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Werke Tertullian (160-220) De anima

Übersetzung ausblenden
A Treatise on the Soul

Chapter X.--The Simple Nature of the Soul is Asserted with Plato. The Identity of Spirit and Soul.

It is essential to a firm faith to declare with Plato 1 that the soul is simple; in other words uniform and uncompounded; simply that is to say in respect of its substance. Never mind men's artificial views and theories, and away with the fabrications of heresy! 2 Some maintain that there is within the soul a natural substance--the spirit--which is different from it: 3 as if to have life--the function of the soul--were one thing; and to emit breath--the alleged 4 function of the spirit--were another thing. Now it is not in all animals that these two functions are found; for there are many which only live but do not breathe in that they do not possess the organs of respiration--lungs and windpipes. 5 But of what use is it, in an examination of the soul of man, to borrow proofs from a gnat or an ant, when the great Creator in His divine arrangements has allotted to every animal organs of vitality suited to its own disposition and nature, so that we ought not to catch at any conjectures from comparisons of this sort? Man, indeed, although organically furnished with lungs and windpipes, will not on that account be proved to breathe by one process, and to live by another; 6 nor can the ant, although defective in these organs, be on that account said to be without respiration, as if it lived and that was all. For by whom has so clear an insight into the works of God been really attained, as to entitle him to assume that these organic resources are wanting to any living thing? There is that Herophilus, the well-known surgeon, or (as I may almost call him) butcher, who cut up no end of persons, 7 in order to investigate the secrets of nature, who ruthlessly handled 8 human creatures to discover (their form and make): I have my doubts whether he succeeded in clearly exploring all the internal parts of their structure, since death itself changes and disturbs the natural functions of life, especially when the death is not a natural one, but such as must cause irregularity and error amidst the very processes of dissection. Philosophers have affirmed it to be a certain fact, that gnats, and ants, and moths have no pulmonary or arterial organs. Well, then, tell me, you curious and elaborate investigator of these mysteries, have they eyes for seeing withal? But yet they proceed to whatever point they wish, and they both shun and aim at various objects by processes of sight: point out their eyes to me, show me their pupils. Moths also gnaw and eat: demonstrate to me their mandibles, reveal their jaw-teeth. Then, again, gnats hum and buzz, nor even in the dark are they unable to find their way to our ears: 9 point out to me, then, not only the noisy tube, but the stinging lance of that mouth of theirs. Take any living thing whatever, be it the tiniest you can find, it must needs be fed and sustained by some food or other: show me, then, their organs for taking into their system, digesting, and ejecting food. What must we say, therefore? If it is by such instruments that life is maintained, these instrumental means must of course exist in all things which are to live, even though they are not apparent to the eye or to the apprehension by reason of their minuteness. You can more readily believe this, if you remember that God manifests His creative greatness quite as much in small objects as in the very largest. If, however, you suppose that God's wisdom has no capacity for forming such infinitesimal corpuscles, you can still recognise His greatness, in that He has furnished even to the smallest animals the functions of life, although in the absence of the suitable organs,--securing to them the power of sight, even without eyes; of eating, even without teeth; and of digestion, even without stomachs. Some animals also have the ability to move forward without feet, as serpents, by a gliding motion; or as worms, by vertical efforts; or as snails and slugs, by their slimy crawl. Why should you not then believe that respiration likewise may be effected without the bellows of the lungs, and without arterial canals? You would thus supply yourself with a strong proof that the spirit or breath is an adjunct of the human soul, for the very reason that some creatures lack breath, and that they lack it because they are not furnished with organs of respiration. You think it possible for a thing to live without breath; then why not suppose that a thing might breathe without lungs? Pray, tell me, what is it to breathe? I suppose it means to emit breath from yourself. What is it not to live? I suppose it means not to emit breath from yourself. This is the answer which I should have to make, if "to breathe" is not the same thing as "to live." It must, however, be characteristic of a dead man not to respire: to respire, therefore, is the characteristic of a living man. But to respire is likewise the characteristic of a breathing man: therefore also to breathe is the characteristic of a living man. Now, if both one and the other could possibly have been accomplished without the soul, to breathe might not be a function of the soul, but merely to live. But indeed to live is to breathe, and to breathe is to live. Therefore this entire process, both of breathing and living, belongs to that to which living belongs--that is, to the soul. Well, then, since you separate the spirit (or breath) and the soul, separate their operations also. Let both of them accomplish some act apart from one another--the soul apart, the spirit apart. Let the soul live without the spirit; let the spirit breathe without the soul. Let one of them quit men's bodies, let the other remain; let death and life meet and agree. If indeed the soul and the spirit are two, they may be divided; and thus, by the separation of the one which departs from the one which remains, there would accrue the union and meeting together of life and of death. But such a union never will accrue: therefore they are not two, and they cannot be divided; but divided they might have been, if they had been (two). Still two things may surely coalesce in growth. But the two in question never will coalesce, since to live is one thing, and to breathe is another. Substances are distinguished by their operations. How much firmer ground have you for believing that the soul and the spirit are but one, since you assign to them no difference; so that the soul is itself the spirit, respiration being the function of that of which life also is! But what if you insist on supposing that the day is one thing, and the light, which is incidental to the day, is another thing, whereas day is only the light itself? There must, of course, be also different kinds of light, as (appears) from the ministry of fires. So likewise will there be different sorts of spirits, according as they emanate from God or from the devil. Whenever, indeed, the question is about soul and spirit, the soul will be (understood to be) itself the spirit, just as the day is the light itself. For a thing is itself identical with that by means of which itself exists.


  1. See his Phaedo, p. 80; Timaeus, § 12, p. 35 (Bekker, pp. 264, 265). ↩

  2. We have here combined two readings, effigies (Oehler's) and haereses (the usual one). ↩

  3. Aliam. ↩

  4. This is the force of the subjunctive fiat. ↩

  5. Arterias. ↩

  6. Aliunde spirabit, aliunde vivet. "In the nature of man, life and breath are inseparable," Bp. Kaye, p. 184. ↩

  7. Sexcentos. ↩

  8. Odit. ↩

  9. Aurium caeci. ↩

Übersetzung ausblenden
De l'âme

X.

Il appartient à l'essence de la foi de déclarer avec Platon que l'âme est simple, c'est-à-dire uniforme, en tant que substance. Qu'importent les arts et les disciplines? Qu'importent les hérésies? Quelques-uns en effet veulent qu'il y ait en elle une autre substance naturelle, l'esprit, comme si autre chose était vivre, qui vient de lame, et autre chose respirer, qui a lieu par le souffle. Tous les animaux ne possèdent pas l'un et l'autre. La plupart vivent seulement, mais ne respirent pas, parce qu'ils n'ont pas les organes de la respiration, les poumons et les artères. Mais, dans l'examen de l'âme humaine, quelle misère que d'emprunter ses arguments au moucheron et à la fourmi, puisque la sagesse de Dieu a donné à chaque animal des propriétés vitales, en rapport avec son espèce, de sorte que l'on ne peut tirer de là aucune conjecture! En effet, parce que l'homme est organisé avec des poumons et des artères, ce ne sera pas une raison pour qu'il respire d'une manière et qu'il vive de l'autre. De même, si la fourmi est dépourvue de cet appareil, ce ne sera pas une raison pour qu'on lui refuse la respiration, comme ne faisant que vivre. Qui donc a pénétré assez profondément dans les œuvres de Dieu pour décider que ces organes manquent à quelque animal? Cet Hérophile, médecin ou anatomiste, qui disséqua des milliers de corps pour interroger la nature, qui déteste l'homme pour le connaître, en a-t-il exploré toutes les merveilles intérieures? Je n'oserais le dire, parce que la mort change ce qui avait vécu, surtout quand elle n'est pas uniforme et s'égare jusque parmi les procédés de la dissection. Les philosophes ont déclaré comme certain que les moucherons, les fourmis et les teignes n'avaient ni poumons, ni artères. Curieux investigateur, réponds-moi? Ont-ils des yeux pour voir? Et cependant ils se dirigent où ils veulent, ils évitent et ils désirent les choses qu'ils connaissent par la vue. Montre-moi leurs yeux; indique-moi leurs prunelles! Les teignes mangent. Fais-moi voir leurs mâchoires et leurs dents! Les |18 moucherons bruissent, lumineux pour nos oreilles jusque pendant les ténèbres. Montre-moi cependant et la trompette et l'aiguillon de cette bouche! Un animal, quel qu'il soit, fût-il réduit à un point, se nourrit nécessairement de quelque chose. Produis-moi ses organes destinés à transmettre, à digérer, et à expulser les aliments! Que dirons-nous donc? Si c'est par ces appareils que l'on vit, tous ces appareils se rencontreront dans tous les êtres qui vivent, quoiqu'ils ne puissent être ni vus, ni touchés, à cause de leur exiguité. Tu ne seras que plus disposé à le croire, si tu te rappelles que la sagesse et la puissance de Dieu éclatent dans les plus petites choses aussi bien que dans les plus grandes. Si, au contraire, tu ne penses pas que l'habileté de Dieu soit capable de produire des corps si faibles, reconnais au moins sa magnificence, puisque sans le secours des appareils nécessaires à la vie, il a néanmoins organisé la vie dans des animaux si exigus, leur accordant la faculté de voir sans yeux, la faculté de manger sans dents, la faculté de digérer sans estomac; de même que d'autres marchent sans pieds, les serpents avec une impétuosité qui glisse, les vers avec un effort qui se dresse, les limaçons en rampant avec une bave écumeuse. Pourquoi donc ne croirais-tu pas que l'on pût respirer sans le soufflet des poumons et le canal des artères, regardant comme un irrésistible argument, que la respiration est ajoutée à l'âme humaine, parce qu'il y a des êtres qui ne respirent pas, et qu'ils ne respirent pas, parce qu'ils sont dépourvus des organes de la respiration? Quoi! tu penses qu'un être peut vivre sans respirer, et tu ne crois pas qu'il puisse respirer sans poumons? Qu'est-ce, à ton avis, que respirer? C'est, j'imagine, émettre un souffle hors de soi. Qu'est-ce que ne pas vivre? Ne pas émettre, j'imagine, un souffle hors de soi. Voilà ce que je devrai répondre, si respirer n'est pas la même chose que vivre. Mais le propre d'un mort sera de ne pas émettre de souffle; donc le propre d'un être vivant est d'émettre un souffle. Mais d'autre part le propre de ce |19 qui respire est d'émettre un souffle, donc aussi respirer est le propre de ce qui vit. Si l'un et l'autre n'avaient pu s'accomplir sans l'âme, l'âme n'eût pas respiré; elle se fût bornée à vivre. Mais vivre, c'est respirer, et respirer, c'est vivre. Ainsi, cette double faculté, respirer et vivre, appartient tout entière à qui appartient la vie, c'est-à-dire à l'âme.

Enfin si tu sépares l'esprit et l'âme, sépare aussi les œuvres: que tous les deux agissent de leur côté, l'âme à part, l'esprit à part; que l'âme vive sans l'esprit; que l'esprit respire sans l'âme; que l'un abandonne le corps, que l'autre demeure; que la mort et la vie se donnent la main, Car enfin, s'il y a deux êtres, une âme et un esprit, ils peuvent se diviser, afin que par leur séparation, l'un se retirant, l'autre restant, s'opère la réunion de la mort et de la vie. Mais jamais il n'en arrivera ainsi. Donc ces choses qui ne peuvent se diviser ne sont pas, puisqu'elles pourraient se diviser, si elles étaient deux. Toutefois il est permis à deux substances d'être inséparablement unies. Mais elles cesseront d'être unies, si respirer n'est pas la même chose que vivre. Ce sont les œuvres qui distinguent les substances: et combien il est plus raisonnable de croire que l'âme et l'esprit ne sont qu'un, puisque tu ne leur assignes aucune diversité, de sorte que l'âme est la même chose que l'esprit, la respiration appartenant au même être qui a le droit de vivre. Quoi donc? C'est vouloir que le jour soit différent de la lumière qui produit le jour. Il y a différentes espèces de lumières, dis-tu, comme le témoigne le ministère du feu. D'accord; il y a aussi différentes espèces d'esprits, ceux qui viennent de Dieu, ceux qui viennent du démon. Ainsi, quand il s'agit de l'âme et de l'esprit, l'âme sera l'esprit, de même que le jour est la lumière. Une chose est identique avec la chose par qui elle existe.

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A Treatise on the Soul
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Inhaltsangabe
  • A Treatise on the Soul.
    • Chapter I.--It is Not to the Philosophers that We Resort for Information About the Soul But to God.
    • Chapter II.--The Christian Has Sure and Simple Knowledge Concerning the Subject Before Us.
    • Chapter III.--The Soul's Origin Defined Out of the Simple Words of Scripture.
    • Chapter IV.--In Opposition to Plato, the Soul Was Created and Originated at Birth.
    • Chapter V.--Probable View of the Stoics, that the Soul Has a Corporeal Nature.
    • Chapter VI.--The Arguments of the Platonists for the Soul's Incorporeality, Opposed, Perhaps Frivolously.
    • Chapter VII.--The Soul's Corporeality Demonstrated Out of the Gospels.
    • Chapter VIII.--Other Platonist Arguments Considered.
    • Chapter IX.--Particulars of the Alleged Communication to a Montanist Sister.
    • Chapter X.--The Simple Nature of the Soul is Asserted with Plato. The Identity of Spirit and Soul.
    • Chapter XI.--Spirit--A Term Expressive of an Operation of the Soul, Not of Its Nature. To Be Carefully Distinguished from the Spirit of God.
    • Chapter XII.--Difference Between the Mind and the Soul, and the Relation Between Them.
    • Chapter XIII.--The Soul's Supremacy.
    • Chapter XIV.--The Soul Variously Divided by the Philosophers; This Division is Not a Material Dissection.
    • Chapter XV.--The Soul's Vitality and Intelligence. Its Character and Seat in Man.
    • Chapter XVI.--The Soul's Parts. Elements of the Rational Soul.
    • Chapter XVII.--The Fidelity of the Senses, Impugned by Plato, Vindicated by Christ Himself.
    • Chapter XVIII.--Plato Suggested Certain Errors to the Gnostics. Functions of the Soul.
    • Chapter XIX.--The Intellect Coeval with the Soul in the Human Being. An Example from Aristotle Converted into Evidence Favourable to These Views.
    • Chapter XX.--The Soul, as to Its Nature Uniform, But Its Faculties Variously Developed. Varieties Only Accidental.
    • Chapter XXI.--As Free-Will Actuates an Individual So May His Character Change.
    • Chapter XXII.--Recapitulation. Definition of the Soul.
    • Chapter XXIII.--The Opinions of Sundry Heretics Which Originate Ultimately with Plato.
    • Chapter XXIV.--Plato's Inconsistency. He Supposes the Soul Self-Existent, Yet Capable of Forgetting What Passed in a Previous State.
    • Chapter XXV.--Tertullian Refutes, Physiologically, the Notion that the Soul is Introduced After Birth.
    • Chapter XXVI.--Scripture Alone Offers Clear Knowledge on the Questions We Have Been Controverting.
    • Chapter XXVII.--Soul and Body Conceived, Formed and Perfected in Element Simultaneously.
    • Chapter XXVIII.--The Pythagorean Doctrine of Transmigration Sketched and Censured.
    • Chapter XXIX.--The Pythagorean Doctrine Refuted by Its Own First Principle, that Living Men are Formed from the Dead.
    • Chapter XXX.--Further Refutation of the Pythagorean Theory. The State of Contemporary Civilisation.
    • Chapter XXXI.--Further Exposure of Transmigration, Its Inextricable Embarrassment.
    • Chapter XXXII.--Empedocles Increased the Absurdity of Pythagoras by Developing the Posthumous Change of Men into Various Animals.
    • Chapter XXXIII.--The Judicial Retribution of These Migrations Refuted with Raillery.
    • Chapter XXXIV.--These Vagaries Stimulated Some Profane Corruptions of Christianity. The Profanity of Simon Magus Condemned.
    • Chapter XXXV.--The Opinions of Carpocrates, Another Offset from the Pythagorean Dogmas, Stated and Confuted.
    • Chapter XXXVI.--The Main Points of Our Author's Subject. On the Sexes of the Human Race.
    • Chapter XXXVII.--On the Formation and State of the Embryo. Its Relation with the Subject of This Treatise.
    • Chapter XXXVIII.--On the Growth of the Soul. Its Maturity Coincident with the Maturity of the Flesh in Man.
    • Chapter XXXIX.--The Evil Spirit Has Marred the Purity of the Soul from the Very Birth.
    • Chapter XL.--The Body of Man Only Ancillary to the Soul in the Commission of Evil.
    • Chapter XLI.--Notwithstanding the Depravity of Man's Soul by Original Sin, There is Yet Left a Basis Whereon Divine Grace Can Work for Its Recovery by Spiritual Regeneration.
    • Chapter XLII.--Sleep, the Mirror of Death, as Introductory to the Consideration of Death.
    • Chapter XLIII.--Sleep a Natural Function as Shown by Other Considerations, and by the Testimony of Scripture.
    • Chapter XLIV.--The Story of Hermotimus, and the Sleeplessness of the Emperor Nero. No Separation of the Soul from the Body Until Death.
    • Chapter XLV.--Dreams, an Incidental Effect of the Soul's Activity. Ecstasy.
    • Chapter XLVI.--Diversity of Dreams and Visions. Epicurus Thought Lightly of Them, Though Generally Most Highly Valued. Instances of Dreams.
    • Chapter XLVII.--Dreams Variously Classified. Some are God-Sent, as the Dreams of Nebuchadnezzar; Others Simply Products of Nature.
    • Chapter XLVIII.--Causes and Circumstances of Dreams. What Best Contributes to Efficient Dreaming.
    • Chapter XLIX.--No Soul Naturally Exempt from Dreams.
    • Chapter L.--The Absurd Opinion of Epicurus and the Profane Conceits of the Heretic Menander on Death, Even Enoch and Elijah Reserved for Death.
    • Chapter LI.--Death Entirely Separates the Soul from the Body.
    • Chapter LII.--All Kinds of Death a Violence to Nature, Arising from Sin.--Sin an Intrusion Upon Nature as God Created It.
    • Chapter LIII.--The Entire Soul Being Indivisible Remains to the Last Act of Vitality; Never Partially or Fractionally Withdrawn from the Body.
    • Chapter LIV.--Whither Does the Soul Retire When It Quits the Body? Opinions of Philosophers All More or Less Absurd. The Hades of Plato.
    • Chapter LV.--The Christian Idea of the Position of Hades; The Blessedness of Paradise Immediately After Death. The Privilege of the Martyrs.
    • Chapter LVI.--Refutation of the Homeric View of the Soul's Detention from Hades Owing to the Body's Being Unburied. That Souls Prematurely Separated from the Body Had to Wait for Admission into Hades Also Refuted.
    • Chapter LVII.--Magic and Sorcery Only Apparent in Their Effects. God Alone Can Raise the Dead.
    • Chapter LVIII.--Conclusion. Points Postponed. All Souls are Kept in Hades Until the Resurrection, Anticipating Their Ultimate Misery or Bliss.

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