are not the same thing. For the quality of incorruption resides entire in each several part, not greater in one and less in another; for no part is more incorruptible than another. The body, indeed, is itself greater in whole than in part; and one part of it is larger, another smaller, yet is not the larger more incorruptible than the smaller. The body, then, which is not in each of its parts a whole body, is one thing; incorruptibility, which is throughout complete, is another thing;--for every part of the incorruptible body, however unequal to the rest otherwise, is equally incorrupt. For the hand, e.g., is not more incorrupt than the finger because it is larger than the finger; so, though finger and hand are unequal, their incorruptibility is equal. Thus, although incorruptibility is inseparable from an incorruptible body, yet the substance of the body is one thing, the quality of incorruption another. And therefore the body is not what it has. The soul itself, too, though it be always wise (as it will be eternally when it is redeemed), will be so by participating in the unchangeable wisdom, which it is not; for though the air be never robbed of the light that is shed abroad in it, it is not on that account the same thing as the light. I do not mean that the soul is air, as has been supposed by some who could not conceive a spiritual nature; ¹ but, with much dissimilarity, the two things have a kind of likeness, which makes it suitable to say that the immaterial soul is illumined with the immaterial light of the simple wisdom of God, as the material air is irradiated with material light, and that, as the air, when deprived of this light, grows dark, (for material darkness is nothing else than air wanting light, ² ) so the soul, deprived of the light of wisdom, grows dark.

According to this, then, those things which are essentially and truly divine are called simple, because in them quality and substance are identical, and because they are divine, or wise, or blessed in themselves, and without extraneous supplement. In Holy Scripture, it is true, the Spirit of wisdom is called "manifold" ³ because it contains many things in it; but what it contains it also is, and it being one is all these things. For neither are there many wisdoms, but one, in which are untold and infinite treasures of things intellectual, wherein are all invisible and unchangeable reasons of things visible and changeable which were created by it. ⁴ For God made nothing unwittingly; not even a human workman can be said to do so. But if He knew all that He made, He made only those things which He had known. Whence flows a very striking but true conclusion, that this world could not be known to us unless it existed, but could not have existed unless it had been known to God.