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Werke Tertullian (160-220) De anima

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A Treatise on the Soul

Chapter XXVII.--Soul and Body Conceived, Formed and Perfected in Element Simultaneously.

How, then, is a living being conceived? Is the substance of both body and soul formed together at one and the same time? Or does one of them precede the other in natural formation? We indeed maintain that both are conceived, and formed, and perfectly simultaneously, as well as born together; and that not a moment's interval occurs in their conception, so that, a prior place can be assigned to either. 1 Judge, in fact, of the incidents of man's earliest existence by those which occur to him at the very last. As death is defined to be nothing else than the separation of body and soul, 2 life, which is the opposite of death, is susceptible of no other definition than the conjunction of body and soul. If the severance happens at one and the same time to both substances by means of death, so the law of their combination ought to assure us that it occurs simultaneously to the two substances by means of life. Now we allow that life begins with conception, because we contend that the soul also begins from conception; life taking its commencement at the same moment and place that the soul does. Thus, then, the processes which act together to produce separation by death, also combine in a simultaneous action to produce life. If we assign priority to (the formation of) one of the natures, and a subsequent time to the other, we shall have further to determine the precise times of the semination, according to the condition and rank of each. And that being so, what time shall we give to the seed of the body, and what to the seed of the soul? Besides, if different periods are to be assigned to the seminations then arising out of this difference in time, we shall also have different substances. 3 For although we shall allow that there are two kinds of seed--that of the body and that of the soul--we still declare that they are inseparable, and therefore contemporaneous and simultaneous in origin. Now let no one take offence or feel ashamed at an interpretation of the processes of nature which is rendered necessary (by the defence of the truth). Nature should be to us an object of reverence, not of blushes. It is lust, not natural usage, which has brought shame on the intercourse of the sexes. It is the excess, not the normal state, which is immodest and unchaste: the normal condition has received a blessing from God, and is blest by Him: "Be fruitful, and multiply, (and replenish the earth.)" 4 Excess, however, has He cursed, in adulteries, and wantonness, and chambering. 5 Well, now, in this usual function of the sexes which brings together the male and the female in their common intercourse, we know that both the soul and the flesh discharge a duty together: the soul supplies desire, the flesh contributes the gratification of it; the soul furnishes the instigation, the flesh affords the realization. The entire man being excited by the one effort of both natures, his seminal substance is discharged, deriving its fluidity from the body, and its warmth from the soul. Now if the soul in Greek is a word which is synonymous with cold, 6 how does it come to pass that the body grows cold after the soul has quitted it? Indeed (if I run the risk of offending modesty even, in my desire to prove the truth), I cannot help asking, whether we do not, in that very heat of extreme gratification when the generative fluid is ejected, feel that somewhat of our soul has gone from us? And do we not experience a faintness and prostration along with a dimness of sight? This, then, must be the soul-producing seed, which arises at once from the out-drip of the soul, just as that fluid is the body-producing seed which proceeds from the drainage of the flesh. Most true are the examples of the first creation. Adam's flesh was formed of clay. Now what is clay but an excellent moisture, whence should spring the generating fluid? From the breath of God first came the soul. But what else is the breath of God than the vapour of the spirit, whence should spring that which we breathe out through the generative fluid? Forasmuch, therefore, as these two different and separate substances, the clay and the breath, combined at the first creation in forming the individual man, they then both amalgamated and mixed their proper seminal rudiments in one, and ever afterwards communicated to the human race the normal mode of its propagation, so that even now the two substances, although diverse from each other, flow forth simultaneously in a united channel; and finding their way together into their appointed seed-plot, they fertilize with their combined vigour the human fruit out of their respective natures. And inherent in this human product is his own seed, according to the process which has been ordained for every creature endowed with the functions of generation. Accordingly from the one (primeval) man comes the entire outflow and redundance of men's souls--nature proving herself true to the commandment of God, "Be fruitful, and multiply." 7 For in the very preamble of this one production, "Let us make man," 8 man's whole posterity was declared and described in a plural phrase, "Let them have dominion over the fish of the sea," etc. 9 And no wonder: in the seed lies the promise and earnest of the crop.


  1. Comp. De Resurr. Carnis, xlv. ↩

  2. So Plato, Phaedo, p. 64. ↩

  3. Materiae. ↩

  4. Gen. i. 28. ↩

  5. Lupanaria. ↩

  6. See above, c. xxv. p. 206. ↩

  7. Gen. i. 28. ↩

  8. Ver. 26. ↩

  9. Ver. 26. ↩

Übersetzung ausblenden
De l'âme

XXVII.

Comment donc l'animal est-il conçu? La substance de l'âme et du corps est-elle formée simultanément, ou bien l'une précède-t-elle l'autre? Nous soutenons que toutes les deux sont conçues, formées, perfectionnées et |55 aussi manifestées en même temps, sans qu'il survienne dans la conception un seul intervalle qui puisse assurer à l'une des deux l'antériorité. Juge, en effet, de l'origine de l'homme par sa fin. Si la mort n'est pas autre chose que la séparation de l'âme et du corps, la vie, qui est l'opposé de la mort, ne sera pas autre chose que l'union du corps avec l'âme. Si la séparation des deux substances arrive simultanément par la mort, elle doit nous enseigner que l'union a lieu également par la vie dans l'une et l'autre substance. Nous faisons commencer la vie à la conception, parce que nous soutenons que l'âme commence à la conception. La vie en effet a le même principe que l'âme: les substances qui sont séparées par la mort sont donc également confondues dans une même vie.

Ensuite, si nous assignons à l'une la priorité, à l'autre la postériorité, il faudra distinguer aussi les temps de la semence, selon la nature de leurs degrés; et alors quand sera placée la semence du corps? quand viendra celle de l'âme? Il y a plus. Si les temps de la semence demandent à être distingués, les substances deviendront aussi différentes par la différence des temps. Car, quoique nous confessions qu'il y a deux espèces de semence, l'une pour le corps, l'autre pour l'âme, nous les déclarons inséparables néanmoins, et de cette manière contemporaines et simultanées. Ne rougissons pas d'une interprétation nécessaire. Les vénérables fonctions de la nature n'ont rien dont il faille rougir. C'est la volupté, mais non l'usage, qui a souillé l'union charnelle; l'impudicité est dans l'excès; elle n'est pas dans la nature de l'acte. Dieu ne l'a-t-il pas béni en ces termes: « Croissez et multipliez? » Au contraire, il a maudit ce qui en est l'abus, l'adultère, la fornication, le lupanar. Ainsi, dans cette solennelle fonction des deux sexes qui unit l'homme avec la femme, je veux dire dans ce commerce des sens, nous savons que l'âme et la chair ont chacune leur rôle; l'âme le désir, la chair les œuvres; l'âme les instincts, la chair les actes. Par l'effort simultané |56 de l'une et de l'autre, et dans le mouvement de l'homme tout entier, la semence qui doit créer l'homme tout entier bouillonne, empruntant à la substance corporelle sa fluidité, à la substance plus subtile sa chaleur. Si l'âme chez les Grecs est synonyme de froid, pourquoi le corps se refroidit-il lorsqu'elle s'en sépare? Enfin, quand même je devrais blesser la pudeur plutôt que de renoncer à convaincre, dans ce dernier effort de la volupté qui produit la semence génitale, ne sentons-nous pas s'échapper quelque chose de notre âme, tant nous éprouvons de marasme et de prostration, joint à un affaiblissement de la vue. Telle sera la semence qui produit l'âme dans une sorte de distillation de l'âme, de même que la semence génitale produira le corps par le bouillonnement de la chair. Les exemples de la créai ion ne sont pas trompeurs. La chair d'Adam fut formée du limon: qu'est-ce que le limon, sinon un liquide plus généreux? De là viendra le venin génital. Son âme fut créée par le souffle de Dieu: qu'est-ce que le souffle de Dieu, sinon la vapeur de l'esprit? De là viendra ce que nous transmettons à la manière d'un souffle par le venin génital. Ces deux substances, le limon et le souffle, distincts et séparés à leur origine, après avoir formé un seul et même homme, se confondirent depuis, mêlèrent leurs semences, et communiquèrent à la propagation de l'espèce humaine sa forme, de sorte que ces deux substances, quoique différentes, s'échappant simultanément et introduites à la fois dans le sillon et le champ destiné à les recevoir, contribuent également à la germination d'un homme dans lequel sera déposée aussi la semence appropriée à son espèce, comme il a été réglé d'avance pour tout être appelé à se reproduire. Ainsi toute cette multitude d'ames dérive d'un seul homme, la nature se montrant fidèle à ce décret de Dieu: « Croissez et multipliez; » car dans ce préambule qui précède la création d'un seul: « Faisons l'homme, » l'emploi du pluriel annonçait toute la postérité: « Et qu'ils commandent aux poissons de la mer: » faut-il s'en |57 étonner? La promesse de la moisson est renfermée dans sa semence.

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A Treatise on the Soul
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Inhaltsangabe
  • A Treatise on the Soul.
    • Chapter I.--It is Not to the Philosophers that We Resort for Information About the Soul But to God.
    • Chapter II.--The Christian Has Sure and Simple Knowledge Concerning the Subject Before Us.
    • Chapter III.--The Soul's Origin Defined Out of the Simple Words of Scripture.
    • Chapter IV.--In Opposition to Plato, the Soul Was Created and Originated at Birth.
    • Chapter V.--Probable View of the Stoics, that the Soul Has a Corporeal Nature.
    • Chapter VI.--The Arguments of the Platonists for the Soul's Incorporeality, Opposed, Perhaps Frivolously.
    • Chapter VII.--The Soul's Corporeality Demonstrated Out of the Gospels.
    • Chapter VIII.--Other Platonist Arguments Considered.
    • Chapter IX.--Particulars of the Alleged Communication to a Montanist Sister.
    • Chapter X.--The Simple Nature of the Soul is Asserted with Plato. The Identity of Spirit and Soul.
    • Chapter XI.--Spirit--A Term Expressive of an Operation of the Soul, Not of Its Nature. To Be Carefully Distinguished from the Spirit of God.
    • Chapter XII.--Difference Between the Mind and the Soul, and the Relation Between Them.
    • Chapter XIII.--The Soul's Supremacy.
    • Chapter XIV.--The Soul Variously Divided by the Philosophers; This Division is Not a Material Dissection.
    • Chapter XV.--The Soul's Vitality and Intelligence. Its Character and Seat in Man.
    • Chapter XVI.--The Soul's Parts. Elements of the Rational Soul.
    • Chapter XVII.--The Fidelity of the Senses, Impugned by Plato, Vindicated by Christ Himself.
    • Chapter XVIII.--Plato Suggested Certain Errors to the Gnostics. Functions of the Soul.
    • Chapter XIX.--The Intellect Coeval with the Soul in the Human Being. An Example from Aristotle Converted into Evidence Favourable to These Views.
    • Chapter XX.--The Soul, as to Its Nature Uniform, But Its Faculties Variously Developed. Varieties Only Accidental.
    • Chapter XXI.--As Free-Will Actuates an Individual So May His Character Change.
    • Chapter XXII.--Recapitulation. Definition of the Soul.
    • Chapter XXIII.--The Opinions of Sundry Heretics Which Originate Ultimately with Plato.
    • Chapter XXIV.--Plato's Inconsistency. He Supposes the Soul Self-Existent, Yet Capable of Forgetting What Passed in a Previous State.
    • Chapter XXV.--Tertullian Refutes, Physiologically, the Notion that the Soul is Introduced After Birth.
    • Chapter XXVI.--Scripture Alone Offers Clear Knowledge on the Questions We Have Been Controverting.
    • Chapter XXVII.--Soul and Body Conceived, Formed and Perfected in Element Simultaneously.
    • Chapter XXVIII.--The Pythagorean Doctrine of Transmigration Sketched and Censured.
    • Chapter XXIX.--The Pythagorean Doctrine Refuted by Its Own First Principle, that Living Men are Formed from the Dead.
    • Chapter XXX.--Further Refutation of the Pythagorean Theory. The State of Contemporary Civilisation.
    • Chapter XXXI.--Further Exposure of Transmigration, Its Inextricable Embarrassment.
    • Chapter XXXII.--Empedocles Increased the Absurdity of Pythagoras by Developing the Posthumous Change of Men into Various Animals.
    • Chapter XXXIII.--The Judicial Retribution of These Migrations Refuted with Raillery.
    • Chapter XXXIV.--These Vagaries Stimulated Some Profane Corruptions of Christianity. The Profanity of Simon Magus Condemned.
    • Chapter XXXV.--The Opinions of Carpocrates, Another Offset from the Pythagorean Dogmas, Stated and Confuted.
    • Chapter XXXVI.--The Main Points of Our Author's Subject. On the Sexes of the Human Race.
    • Chapter XXXVII.--On the Formation and State of the Embryo. Its Relation with the Subject of This Treatise.
    • Chapter XXXVIII.--On the Growth of the Soul. Its Maturity Coincident with the Maturity of the Flesh in Man.
    • Chapter XXXIX.--The Evil Spirit Has Marred the Purity of the Soul from the Very Birth.
    • Chapter XL.--The Body of Man Only Ancillary to the Soul in the Commission of Evil.
    • Chapter XLI.--Notwithstanding the Depravity of Man's Soul by Original Sin, There is Yet Left a Basis Whereon Divine Grace Can Work for Its Recovery by Spiritual Regeneration.
    • Chapter XLII.--Sleep, the Mirror of Death, as Introductory to the Consideration of Death.
    • Chapter XLIII.--Sleep a Natural Function as Shown by Other Considerations, and by the Testimony of Scripture.
    • Chapter XLIV.--The Story of Hermotimus, and the Sleeplessness of the Emperor Nero. No Separation of the Soul from the Body Until Death.
    • Chapter XLV.--Dreams, an Incidental Effect of the Soul's Activity. Ecstasy.
    • Chapter XLVI.--Diversity of Dreams and Visions. Epicurus Thought Lightly of Them, Though Generally Most Highly Valued. Instances of Dreams.
    • Chapter XLVII.--Dreams Variously Classified. Some are God-Sent, as the Dreams of Nebuchadnezzar; Others Simply Products of Nature.
    • Chapter XLVIII.--Causes and Circumstances of Dreams. What Best Contributes to Efficient Dreaming.
    • Chapter XLIX.--No Soul Naturally Exempt from Dreams.
    • Chapter L.--The Absurd Opinion of Epicurus and the Profane Conceits of the Heretic Menander on Death, Even Enoch and Elijah Reserved for Death.
    • Chapter LI.--Death Entirely Separates the Soul from the Body.
    • Chapter LII.--All Kinds of Death a Violence to Nature, Arising from Sin.--Sin an Intrusion Upon Nature as God Created It.
    • Chapter LIII.--The Entire Soul Being Indivisible Remains to the Last Act of Vitality; Never Partially or Fractionally Withdrawn from the Body.
    • Chapter LIV.--Whither Does the Soul Retire When It Quits the Body? Opinions of Philosophers All More or Less Absurd. The Hades of Plato.
    • Chapter LV.--The Christian Idea of the Position of Hades; The Blessedness of Paradise Immediately After Death. The Privilege of the Martyrs.
    • Chapter LVI.--Refutation of the Homeric View of the Soul's Detention from Hades Owing to the Body's Being Unburied. That Souls Prematurely Separated from the Body Had to Wait for Admission into Hades Also Refuted.
    • Chapter LVII.--Magic and Sorcery Only Apparent in Their Effects. God Alone Can Raise the Dead.
    • Chapter LVIII.--Conclusion. Points Postponed. All Souls are Kept in Hades Until the Resurrection, Anticipating Their Ultimate Misery or Bliss.

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