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De civitate Dei (CCSL)
Caput XV: De iustitia retributionis, quam primi homines pro sua inoboedientia receperunt.
Quia ergo contemptus est deus iubens, quia creauerat, qui ad suam imaginem fecerat, qui ceteris animalibus praeposuerat, qui in paradiso constituerat, qui rerum omnium copiam salutisque praestiterat, qui praeceptis nec pluribus nec grandibus nec difficilibus onerauerat, sed uno breuissimo atque leuissimo ad oboedientiae salubritatem adminiculauerat, quo eam creaturam, cui libera seruitus expediret, se esse dominum commonebat: iusta damnatio subsecuta est, talisque damnatio, ut homo, qui custodiendo mandatum futurus fuerat etiam carne spiritalis, fieret etiam mente carnalis et, qui sua superbia sibi placuerat, dei iustitia sibi donaretur; nec sic, ut in sua esset omnimodis potestate, sed a se ipse quoque dissentiens sub illo, cui peccando consensit, pro libertate, quam concupiuit, duram miseramque ageret seruitutem, mortuus spiritu uolens et corpore moriturus inuitus, desertor aeternae uitae etiam aeterna, nisi gratia liberaret, morte damnatus. quisquis huiusmodi damnationem uel nimiam uel iniustam putat, metiri profecto nescit, quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccandi facilitas. sicut enim Abrahae non inmerito magna oboedientia praedicatur, quia, ut occideret filium, res difficillima est imperata: ita in paradiso tanto maior inoboedientia fuit, quanto id, quod praeceptum est, nullius difficultatis fuit. et sicut oboedientia secundi hominis eo praedicabilior, quo factus est oboediens usque ad mortem: ita inoboedientia primi hominis eo detestabilior, quo factus est inoboediens usque ad mortem. ubi enim magna est inoboedientiae poena proposita et res a creatore facilis imperata, quisnam satis explicet, quantum malum sit non oboedire in re facili et tantae potestatis imperio et tanto terrente supplicio? denique, ut breuiter dicatur, in illius peccati poena quid inoboedientiae nisi inoboedientia retributa est? nam quae hominis est alia miseria nisi aduersus eum ipsum inoboedientia eius ipsius, ut, quoniam noluit quod potuit, quod non potest uelit? in paradiso enim etiamsi non omnia poterat ante peccatum, quidquid tamen non poterat, non uolebat, et ideo poterat omnia quae uolebat; nunc uero sicut in eius stirpe cognoscimus et diuina scriptura testatur: homo uanitati similis factus est. quis enim enumerat, quam multa quae non potest uelit, dum sibi ipse, id est uoluntati eius ipse animus eius eoque inferior caro eius, non obtemperat? ipso namque inuito et animus plerumque turbatur et caro dolet et ueterescit et moritur, et quidquid aliud patimur, quod non pateremur inuiti, si uoluntati nostrae nostra natura omni modo atque ex omnibus partibus oboediret. at enim aliquid caro patitur, quo seruire non sinitur. quid interest unde, dum tamen per iustitiam dominantis dei, cui subditi seruire noluimus, caro nostra nobis, quae subdita fuerat, non seruiendo molesta sit, quamuis nos deo non seruiendo molesti nobis potuerimus esse, non illi? neque enim sic ille nostro, ut nos seruitio corporis indigemus, et ideo nostra est quod recipimus, non illius poena quod fecimus. dolores porro, qui dicuntur carnis, animae sunt in carne et ex carne. quid enim caro per se ipsam sine anima uel dolet uel concupiscit? sed quod concupiscere caro dicitur uel dolere, aut ipse homo est, sicut disseruimus, aut aliquid animae, quod carnis adficit passio, uel aspera, ut faciat dolorem, uel lenis, ut uoluptatem. sed dolor carnis tantummodo offensio est animae ex carne et quaedam ab eius passione dissensio, sicut animi dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt. sed tristitiam plerumque praecedit metus, qui et ipse in anima est, non in carne. dolorem autem carnis non praecedit ullus quasi metus carnis, qui ante dolorem in carne sentiatur. uoluptatem uero praecedit adpetitus quidam, qui sentitur in carne quasi cupiditas eius, sicut fames et sitis et ea, quae in genitalibus usitatius libido nominatur, cum hoc sit generale uocabulum omnis cupiditatis. nam et ipsam iram nihil aliud esse quam ulciscendi libidinem ueteres definierunt; quamuis nonnumquam homo, ubi uindictae nullus est sensus, etiam rebus inanimis irascatur, et male scribentem stilum conlidat uel calamum frangat iratus. uerum et ista licet inrationabilior, tamen quaedam ulciscendi libido est, ut nescio qua, ut ita dixerim, quasi umbra retributionis, ut qui male faciunt, mala patiantur. est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae auaritia; est libido quomodocumque uincendi, quae peruicacia; est libido gloriandi, quae iactantia nuncupatur. sunt multae uariaeque libidines, quarum nonnullae habent etiam uocabula propria, quaedam uero non habent. quis enim facile dixerit, quid uocetur libido dominandi, quam tamen plurimum ualere in tyrannorum animis etiam ciuilia bella testantur?
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The City of God
Chapter 15.--Of the Justice of the Punishment with Which Our First Parents Were Visited for Their Disobedience.
Therefore, because the sin was a despising of the authority of God,--who had created man; who had made him in His own image; who had set him above the other animals; who had placed him in Paradise; who had enriched him with abundance of every kind and of safety; who had laid upon him neither many, nor great, nor difficult commandments, but, in order to make a wholesome obedience easy to him, had given him a single very brief and very light precept by which He reminded that creature whose service was to be free that He was Lord,--it was just that condemnation followed, and condemnation such that man, who by keeping the commandments should have been spiritual even in his flesh, became fleshly even in his spirit; and as in his pride he had sought to be his own satisfaction, God in His justice abandoned him to himself, not to live in the absolute independence he affected, but instead of the liberty he desired, to live dissatisfied with himself in a hard and miserable bondage to him to whom by sinning he had yielded himself, doomed in spite of himself to die in body as he had willingly become dead in spirit, condemned even to eternal death (had not the grace of God delivered him) because he had forsaken eternal life. Whoever thinks such punishment either excessive or unjust shows his inability to measure the great iniquity of sinning where sin might so easily have been avoided. For as Abraham's obedience is with justice pronounced to be great, because the thing commanded, to kill his son, was very difficult, so in Paradise the disobedience was the greater, because the difficulty of that which was commanded was imperceptible. And as the obedience of the second Man was the more laudable because He became obedient even "unto death," 1 so the disobedience of the first man was the more detestable because he became disobedient even unto death. For where the penalty annexed to disobedience is great, and the thing commanded by the Creator is easy, who can sufficiently estimate how great a wickedness it is, in a matter so easy, not to obey the authority of so great a power, even when that power deters with so terrible a penalty?
In short, to say all in a word, what but disobedience was the punishment of disobedience in that sin? For what else is man's misery but his own disobedience to himself, so that in consequence of his not being willing to do what he could do, he now wills to do what he cannot? For though he could not do all things in Paradise before he sinned, yet he wished to do only what he could do, and therefore he could do all things he wished. But now, as we recognize in his offspring, and as divine Scripture testifies, "Man is like to vanity." 2 For who can count how many things he wishes which he cannot do, so long as he is disobedient to himself, that is, so long as his mind and his flesh do not obey his will? For in spite of himself his mind is both frequently disturbed, and his flesh suffers, and grows old, and dies; and in spite of ourselves we suffer whatever else we suffer, and which we would not suffer if our nature absolutely and in all its parts obeyed our will. But is it not the infirmities of the flesh which hamper it in its service? Yet what does it matter how its service is hampered, so long as the fact remains, that by the just retribution of the sovereign God whom we refused to be subject to and serve, our flesh, which was subjected to us, now torments us by insubordination, although our disobedience brought trouble on ourselves, not upon God? For He is not in need of our service as we of our body's; and therefore what we did was no punishment to Him, but what we receive is so to us. And the pains which are called bodily are pains of the soul in and from the body. For what pain or desire can the flesh feel by itself and without the soul? But when the flesh is said to desire or to suffer, it is meant, as we have explained, that the man does so, or some part of the soul which is affected by the sensation of the flesh, whether a harsh sensation causing pain, or gentle, causing pleasure. But pain in the flesh is only a discomfort of the soul arising from the flesh, and a kind of shrinking from its suffering, as the pain of the soul which is called sadness is a shrinking from those things which have happened to us in spite of ourselves. But sadness is frequently preceded by fear, which is itself in the soul, not in the flesh; while bodily pain is not preceded by any kind of fear of the flesh, which can be felt in the flesh before the pain. But pleasure is preceded by a certain appetite which is felt in the flesh like a craving, as hunger and thirst and that generative appetite which is most commonly identified with the name" lust," though this is the generic word for all desires. For anger itself was defined by the ancients as nothing else than the lust of revenge; 3 although sometimes a man is angry even at inanimate objects which cannot feel his vengeance, as when one breaks a pen, or crushes a quill that writes badly. Yet even this, though less reasonable, is in its way a lust of revenge, and is, so to speak, a mysterious kind of shadow of [the great law of] retribution, that they who do evil should suffer evil. There is therefore a lust for revenge, which is called anger; there is a lust of money, which goes by the name of avarice; there is a lust of conquering, no matter by what means, which is called opinionativeness; there is a lust of applause, which is named boasting. There are many and various lusts, of which some have names of their own, while others have not. For who could readily give a name to the lust of ruling, which yet has a powerful influence in the soul of tyrants, as civil wars bear witness?