29.
But, observe, say they, God was always a Maker, nor is the power of framing adventitious to Him; does it follow then, that, because He is the Framer of all, therefore His works also are eternal, and is it wicked to say of them too, that they were not before origination? Senseless are these Arians; for what likeness is there between Son and work, that they should parallel a father’s with a maker’s function? How is it that, with that difference between offspring and work, which has been shewn, they remain so ill-instructed? Let it be repeated then, that a work is external to the nature, but a son is the proper offspring of the essence; it follows that a work need not have been always, for the workman frames it when he will; but an offspring is not subject to will, but is proper to the essence 1. And a man may be and may be called Maker, though the works are not as yet; but father he cannot be called, nor can he be, unless a son exist. And if they curiously inquire why God, though always with the power to make, does not always make (though this also be the presumption of madmen, for ‘who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been His Counsellor?’ or how ‘shall the thing formed say to’ the potter, ‘why didst thou make me thus 2?’ however, not to leave even a weak argument unnoticed), they must be told, that although God always had the power to make, yet the things originated had not the power of being eternal 3. For they are out of nothing, and therefore were not before their origination; but things which were not before their origination, how could these coexist with the ever-existing God? Wherefore God, looking to what was good for them, then made them all when He saw that, when originated, they were able to abide. And as, though He was able, even from the beginning in the time of Adam, or Noah, or Moses, to send His own Word, yet He sent Him not until the consummation of the ages (for this He saw to be good for the whole creation), so also things originated did He make when He would, and as was good for them. But the Son, not being P. 324 a work, but proper to the Father’s offspring, always is; for, whereas the Father always is, so what is proper to His essence must always be; and this is His Word and His Wisdom. And that creatures should not be in existence, does not disparage the Maker; for He hath the power of framing them, when He wills; but for the offspring not to be ever with the Father, is a disparagement of the perfection of His essence. Wherefore His works were framed, when He would, through His Word; but the Son is ever the proper offspring of the Father’s essence.
Vid.Orat.iii. §59, &c. ↩
Rom. xi. 34 ; ib. ix. 20. ↩
Athan.’s argument is as follows: that, as it is of the essence of a son to be ‘connatural’ with the father, so is it of the essence of a creature to be of ‘nothing,’ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ; therefore, while it wasnotimpossible ‘from the nature of the case,’ for Almighty God to be always Father, itwasimpossible for the same reason that He should be always a Creator. vid. infr. §58: where he takes, ‘They shall perish,’ in the Psalm, not as a fact but as the definition of thenatureof a creature. Also ii. §1, where he says, ‘It is proper to creatures and works to have said of them, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων and οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γεννηθῇ .’ vid. Cyril.Thesaur.9. p. 67.Dial.ii. p. 460. on the question of being a Creator inposse,vid. supra,Ep. Eus. 11 note 3. ↩
